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This project is a sincere effort to illustrate alienation in ways not typical or
formally represented.  Drawing upon respected insights, initial interests have matured
into a venture intent on crafting a composite, conceptual place for alienation, to consider
holistically pathways where it manages to thrive as a stereotypic feature of human
existence.  The reason an aggregate, wholesale perspective proves necessary is because
fundamental characteristics of alienation (paradoxically) incorporate images of both
dependence as well as social disconnection.  These are quite dissimilar orientations from
which to consolidate a single idea.  One’s preferred stance or insight may appear
justifiable while, given this ambiguous base, conceptual arrangements often conflict,
favored positions become troublesome to defend, leaving many still groping for credible
explanation and clarification.  Two primary points of emphasis are necessary.  One is to
present a convincing picture of how extensive, pervasive and enduring forces that drive
conformity are.  Another is to fashion a case for the self, to sketch a portrait for its
potential growth, and, most significantly, to advance a proposal for how and why self-
development (through independent initiative) appears the most befitting asset for both
recognizing as well as challenging illusive, alienating restraints.
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6Chapter I
Alienation's Immense Foundation
Introduction
Alienation is an indisputably vogue idea within sociological as well as
mainstream circles.  It is a motif with a long history through which varied and
distinctive interpretations get projected.  Semantic representations are both broad
and loose.  For purposes of this presentation a number of widely recognized
applications will be considered, drawing upon historically impacting as well as more
contemporary understandings.  A more essential objective, nonetheless, will be to
propose a set of representative aspects of alienation, less as an inventory of
manifestations or effects, but more closely as an outline featuring characteristics of
its course.  It is an effort to explore its rudimentary makeupthat which bespeaks
of separation in its varied spectrum of forms.
While this premise is both wide-reaching and crude it, in any case, provides the
glue in supporting the thematic foundation for wedding the array of interpretations
generally accepted.  As a central idea division marks the essential axis whereby a
multitude of possible meanings claim their base.  And from this homogeneous beginning
at least one common assumption can be retained: that given this—separation as a point of
understandingthere had existed a condition of “non-alienation,” a fundamental integrity
or deep-seated inclusion preceding the actual division.  The general consensus is that
“Most usages of ‘alienation’ share the assumption that some relationship or connection
that once existed, that is ‘natural,’ desirable, or good, has been lost.” (Keniston, 1965, p.
452).  Alienation then, is not a term useful for depicting pure or ever-present absence, for
it presumes the existence of an earlier association, a linkage not incidental but that
cardinal, critical and essentially meaningful.
As a touchstone this semantic base is always available, but there emanate
strikingly diverse interpretations hinging on this common platform.  For this subject
invites a variety of depictions, some that seem not even remotely related, which together
still manage to consecrate around this single formulationalienation.  With universal
pertinence there spring numerous possibilities to guide interpretation, vast conceptual
area for approaching consistency, and shifting targets for securing definition.
Noteworthy as these limitations may be, not to be overlooked is the appreciable
slack available for crafting a perspective; with fragile certainty and great range for
application there is gained better leverage for questioning.  With considerable ambiguity
7there is also broader opportunity for a more complete conception ofwith low
concordance the rulewhy this most basic idea (severance) so thoroughly splinters off
into various interpretations.  As will be explored much has to do with the ubiquity of
alienation itself, of how it manages to characterize or otherwise impact, in illusive and
unpredictable ways, the essence of every living human being.  And if this seems inflated
or excessive consider Johnson’s (1973) Biblical analogy where he observes “...Man is
driven from Eden...Alienation is his chronic mortal state...” (p. 6).  Given such a
formidable prologue strivings for predictability cannot easily escape obstacle.  This is not
simply a declaration of low optimism, only stark recognition that the space allowable for
prospective truth is so vast it forces obscurity through an omnipresence great enough
overwhelm.
Alienation, being a vogue concept, tends to get tied with and generate strong
emotion; there seems a natural impulse to “select-out” certain features emphasizing
passion over objective clarity; this personal, affective, dimension is most instrumental
inspiring and solidifying its broad appeal.  If one happened to side with a familiar
sociological interpretation that social isolation, for example, was a distinct quality of
alienation, support for this outlook is not justified merely by objective evidence alone.
Rather, relevance is drawn almost wholly through subjective impression.  Most would
never even recognize a weak social foundation as something intrinsically alienating
unless the loneliness and despair so closely associated with it gets experienced directly.
Irrespective of any sociological standard, therefore, isolation might become
distinguishable as alienation only inasmuch as it can reveal concerns of emotional
significance.
In a move toward greater certainty, over the last century, sociological researchers
have created criteria for tangible, interpersonal estrangements to be fitted within
subjectively “customized” contexts.  Subjectivity retains relevance, but only through
generalization, sharing the spotlight with objectively static definitions.  “The effect is that
‘social isolation’ can thus be construed both in the sense of the absence of positive
interpersonal relationships, and in the sense of dissociation from norms, values and
culture of one’s society.” (Schacht, 1970, p. 157).  It seems that by not drawing a clear
distinctionby allowing for an all-inclusive semantic valuationthe significance of
8subjective impression is left to depreciate.  Concerns born via affect, contributing
abundantly to alienation’s initial interest, are given a back seat to more objective
conceptions that may or may not retain any psychological relevance, the cost being that
inner (estranging) perceptions get systematically dissociated from available constructs.
There are several additional conceptual (sociological) standards which, seen in
collective, are intended as a composite representation for alienation.  Descriptors
receiving greatest attentionanomie, meaninglessness, normlessness and
powerlessnesshowever, impart an ambiguity equal in magnitude, where pessimism, for
example, might get equated with meaninglessness as presumptuously as loneliness does
with isolation.  Weak discrimination invites an inevitable leap-of-faith whereby it
becomes admissible..."to describe internal psychological states as well as objective social
phenomena…interchangeably…"(Johnson, 1973, p. 16) with identical conceptual
premises.  Having to draw upon a vocabulary not equipped to distinguish clarity of intent,
the utility these descriptors contribute for marking subjective as well as objective
relevance with consistent discretion is decidedly poor and open for scrutiny.
Expanding upon the initial example, it is certainly conceivable that one could be
physically isolated while, the whole time, never shouldering a conscious burden, nor
revealing a fleeting inclination that such circumstance be regarded negatively.  “An
individual who tries unsuccessfully to establish meaningful contact with others is in a
different situation from one who chooses to live alone, in order (for example) to achieve
some special purpose.…the fact that his isolation is of his own choosing gives his
alienation a quality that sets it apart from that of one whose isolation is not chosen.”
(Schacht, 1970, p. 157).
Another point of ambiguity to consider is that alienating circumstances can result
in a “clouding of awareness,” driving inner obscurities such as is typical of romantic
ideation.  Detachment in this sense might get highlighted by suspense or frenzy more
than pessimism, (when intentions are to portray "meaninglessness" or one of the other
terms favored for classifying personal debasement).  While frustration may certainly be a
standing feature of infatuation there is also, not to be ignored, a restless apperception and
involvement corresponding with, conceivably driving, one's bewilderment.  Uncertainty
and discouragement can take active as much as passive forms; personal impressions are
9qualities specific to, and must get gauged in accordance with one's unique discontinuity,
so that affective experiences are always subjective matters for clarification.
These general observations are not intended to suggest sociological models lack
importance, only that inner attribution (with its wide array of inference) can get
capriciously compartmentalized or standardized unjustly.  In the quest for inclusive
categories, despite convenience of arrangement, characterizations are not allowed to pivot
effectively enough on personal insights.  Whatever the shortcoming of subjective
impression, illusive particularities that impede clarity of intent are not conveniently
circumvented by virtue of more semantically conveyable devices.  Alienation’s breadth,
its historically grounded base, will not permit any simple overshadowing or thematic
envelopment by sociological generalization at the expense of intrinsic relevance.
As indicated, poor semantic resolution is an outgrowth of the smooth, often
undetectable, allowances made where intentions are freely juggled between subject and
object.  This stealth interchangeability permits depictions of alienation to elude the realm
of reality, condoning composite images, those attempting to include both the actual
individual as well as the “relative individual,” pictured against an omniscient socio-
cultural backdrop.  Magnifying complexity are alienation's metaphysical inferences,
crucial considerations, the inclusion of which ensure the blurring of subject and object
remains even more plausible.
To locate the roots of this great dilemma, retaining an historical perspective, it
was Hegel’s position, in his groundbreaking work the phenomenology of spirit (1806),
that alienation be intrinsically purposeful and still retain universally significant
application.  His idyllic image required inclusion of both objective as well as subjective
relevance at its core, a designation held essential to support the construct’s breadth.  Most
fundamentally, he saw need to retain subjectivity for the sake of "...man’s capacity to
perceive ‘the other’ as discrete from himself..." (Johnson, 1973, pp. 30-1).  From this
premise the framework was set in place which allowed for subjective attributions of
objectively tangible (conceivably measurable) phenomena.  Upon these spacious
beginnings it became possible for alienation to include matters benign as the transfer of
property, to consignments of human consciousness, those pointing to concerns grave as
psychotic divisions within the self.
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With a foundation this expansive and potentially flexible, objectivity and
subjectivity gain leeway to sustain or, with poor basis, prematurely validate one another.
Personal perspectives, when this happens, get impulsively “fitted” into objectively crafted
categories, a consequence that can effectively squelch authentic subjectivity.  For one
who believes to be alienated (in whatever possible sense) there is very likely to co-exist a
parallel impulse attempting to justify such beliefs.  What often unfolds is a circumstance
where personally held insecurities seek-out tangible relevance; more specifically,
evidence which (apart from its reliability) becomes an effective “validator” prompting
unique impressions to mushroom into objective alienating truths.  Any neatly construed,
"universally appropriate" operational definition, therefore, will always in certain ways
manage to misshape meaning, to slant or curtail intrinsic pertinence considering the
countless, divergent inferences spinning off this single theme.  It is no surprise then that
Johnson borrowed Hardin’s concept “panchreston” for alienation, a fitting catch-phrase
for terms which, in attempting to explain everything, (not withstanding their popularity)
end up in the end, signifying nothing at all (pp. 3-4).
This introductory overview, critical in exposition, is not an endeavor to
undermine prevailing, seminally grounded interpretations of estrangement; nor is it an
attempt to delimit the idea as something that will forever escape tangibilityto render it
"unknowable," or not deserving of effort toward a useful explanation.  The background is
simply a sincere initiative to enlighten the reader that speaking of alienation as it is
formally recognized carries inherent limitations.  In order for intrinsic meaning to surface
specific characterizations (one’s personal version, degree and quality of separation) need
to be accounted for.  This means that points-of-view be respected for their subjective
significance, in spite of clarification shortfalls.  It calls for an appeal where personal
disposition gets, not simply allowed, but taken seriously; that uniqueness is not denied a
context nor position to sustain, so that intuition might generate cause to propose original
discriminations.
This emphasis, moreover, is in no way to be mistaken as a plea to unequivocally
personalize and, in effect, jeopardize the semantic integrity of alienation by embracing
subjectivity alone.  Alienation’s proclivity for broad application is mostly justifiable and
largely unavoidable.  But it cannot automatically follow that personal impressions are
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merely esoteric truths, matters hopelessly ambiguous, those to be left blindly
unsubstantiated.  Self-justifications need not be elaborate or sophisticated, only clearly
defensible through consistent and carefully chosen vocabulary.  And while there is no
absolute way to delimit individual aberration, it is guarded receptivity that seems the
greatest obstacle.  The suggestion is subjectivity's relevance next to objectivity may not
be the fundamental issue.  Rather, it could be the naïve, deceptive manner in which
subjective impression gets embedded proving most obscuring, the tendency to assign
permanent meaning to not yet ripe beliefs requiring more sincere scrutiny.  Often
personal (alienating) insecurities get coupled with early lags in confidence and, after
much external sway, get single-handedly "verified" as "certifiable" constitutional
deficiencies.  Here it remains unclear whether intrinsic disposition or societal expectation
impacts as the primary culprit.  However the subjugation arises, nonetheless, the
consequences are often indistinguishable—a character disposition where choice range is
stifled; featured by attitudinal barriers that limit opportunities for exercising free will.
An abbreviated range of choice means scarcity option, this has obvious
implication when considering political and economic variations on estrangement.
Needless to say, there are some convincing arguments (particularly by Marx) how
manipulation through capitalist imposition might narrow the spectrum of true choice.
The allusion is to popular ideals, their insistent lure, how they seduce or otherwise impart
influence where significant intuitions get imprudently ignored; relationships steeped in
dependence hinge upon such sacrificial conditions (Fromm, 1947, pp. 36-7, 70-1).
Having personal liberty swindled through unwitting sacrifice is no less evidence of
alienation than any overt, directive subjugationthe impetus of which, in the later case,
is to take advantage, where insecurity detected in another translates into "opportunity" to
control and create an alienating effect.  While relinquishment of sovereignty is often
attributed to personal choice, actual motives driving compromise are not always so clear.
Incentives bound to obligations toward duty, however self-denying, get routinely
rationalized as one’s investment in "love," or simply a belief that forfeiture of will is in
one’s ultimate best interest.
This observation is not applicable merely to those viewed neurotically estranged
or found incapacitated in a clinical sense.  Relinquishments noted are indicative of
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alienation in a more fundamental wayas encompassing, often imperceptible features of
everyday life.  Even when acknowledged, alienation’s under-appreciated dimension tends
to get overshadowed by more conventional depictions of separationmost evidently,
estrangements associated with race, class or ability.  These considerations, while certainly
real, function as effective (objective) scapegoats for deflecting emphasis from less
revealing, more thoroughly interwoven faucets of alienation.
While it would be presumptuous to insist a flexible base for interpretation
guarantees inconsistency, it is at least fair to say that multifarious designations unique to
alienation’s etymology coincide with varied images that parallel its slack for application.
Given the open ontological groundwork it is rather difficult not to allow for vague
attributions.  Historical breadth along with the current sociological intrigue for a many-
layered "umbrella concept" assure not only wide semantic inclusion but, just as well, the
difficulty not to include, the problem of justifying that something could actually escape
alienation’s semantic "all-encompassment."
The biggest challenge given a vast base for application is in making certain
comprehensiveness not overshadow intrinsic relevance, that inductive impression secures
value an essential ingredient to carve out meaningful demarcations.  This emphasis
appears indispensable for supporting a proposal that recognizes how any given stretch of
(alienating) propositions might be seen as patternedknitted together—into a multiform
definition with relevant concepts in dynamic transition.  This image is distinct from most
sociological representations which tend to project alienation as a set of exclusive
components based on vaguely related terms, where "…the general tendency...is to draw
on one rather than on all...sources." (Barakat, 1969, p. 2).
Difficulty arriving at a reliable base for understanding is not entirely a reflection
on the sole individual; alienation can just as likely pertain to whole communities or have
group applicability that goes beyond personal indicators and most sociological models.
A competitive capitalistic culture as ours creates a slant or "alienation personality"
through a collection of features markedly distinguishable from, yet no less alienating
than, variations on estrangement for less industrialized, more integrated cultures.  To
pose a simple yet useful illustration, given a western world standard, discrepancies
generally perceived between desire and achievement get shouldered as personal burdens,
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while such discontinuities within more "functionally interdependent societies" tend to be
addressed and endured collectively (Sennett, 1979, pp. 115-16; Singer, 1983, pp. 34-5).
Given this difference, while not earth shattering news, it is important to note that each
case example manages to signify distinct division, unique expressions of alienation (or at
least shortcomings of self-realization) peculiar to a culturally relevant estranging reality.
Naturally, defiance and challenge always find ways to upset patterns formal and
risky to scrutinize, ideals supported by long held assumptions.  If an inner sense of
independence happens to collide with one’s familiar environment layered in uniformity, a
simmering (life quality) disaffection is the likely consequence.  But shifts away from
usual patterns create a more noticeable division, where alienation is something directly
conscionable and immediately relevant, clearly discernible from an estrangement
routinely tolerated within a climate of naive obedience.  If alienation is to be addressable
as a composite concept however it is necessary to include both individualistic as well as
social barriers.  Face-value biases from either position require sincere questioning, where
judgements are arrived at only after being critically contemplated.  While subjective
paths for meaning must certainly be distinguished from more collective characterizations,
one's preferred base of bias does not contribute sufficient evidence (by itself) to
accurately consolidate estrangement in any holistic sense.
This brief outline is likely to offer a fair indication of the difficulty involved
settling on a convenient "operationally prepared" package.  There simply does not exist
any neat semantic arrangement for carrying this load.  Respecting inherent ambiguities,
there appears little reason to defend any existing models toward an integrated definition;
there seems no need to narrow downand ultimately widenthe way in which
alienation is formally conceived.  Emphasis instead will be to steer away from bounded,
objectively static interpretations.  And while to substantiate a premise, respecting how
alienation is currently understood will prove necessary, the primary effort is not to isolate
syndromes but to delineate alienation as a multifaceted, fluid, inevitability of human
existence.  Researching this topic, what gets appreciated most keenly are the enormous
complexities involved attempting to weigh fundamentals of human nature, those
controvertible hurdles of life as significant personally as they are collectively real.
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Circumstances open opportunity to propose something of an extended model for
alienation, enabling an ability less to centralize, but more categorically to construe, size
and meaningfully arrange some of its fundamental attributes.  More specifically this is an
effort to view alienation as a phenomenondisplacementunfolding with sequential
relevance, where it is possible to align faucets, temporal and developmental categories
that highlight a dynamic process.  While this project is intended to be comprehensive it is
not a valiant attempt to be all-inclusive.  It is simply an effort to locate and situate
meanings intrinsic to “separation as a projective course.”
From the point that marks one’s most rudimentary "self-awareness" to the most
complete "interpersonal dispersion" conceivable, respective meanings and features of
alienation will be contemplated.  Subsequent to this, alienation as it relates to dependence
will be more carefully weighed against a more overt picture of estrangement, that
generally associated with social distancing.  Because of the latitude of this endeavor,
before considering alienation as a fundamental process of human development can be
attempted, it will first be necessary to "pin down" this (aspectual) vision by picturing how
estrangement might appear at each of these dissimilar ends.  The essential aim here is to
better anticipate the problem of how one could even begin to conceive an interwoven
reality, or relate on the other hand with the opposing image, where familiar and relentless
influences are tellingly absent.
Ethical world interdependence
At its seminal extreme, particularly with infants, before it is even possible to
consider alienation proper, humans are critically unreflective beings.  This is generally
viewed one’s "being" prior to "person-hood," an existence oblivious to valuations
connected with personal identity.  Short of transcending this all-inclusive realm the
individual (sometimes the whole community) is fundamentally restricted, not as in
initiative, but by whatever collective attitude or composite circumstance happens to
prevail.  That which can secure focus most thoroughly is what ends up characterizing
behavior, so understanding remains situation dependent, getting wholly delimited by
matters of group or role relevance.  In a very real way introspective possibility is
hampered, again, not from insincerity of drive but in having one’s essentiality affixed,
bound up by a fundamental impenetrable giventotal and immediate togetherness.  This
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notion of a harmonious protective unity incorporates an obvious theological premise, but
it was a theme Hegel carried over and secured a distinct philosophical application.
Hegel’s ethical world is in an unmistakable way analogous to the Biblical Garden of
Eden.  Before the symbolic fruit triggering an awareness of good and evil is bitten
(perspective transcended) existence, while metaphysically whole, endures as a state
devoid of self-consciousness (Schacht, 1970, pp.19-25).
While it may be difficult for someone to imagine where a clear sense of self has
surfaced, there are many cases of those (including adults) who never arrive at that insight,
that perceptually tangible place where it becomes possible to recognize one-self as a
distinct and unique "person."  In various instances for reasons not wholly understood,
some simply never see beyond their most primary (contextual) awareness and live out
entire lives oblivious to prospects for questioning their most immediate, provided of
understandings.  With enmeshments secure roots are retained, where participation in roles
is something reflexive and usual expectations get taken fully for granted (Singer, 1983,
pp.37-43).  Assuming this restrictive consciousness persists, a person may certainly
become "aware" of pain, joy, anger and so forth, these are undoubtedly intrinsic human
characteristics.  But they are also qualities which can exist (and often thrive more
passionately) without having to appreciate a primary source, an origin of affect, the
incipient context of which they are still a part; there can be an energy emanating fully
without first having to isolate or appropriately discriminate.
This standing dependency, its resilience, is no reflection on the intelligence of
persons, or their aptitude in composite, as much as evidence of how heavily culture can
weigh-in to curb and channel inner evaluations.  Shame and humiliation for example,
(with the possible exception of exile from the ethical realm) might never be a
consideration outside the collective point-of-view.  In a parallel way it could be said,
social vs. singular burdens are blurred to such a degree that any notion of "persons as
distinct entities," even if not recognized unimportant, remain points of concern essentially
irrelevant, at least against the gravity of one’s immediate group.  This backdrop is helpful
for picturing a possibility where even if self-initiative is "in the air," so to speak, there
will always be those (via the fortitude of convention) for whom culture interferes with
one’s capacity to "behold" any inner-outer distinction, ensuring self-relevance will be
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roundly dismissed.  Given this boundary, even when drawing on a contemporary
(westernized) template, it is imaginable how ubiquitous influence might infringe with
parallel resolve—suppressing similarly if only less comprehensively—to cloud awareness
essential for pursuits in self-discovery.
Beyond ethical world reality
With a closer look at Hegel, his conviction was unequivocal that a "true self"
would be realized only "in aggregate," given a socially integrated context.  But with
comparable emphasis he found need to recognize an essential individuality (through
separation) in order to make possible this broader universal self, one purportedly more
self-enlightening than any lone pursuit could manage.  The stark implication was that
only upon realizing a distinct (and complete) individual nature would one then know the
greater implications possible for universal completeness—or more tellingly, the measure
to which it remains woefully absent.  As paradoxical as it may first appear, solely through
interpersonal departure (the perspective it enables) is the greater value of socio-cultural
connection genuinely understood.  Not until discretion gets "held to the light," showing
the full implications of first connection, separation, and then the ultimate importance
behind one’s reemerging, does the broader advantage of wholeness surface and take a
conscious shape.  If understanding one’s collective essential nature was ever to be a
credible pursuit, first recognizing, following along, and ultimately enclosing this
ontological loop was considered unavoidable (Schacht, 1970, pp. 50-2).
With this image societies’ members could be (metaphorically) characterized as
"representative organs," constituent elements comprising an essential organic whole.
This grand-cohesive vision (group as the greater person) was for Hegel an irreducible
spiritual individual, the sole, genuine representation of ourselves (p. 21).  It can easily
follow therefore that estrangement from this pure relatedness (Hegel’s true self) must
represent a kind of self-alienationcoupled with or amplified through social alienation.
(This however is a deeper indication of self-alienation than is commondepicting self as
a collective wholeso, for purposes of clarification, self in this sense will be avoided).
What Hegel's holistic view captures best is the immense cost of departure from
interconnectedness.  While bifurcation from a composite realm has many possible
17
implications, what stands out most meaningfully are the sublime revelations when
meeting a world where there are, suddenly to be accounted for, features that distinguish
self from social object.  Appearing at once are engagements to be incessantly weighed;
greater awareness pays the price of greater responsibility, that inescapable consequence
of one's newfound perception.
In gathering Hegel’s characterization, it is crucial to note that ethical world
emergence is the point where self-alienation as well as social alienation both (strangely)
sprout their embryonic roots.  The captivating effects of perceiving a self, it seems, have
diverse and far-reaching effects.  While predictability and cohesiveness may be stifling,
the alternative, potentially liberating opportunity for "finding oneself" carries the
unavoidable consequence of finding oneself separated.
Hegel, noted as the first contemporary to expand on this notion of bifurcation
outside of religion, portrayed emergence of consciousness on an individual as well as
historical, cultural-developmental level.  With respect to the latter, the image of an
emerging self-awareness from the depths of primal togetherness was looked upon as a
relatively novel phenomenon; historically speaking, he branded ethical world unity to be
rule more than exception.  But at various times for reasons peculiar to social constituency
some, at culturally relevant ages, get driven or otherwise stumble out of this
interconnectedness.  A newly found capacity to objectify social reality can be viewed as
an "awakening" of sorts, varying according to circumstance, yet still implying a
capricious development, where recognition of self is not catalyzed directly through
initiative (Singer, 1983, pp. 9-23).
While there is no sure margin to anticipate or signify one’s "challenging" primal
understandings, factors surrounding self-emergence were not viewed entirely fortuitous.
As alluded, likelihood was not to be understood outside of a culturally poised context,
there were nonetheless distinct variations noted between cultures sharing historically
parallel potentials (pp. 11-12).  Hegel’s famous disclaimer extolling "progress toward a
consciousness of freedom," while touting clear historical relevance, was never absent of
an essential personal component.  As is true of cultural variation in spite of similar epoch,
disparities might also be expected between individuals; in this case not as normal
deviation but as consequences of contextual exception, where intuitive qualities are
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exclusive enough to transcend one’s fundamental communal consciousness.  And while
collective anomalies may arise for temporal parallels, as they are expected across
historical epochs, the issue of individual variation and emergence is a more thematically
relevant (and personally interesting) consideration.  While many examples exist, Hughes
(Quoted in Fromm, 1941, pp.27-8) provided a compelling account of how a seminal self-
unfolding might actually appear:
And then an event did occur, to Emily, of considerable importance.  She suddenly realized who she was.
There is little reason that one can see why it should not have happened to her five years earlier, or even five
years later; and none, why it should have come that particular afternoon…walking rather aimlessly aft,
thinking vaguely about some bees and a fairy queen, when it suddenly flashed into her mind that she was
she.  She stopped dead, and began looking over all of her person which came within the range of her
eyes...she moved an arm or a leg...with fresh amazement to find them obeying her so readily.  Memory told
her, of course, that they had always done so before: but before she had never realized how surprising this
was.  Once settled on her perch, she began examining the skin of her hands with the utmost care: for it was
hers.
This simple scenario illustrates how after a transparent moment, recognition of
oneself as distinct and unique might occur and endure, personal existence has suddenly
become a point of contemplation.  From a Hegelian perspective the social objectification
made available by this emergence provides opportunity for a more enlightened reunion.
But the benefit of this separation is essential in a less universal or metaphysically
consequential way: it not only enables, it necessitates functioning where distinguishing
inside from outside has become inevitable.  Aside from desire there must be faced a
world where one is not directly interlaced with the other.  While this is not an
unequivocally positive development it is an indisputably liberating one.  For it permits
faculties that question, those that might evaluate impartially and craft a will to challenge
beliefs customarily taken-for-granted.  Short of this perspective why can never be a
question of relevance next to what and how.
For Hegel, this objectification of one's social reality, in spite of the individuality it
potentially begets, is only a humbling stepping stone in light of the wholeness anticipated
by way of surrender.  And while self-awareness is essential for any self-renunciation ever
to be a question, it alone is no sufficient indicator for growth in individualistic initiative.
For most, well into adulthood but particularly at early ages, this unfolding or transition
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(from social to self-determined reality) gets heavily inhibited, progress relentlessly
dissuaded by a bombardment of cultural influences, those stirring anxieties featured by
fears of disapproval and abandonment.
In the case of our own culture revelations in self-awareness tend to occur at
relatively young ages.  Along with this early emergence, illusions of freedom gain
prominence while outer assurances for truth are compulsively sought, retaining strong
significance and overshadowing inner fortitude.  But because an awakening of self is so
intoxicating youngsters exhibit an infallible exuberance to brave (often through innocent
exploration) prevailing cultural assumptions.  What commonly occurs is an ironic
inclination to both appease (to effectively incorporate norms) all the while one refuses to
relinquish a growing, self-propelled defiance.
This dichotomy lends testimony to the difficulty delimiting alienation,
underscoring the importance of its being represented as an aspectual concept.  As
suggested, the painful distancing typical of social alienation along with the gullibility and
eager dependence of self-alienation share a paradoxical connection with the point
immediately following (Hegel's) ethical world emergence.  So before alienation can be
considered in-depth, the relevance of detachment (social alienation) at its unique extreme
must first be granted comparable recognition.  As Hegel’s alter ego in Heidegger so
vehemently emphasized, non-relational understanding has value, not simply as a means
to another end, (as in unification) but as a pinnaclesignifying an "enlightenment" in-
and-of-itself.
Self-direction through separation
In distinct contrast to Hegel, for Heidegger there was to be no groping toward a
womb-like inclusion after a taste of self-directed initiative.  The quest, instead, toward
one’s "potentiality-for-being" was geared as an exclusively one-way pursuit.  Here, after
conceptions of "person-hood" are recognized and subsequently amplified from the inside,
any greater progress (in attempt to culminate one’s growth) was to be catalyzed only by
aiming toward the apex of this themeinterpersonal separation.  For Heidegger there
was no purpose in curving back, no glorious communal-like reunion was ever proposed.
Social convention and expectation, rather than potential assets were considered
20
hindrances.  Interpersonal involvement, outside its most essential requirement, was
viewed the primary source of troublesome, formidable barriers, those heavily impinging
upon one’s non-relational potential.  The indication was that a path toward truth-in-being
never alludes sacrifice, it demands a will able to avoid presumptuous judgments that
synthesize ways of society indiscriminately, ways which through condoned ignorance
ensure understanding never transcends the conventional, inauthentic and superficial.
Heidegger was adamant pointing out the great discrepancy between pureness of
"being" and its distinct oppositean essence the product of (primarily impersonal)
societal imposition.  Seen as illusive mediums to subjugate, the most common social
structures were associated with entrapment; familiarities generally overlooked as benign
were for Heidegger virulent channels thwarting self-projective potency.  Communal
obligation was viewed constraining, not through outright insensitivity but for its tendency
to distract, to divert energy toward trivialities and preoccupation’s of the present.  These
"normal concerns" become opportunity-blocking impediments.  What ordinarily might
get dismissed as usual life-disruptions were, for Heidegger, matters that create
misconstrued impressions, where even casual contacts allow potentiality-for-being to be
hidden, "protected" from an awareness which might otherwise be discovered with
decisiveness and, further, directed with intrinsic meaning (Schacht, 1970, pp. 200-4).
It is noteworthy that Heidegger’s preference for the word "being" was emphasized
deliberately as a verb; he appropriated this usage greater purpose than the more familiar
(noun relevant) interpretationbeing as a thing.  Due largely to a western world
monopoly the objective version, Heidegger considered the proposition "to be" as static,
over done, and so advanced a compelling counter-emphasis more closely intended as
"becoming."  The advantage recognized was one is not standing there "formed," as a
completed essence, but more fluidly on their way to becoming this or that (Barrett, 1962,
pp. 210-13).  For Heidegger, discovery of one's core existence was possible only through
distancing, this was his unconditional prerequisite to know true being, to become what
one is intrinsically meant to become, independently.  His stance bolstered the argument
that those who exhibit authentic agency gain a sharper perception of ambiguity in the
other, discrepancies emanating that can more clearly reveal irksome restraints impending
upon the self, compelling need for a more comprehensive, personalized picture of
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freedom.  Unificationcontrary to being equated with metaphysical harmony as in
Hegel’s symbolic true selfgot avowed a condition of "falleness," a flawed ideation
where possibilities for realizing genuine being are left to atrophy, surrendered in effect,
as bound and squandered resources.  Heidegger branded mankind as overwhelmingly
“swayed by the anonymous they,” underscoring a great human propensity to get side-
tracked, where most resign to drift through a world of commitments that center not upon
matters self-relevant, but on paralleling or appeasing the motives of others (Macquarrie,
1970, p.315; Pappenheim, 1959, pp.121-22).
Banking upon a solitary means for self-realization naturally demands an emphasis
on subjective process over-ruling reason and objective clarity currently in place; the
message for Heidegger was away from any simple approbation for incorporating what
already exists.  This familiarity would only distract, to bottle-up potential and bind one
more firmly to the caprices of the present.  Rather, only by broadening an introspective
orientation would "existence" or "being" move beyond itself (in present) in order to
approach itself in truth.  Only when one not only emerges from a unified reality, but
extends as a person realized "from the inside" could individuals represent truly distinct
points of view rather than expressions of roles; only where self-insight can be appreciated
will self-relevance get prioritized (Barrett, 1962, pp. 213-16).
If self-striving receives full priority, any notion of being treated the instrument of
another’s purpose is unlikely to be taken as a matter of course, but rather to be considered
intrusive and potentially intolerable.  For those independently insightful enough, there
presumably develops a keen ability to distinguish personally relevant endeavors from
influence set to upend or lead astray.  Matters of importance are addressable with "true
choice" given a genuine self-aimed maturity where, with boundaries extended, self-
projections willingly challenge parameters of set convention.  (Heidegger however, did
not focus upon choice as a key word indicative of authenticity.  The most feasible
explanation is that, while essential, it tends to imply deliberation between prevailing or
prefabricated alternatives).
Pursuing this point further, life suggests few absolutes (with respect to discretion
and volition) but a fine mixture of context-bound assertions along with those seemingly
more self-determined.  A certain implication is that one may with fortitude and assurance
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denote a vibrant will, all the while the source of drive hinges upon set premises, most
pointedly those never carefully scrutinized.  While growth of choice undoubtedly aligns
with heightened independence, it could also be simply indicating more selections,
amounting to nothing more than a widened array of socially condoned expectations and
attractions.
Any evidence of one's resolution to choose, nevertheless, attests to an amplified
ambition or complexity of self, even if it falls short of providing irrefutable evidence of
agency-in-action.  The indication here is that choice ends up situated somewhere in-
between Hegel’s harmonious, naive ethical world and Heidegger’s self-affirming
pinnaclewith dissociation as its keystone.  It seems in fact, most forms of separation or
conditions of "being," with scattered exceptions, might just as easily fall somewhere
within the illusive void created between these extreme (fundamentally opposing) images,
each attempting to depict a unique apex of human development.  From either end of the
spectruminwardthere seem potentially endless possibilities (a few to be explored)
where revelations of the self are, in very ordinary and expected ways, sidetracked,
dampened or otherwise disturbed from knowing truth, that of oneself as well as one's
world.  That’s because unified, interwoven images as much as exclusive, non-social
interpretations of reality are each overstated ideals, absolutes at extremes of a more true-
to-life continuum which, with respect to alienation, has been markedly underrepresented.
The intention here is not to discredit or challenge these theoretical endpoints as
farfetched, nor is it an attempt to convey a skepticism implying possibilities for their
realization as impractical.  Testing the boundaries of convention, the ultimate objective of
this thesis is to open-mindedly explore just what it is which might actually comprise an
"alienation phenomenon."  It necessitates an openness challenge, to provide old ideas
new niches and hopefully more suitable angles for understanding.  This endeavor first
begs the question of why the attraction to these polar determinants in the first place.  And
it seems the most sensible way for investigating what significance opposing ultimatums
might allow is to best understand what lies in-between.
Before alienation as an aspectual concept is addressed directly, the next four
chapters of this thesis will hopefully provide a useful interpretive backdrop for the
aspects to be subsequently proposed.  Each leads toward the problem of alienation as a
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series of interrelated aspects.  Each moreover is believed uniquely relevant to alienation
in a less categorical, more global sense.
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Chapter II
Individuality vs. Individualism
John Dewey's Critical Insight
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast a couple of familiar ideas
or conceptual positions generally considered synonymous.  There is a critical
differentiation to make; one essential for proposing a clear distinction between the
philosopher John Dewey’s depiction of individuality (closely paralleling Heidegger’s
characterization of self-directed potential) and the more stereotypical "westernized"
conception of individualism.  Because Dewey considered the later, more prominently
accepted, "American Individualism" hinging upon criteria of times past, he recognized
the established view of unitary initiative to be well at odds with existing conditions.  His
observation was of a society embracing a rugged, "romantically-charged" individualism
insincerely.  More precisely, he saw the contemporary version of individualism
substantially different, being applied widely out of context, where older associations
continued to color the term in ways quite dissimilar from modern manifestations.  Much
revered images continued while time-altered inconsistencies grew, interpretations long
obsolete, in spite of dynamic changes, were not effectively discarded (Dewey, 1930, pp.
74-80).
These outdated ideals managed to persist, supported most by a lingering
glorification of unbounded opportunity characteristic of Pioneering Early America.  In
times gone by when challenges were novel, often boundless, forces of influence were
unmistakably physical and intricately tied with emotions channeled through love for
adventure and conquest.  Overcoming obstacles was rigorous; objectives were tangible
and clear, while abilities depended only marginally on interpersonal savvy.  But Dewey
was convinced (early in the 20th century) that the climate where vigor in the wilderness
was a critical attribute for success was no longer a viable reality.  He did not witness
loyalties continuing to be forged and supported upon this historically classic theme, now
worn exhausted.  What emerged instead in tradition's wake were values driven by logic of
a proliferating economic machine.  Here systems already in place determine the course of
one’s endeavors, courses depending primarily on obligation irrespective of intrinsic
relevance (pp. 92-3).  Dewey’s impressions drew upon evidence suggesting that
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technological age allegiance and opportunity rested on such superficial grounds the
consequence was "…a confusion...the inability to find a secure and morally rewarding
place in the economic scene.” (p. 80).
Indications were that individuals of the modern era would find it virtually
impossible to steer clear from imposing contingency, hard-pressed to avoid a vast
network of interdependency, key features of pecuniary and technological encroachment.
Given this inflection, any contemporary version of individualism becomes conveyable
only where it gets subject to (and so inextricably linked with) a monetary motive.  While
modern "takes" on individualism may exist, Dewey recognized these as little more than
illusions, dogmas retained by impressions of economic "independence" lying at the heart
of most motives and aims.  Upon this premise it was reasoned that even those at liberty to
orchestrate a corporate machine were "free" only surreptitiously, imparting
"decisiveness" at the expense of more genuine inner initiative (pp. 93-4).  The indication
was, morally unprepared for industrialization’s onslaughtirrespective of one’s position
in lifeolder creeds, far from being abandoned were clung to ever more fervently.  But
this last ditch for certitude coincided with heightened gullibility, inflated eagerness to
condone ideals and values while blissfully overlooking shifting foundations.
Dewey’s critical stance pointed directly toward a cultural blind spot—drive for
unbridled accommodation persisted because individualist ideals were heavily curbed.
This meant self-control was held dear mostly by impression alone, while at the same time
one naively surrendered, failing to awaken more sincere self-interests rendered dormant
(p. 71).  What all this boils down to is that individualistic sensitivities managed to linger
on, while in reality it was conformity that actually prevailed.  Dewey did not overlook
convincing evidence that change more than stability had become a mainstay for our
culture.  But he comprehended these transitions to be fundamentally longitudinal, cultural
attributes diversifying through cohesive waves, (when considering epochal cross-sections
there was much greater group adhesion to be noted).  Moreover, values associated with
trend (newly emerging cultural ideas) were viewed as shallow, going “...far enough to
effect suppression of original quality of thought but not far enough to achieve enduring
unity.” (p. 84).
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Distinct from crafting a picture of "modern individualism," or a view
contemporarily fitting, Dewey depicted a much-modified variation riding upon self-
interests—those appeased most by attractions which allow initiative to pivot
fundamentally upon greed.  The "individualists," ironically, jump on the profit-motive
bandwagon creating a "culturally worthy" justification to exploit.  Interestingly, Dewey
ended up singling out this feature of self-determination (driving appetites for wealth) as
the sole remaining characteristic of the, still revered classical individualism.  But this,
now stereotypic, avarice was being extolled through conformist promotion, where
uniform disposition manages well to masquerade as stoic inner-initiative.
While conformity’s relevance with respect to alienation is a larger issue to be
subsequently explored, it can at least be mentioned that for Dewey, this version or
emphasis on alienationestrangement colored by delusions of self-initiativewas
something noteworthy.  For it allowed alienation to be depicted as something broader
than interpersonal exclusion alone proves relevant.  Here subtle absence can be
highlighted alongside more overt separation, that which indicates "an artificially induced
uniformity of thought and sentiment...a symptom of an inner void." (p. 87).  Excesses in
sociability, rather than touted as assets, got instead scrutinized; seen as impetuous half-
hearted attempts to fill a vacuum the passing of the older individualism had created.  The
only credible initiative where Dewey saw true individuality prevailing was in the letting
go of culturally provoked, chimerical impressions of independencethose which ignore
the fact that institutions have taken over persons as the functional repositories of
rationality.  For in his estimation proper paths for discovering individuality, without
varnish, reside not in cherished ideologies but more intimately within the individual mind
(Featherstone, 1979, p. 28).
Conventionalized Avenues toward "Liberty"
Of Fromm’s (1962) remark: “The alienated person is out of touch with himself as
he is out of touch with any other person....”(p. 56), the primary message to draw is that
internal estrangement automatically implies an accompanying external estrangement.  In
a spirit akin with Dewey, he recognized that surface inclusion (being with people without
being wholly a part) contributes little more than a weak buffer for quelling uncertainty.
Interaction often manages only as a "medication," of sorts, for making life endurable
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instead of fostering meaningful connection.  In this way, at least for Fromm, not simply
self-alienation but social alienation persists where relation never transcends the
superficial.  It is this paradoxical "estranged dependence," moreover, which was believed
a principle culprit thwarting individualistic initiative.  This image is broad-based, backed
by the conviction that it takes something beyond prosaic social contact to enable inner
growth as well as interpersonal possibility.
Fromm’s portrait was of a modern culture fundamentally inhibiting, character
manipulating, one creating few viable avenues for escaping the monotony of custom.  In
a society where outlets are disperse and vague many settle for substandard, surrogate
mediums, thereby broadening the range of possible bases, increasing available points
from which to relate in an endless quest for security and personal meaning.  "All this
interest and fascination is not simply an expression of bad taste and sensationalism but a
deep longing for a dramatization of the ultimate phenomena of human existence." (p. 72).
These strivings for communal connection (in spite of their superficiality) tend to take
shape in popular forums such as tabloid news, sports events, and most recently via the
modern talk show outlet.
Such avenues (while not always clearly delineated) are not difficult to find.  They
get incorporated, digested so to speak, little differently than most other market
consumables.  Yet sincerity invested into these familiar venues is so unpredictable, so
arbitrary, overall relevance ends up minimized.  Involvement tends to be optional, or
(being matters of preference) reduced to unnecessary.  There is little criteria or standing
obligation for attending one cultural recess over another.  While social engagement being
a necessity remains certain, tangible forms now popular have varied as much as the value
they retain as cultural obligations has depreciated.  Such dissonance fuels attitudes where
a great number, for obvious reasons, grow apathetic; most are empty of good incentives
to identify strongly with a particular niche, attesting to the poor odds any contribute a
lasting (affective) value.  The point must not be overlooked however; venues that on the
surface seem trivial are not necessarily those—bases for alliance—any less important.
Indeed, many adhere more desperately to association points admittedly limiting in
purpose as lifelines, held dear as a "best alternative" next to nothing.
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This gross arbitrariness characterizing socially condoned outlets for connection
(or self-escape) calls to question if there are actually any reliable points of legitimacy
and, more deeply, if any intrinsic benefit might possibly result.  Even when freedom is
something appreciated, voicing and committing to (actually backing) choices is always an
unpredictable challenge, where sands shift readily.  Irrespective of how strong one’s
admiration for freedom might be, even where room-to-maneuver is recognized more than
criticized, the ball and chain of one’s cultured character incessantly lingers, magnetically
swaying the future relevance of inner expectation.
One’s "freedom quest," (to loose or find oneself) with vast room for expression,
might assume a benign shape, as a party mask, or possibly culminate in a full-blown
"cult-like" crusade.  In either case the subtle, festering effects of self-alienation get
medicated while more visible, often demeaning, impacts of social alienation are
ephemerally evaded.  And while diversions and avenues to access vary widely, their
impetusthe impulse for outlets as securitiesremains at its core the same.  Put simply,
it is to lessen the burden of holding up too long with an image where appropriateness is
delimited; an image obscured by concerns about falling outside confines, where
confidence and patience to circumvent boundaries of cultural acceptance seems always in
short supply.
As with anything sought meaningfully quests tend to be colored by strong
impressions of independence, the effect of which (at least superficially) presents a
broadening of possibilities.  While extending boundaries may promote a liberating
attitude, there is nothing fool proof for suggesting internal change will parallel (even
valued) assertions or help open avenues for self-expression.  Culturally condoned escapes
can be genuinely judged only subsequent to finding out opportunities fall well short of
personal longings and more far-sighted ideals.
With this broad ambiguity, one feature that cannot go overlooked is a cultural
preference for "decisiveness" creating the stereotypic outline for the way individuality
gets generally understood.  The idea that when selecting something to select with
certainty, not to mention efficiency.  Here resolve gets prioritized over any incentive to
recognize a full scope of choices.  And even with non-intrusive conditions, when the
selection spectrum actually broadens, standards it seems whimsically appear.  If a favored
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position happens to be vague, where assurances are few, something more absolute
(oblivious to ramifications) gets earnestly sought.  For even the most certain of fellows
much unanticipated criteria must be sized and managed, self-imposed guidelines are not
only consequences of context, but indicators that contextual draw is virtually inevitable.
Certainty is only possible in retrospect, after trial and error wherein uniqueness
can be excavated.  Apart from impression there is a very real way in which the actual
number of choices gets illusivelyand yet, without palpable intrusiondiminished.
More personally relevant choices may exist in potential, but the point is they are not
generally noticed.  If this holds true it becomes possible to, quite bluntly, expect what has
been dealt and still incorporate a sincere belief in freedom of choice.  What the ego may
first understand as certitude of liberty is, by way of introspective questioning, begging to
be challenged.
Pseudo-Opportunities for Individuality
One of the most prevalent, culturally tolerated, outlets of today prospers via the
modern-day talk show.  While many programs might seem nothing beyond harmless
entertainment most have evolved into havens for eccentricity, mediums of public ritual,
where participants and viewers alike religiously turn.  For many this seems a reliable
forum for catharsis, a tolerated arena for unleashing pent-up inhibitions.  But most shows
never excel as effective platforms enabling unbridled initiative, nor do they allow
credible opportunities for individuality to manifest.  Opinions are certainly voiced, but it
is another question entirely as to whether ideas are actually shared.
Most noteworthy of these performances—the marked time constraints, parameters
that guarantee to attenuate fullness of expression.  And while there is nothing uncommon
about urgency in today’s media-driven circus, there seems here something even more
intensely stifling than "air efficiency" obstacles.  This is a general discouragement that
guests rely upon reflective potential as viable reservoirs for communicating.  Emphasis in
most cases gets routed away from introspectively sought, descriptively supportable
considerations, so that dialogue is invited to succumb to ravings fostered by, or at least
pivoting upon, emotional impulse.  The bottom line it appears, is that because drama
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captivates it must be pursued, even if all the while more thought provoking, tempo-
disrupting (for television) penetration gets effectively denied.
When impulse is rewarded over foresight what becomes most clear is opinions get
blurted out, not only without much contemplation, they also with equal flair, escape need
for explanation.  The point concerning the problem of choice is relevant here: any motion
carrying an aura of resoluteness will outweigh a comparable one for securing
applicability.  These forums, at the very least, release one from obligation to concretize
an argument only after reasonably supporting its significance.  Defensiveness then,
manages to overshadow open-mindedness, vehemently protecting an angle to save face,
gains priority over relenting for the sake of considering a wider array of more practicable
options.
Naturally, there is little point attempting to be sensible in an arena where sense
gets routinely compromised.  Admitting these limitations, in any case, provides no
allowance to condone inauthentic, vile versatilityto defend oneself "as an equal"—by
relinquishing personal values and integrity for the sake of a voice.  For if reflective
sensibility was one’s actual aim, say, upon being invited as a guest on the Jerry Springer
Show, there seems before the chaos has even begun, a compelling reason to never show
up.  It cannot be easily dismissed that aside from one’s quality of character, and
irrespective of any uniqueness or vulnerably, one will be expected to speak quick, loud
and frankly, to become aggressive on cue, to pivot upon exposition that is
succinctstabbingand presented without excess elaboration.
This is the kind of arena where equality of disclosure, as much as verity of
description, secures no basis in fact.  Settings are actually restrictive, at least in the sense
that concern for "the person" generates a quality of compassion no better than the
collective temperament expected at an exotic carnival attraction.  These are environments
that neither encourage nor reveal a capacity to expend effort and dignify through
semantic advantage.  Crucial energy instead is diverted to ensuring a forward demeanor,
and accompanying conviction, capable of guaranteeing audience absorption.  The payoff,
talk TV’s highest reward—approval—generates greater attention and apprehension than
deeper, intrinsic beliefs can maintain relevance.  This is a stage where the most dominant
capture the best leverage in "justly" overshadowing evidence, at least the quality of its
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integrity.  As credible opinion grows increasingly relative, value diminished with each
forthright voice, meaningful qualities are less effectively sought.  Whether important or
not, the relevance of topics gets undermined because veracity of opinion cannot secure a
forefront in the absence of reputable dialogue.  Fueled by impressions of genuine
involvement, most nonetheless exaggerate confidence of being full participants in open
parlance, remaining deluded that they are model representatives for freedom of
expression.
A necessary question then, not to be avoided, is why this forum exists as it
doesjust what is it that creates, perpetuates, and ultimately permits this no-holds-barred
mentality.  To pose a backdrop, it would not be difficult gaining support for the idea that
Americans tend to believe in each person’s right to an opinion.  In fact, it would be no
exaggeration to say most would rise quickly in defense of this proposal as a cherished
liberty.  While all this appears justifiably positive on the surface, what cannot go
overlooked is something Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 deemed an often obscure, but
nonetheless ensuing, collective determinism enervating the essential democratic ideal.
His fundamental proposal was that individuality, while revered, gets compromised since
collective dependence hampers intuitive perspective to sincerely question (Paicheler,
1988, pp. 57, 109).  An insight that holds just as true for the contemporary it seems; there
appear few clear openings for pursuing an idiosyncratic will without risk of rejection.
While genuine democratic equality is only an ideal it seems never further from
real when gripped by the zoo-like atmosphere most talk shows encourage.  As a general
observation there permeates an assurance (notwithstanding democracy’s assuming
everyone an equal) for equal opportunities to humiliate.  Potential equals treating each
other as potential threats have considerable incentive securing advantage, highlighted by
drives to castigate irrespective of meaning or another’s sincerity of intent.  For as most
have come to accept, generally with disdain, it is the loudest and least hesitant voices
which supply the greatest punch.  This is the cost of venerating those with enough
audacity to secure high visibility, those who selfishly dictate the floor in spite of others.
Unabashed offensive persistence forces unwarranted recognition.  This, along with the
perpetrator's substandard receptivity, fosters the snubbing of more meaningful inclusion,
enabling aggression to monopolize and repress the integrity of democratic public opinion.
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The main criticism of equality then, absent its realization, is by belief alone it
invites conditions that (rather than contribute to actualize) manage to level opportunities
for fullness of expression.  It is hard to underestimate the magnitude by which distortions
in tenet can create tangible, lasting interpersonal barriers.  Expectation of consistent
opportunity (not consistency itself) is sufficient to encourage a windfall of false
assumptions.  Presuming that one’s belief in equality remains, but is painfully absent or
inconsistent in truth, there is a strong suspicion that shortcomings will arrive as burdens
to be endured with an internal locus for shame (Sennett, 1979, pp. 121-2).
The point is that matters of cultural relevance are not only held important, the
entire burden for identification weighs squarely upon one’s own shoulders.  Deservedly
or not responsibility gets “taken on,” tested by uncertainty, tempered by pesky
distractions, preoccupations seemingly benign as posture, dialect or fashion.  And these
are more than just cute trivialities accepting that much time, effort and energy goes into
establishing and maintaining an image, one defended with greater determination than
could ever be justified intrinsically relevant.  Rightly or not these things impact
awareness.  When intuition contrasts with expectation, details that might otherwise be
considered personally revealing have a way of getting conveniently omitted, the prime
impetus driving influence often magically escapes.
Whether or not the talk show mentality is having far-reaching effects by
transcending its viewer-ship perimeter is not easily discernible.  But tragically its likeness
or personificationthe incessant groping for a deceptive front as a communication
crutchpersists as a typical feature of the modern American learning environment.
Students may certainly portray assertive involvement, but this alone is no sufficient
indicator for inquisitive insight and interest.  In too many cases participation gets
channeled, evaluated insincerely by criteria focusing almost exclusively on precision and
efficiency, approaches which (when accentuated at the expense of all others) elbow out
reflective depth.  Allowing a moment to gather thought without interruption is a luxury
subtly discouraged, often something unheard of in places where five seconds of silence is
considered an eternity.
Teachers, of course, are guilty as anyone for assuring that participation gets
streamlined, kept within “reasonable” boundaries and essentially minimized in quality.
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When the instructor does happen to inquire “are there any questions,” everyone sees that
small window of opportunity to act rather than the (necessary) freedom required for
comprehensive reflection.  Even when a gripping assertion seems in order, after that
window has passed and the instructor moves out of range, intuitions get prematurely
purged of relevance.  Commonly they fade, blurring back into safe recesses, going
without recognition or challenge.  Incentive for securing one’s point of view gets
mysteriously lost, along with optimism and necessary energy for it to ever carry an
impact.
The strongest impression is this stunting of initiative is largely consequence of
being mesmerized, stifled by preoccupations over eliciting “group relevant” responses.
For students it is only common sense that when sharing penetrating insights, particularly
if convention is being challenged, there exists the very real likelihood of ending up on a
hot seat.  There await a room full of reasons for making sure responses are quick,
decisive and not too far out of bounds.  With this urgency for “correctness” there
emanates a slanted performance, a "subjective sharing" of beliefs teeming with
incredulity.  Because if there is one thing the voluntary participant knows for sure, final
judgments are matters left to the mercy of an audience (or class)not simply to interpret
but weigh, parenthesize, and otherwise punctuate one’s fate as well.
Since sharing information seems to depend upon skewed initiative, at least as
much as raw spontaneity, talk shows along with classrooms stop considerably of
functioning as vibrant forums for individualistic expression.  Toward the question of
authenticity more specifically, it seems that if abrasive, controlling communication were
true-to-life indicators of individuality, assertive parallels would be signature features in
life beyond the stage, infiltrating employment and similar public venues.  In other words,
if fast-paced, dominating, poor-listening, outspoken characteristics really did underscore
essential qualities of individualistic initiative, why wouldn’t these features be fervently
embraced, more roundly internalized.  But, it seems truthfully, when culturally condoned
opportunities for “stepping out of character” are absentonce the show is overpseudo-
individualistic attributes quickly dry up.  Unadulterated apprehensions are never far off,
messaging to the assertive “heroic” character front (where usefulness sways with context)
that it is time to vanish.
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To consider another example, movie violence is familiar venue or outlet where
directive character attributes generate for many a magnetic attraction.  Aggression,
revenge and independence are well-noted qualities getting routinely glorified.  These are
regular cultural staples, well-engrained genres that make it lucrative to invest in hunger
for power; where vulnerabilities are fed by media relentless to secure and cash-in-on a
faithful, lucrative following.  And while it is true that certain viewers press beyond mere
emulation—duplicating forceful resolve and violence exhibited upon the screenmost
do not.  Formidable inner-will comparable to that for which movie characters get
sententiously extolled rarely see real-world parallels.  Those who revere unwavering,
vociferous qualities projected on the screen are often the very ones not assertive enough
to request a stranger to keep a respectful voice (low) in the library.  Touted ideals, no
matter how well admired are pursuable, sustainable and defendable only through
principled action, for matters that are relevant, and only after meeting difficulties beyond
virtual contexts—overtly, directly and authentically.
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Chapter III
The Ubiquity of Tacit Convention
Introduction
From a socio-centric perspective, with respect to human learning, only a small
part of knowledge is contrived internally.  For the greater portion aptitude develops
through unified constructs, toward ends fashioned along customary channels in typical
situations.  Conceding just such a position were some respected social theoristsmost
notably Emile Durkheim, and Lev Vygotskywho shared the opinion that understanding
gets established overwhelmingly within interpersonal constructs.  Guiding these external
boundaries for curbing human awareness was believed a distinct familiarity, an enduring
base of expressive consensus that dominantly colors and, so, fundamentally unifies the
social realm.
The effect this positioning has for understanding is that socially carved
parameters sustain relevance (justifiably or not) as encompassing certainties in life.
Schultz (1967) noted that most sociologists view predictable structure and function as
“factual occurrence”where familiar patterns accrue along channels corresponding with
culturally embedded vernacular.  With social immersion this absolute (where verbal,
behavior and intuitive attributes can thoroughly merge) impulse for impressions
extending beyond immediate contexts suppresses into nonexistence.
It is well known that sociologists favor an empirical orientation, committing their
energy toward elevating only measurable “truths” in a fervent quest to weigh the world
within highly expectant boundaries.  Such standards buttress uniformity not only within
venues for justifying practical (science relevant) knowledge but even in the most prosaic,
common-sense contexts.  Schultz considered such embedded regularity evidence of a
“world known in common and taken for granted.”  He further stated....
It is, first, structurally socialized...that if I were to change places with my fellow-man I would
experience the same sector of the world in substantially the same perspective as he does, our particular
biographical circumstances becoming for all practical purposes at hand irrelevant.  I propose to call this
idealization that of the reciprocity of perspectives (p, 19).
The notion that fundamental ways of knowing are primarily interchangeable may
at first seem farfetched, but evidence for stock-patterns and predictability within cultural
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confines receives credible support.  Such proposals coincide with psychosocial
phenomena Ross (1908) coined as “conventionality” where, outside any natural
contextual impediments, an inability to escape majority influence is a cost assumed
without the need for direct oppression.  Instead an illusive ideological imperative ensues,
replete in its virulence, imparting as a pervasive and reflexively incorporated “moral
force”(p.191).  Uniformity from this vantage point is both prerequisite and consequence
of consensual accord, where character disposition merging with communal pattern
becomes, imposing beyond matters of choice, internalized as a native (as well as naive)
impulse.
Cultural coherence may be dismissed as essentially harmless (possibly viewed
beneficial) in a world so interdependent.  If an actual asset, however, it is one where
distinctions between self and outer reality retain a blur, no matter what one’s "good
sense" may be convinced otherwise.  As Fromm (1941) understood, to simply say "I
think" or "I feel" is insufficient information by itself.  The primary concern is not one’s
degree of conviction, or even whether personal beliefs (often rationalizations) correspond
closely to facts.  What is instead crucial is the criteria by which those insights are
founded, and whether authenticityupon which initiative and spontaneity are
boundhas opportunity to emerge.
The decisive point is not what is thought but how it is thought.  The thought that is the result of
active thinking is always new and original; original, not necessarily in the sense that others have not
thought it before, but always in the sense that the person who thinks, has used thinking as a tool to discover
something new... (p. 195).
Capriciously affirming the most accepted patterns as givens, on the other hand,
only serves to narrow and sentence schemes for interpretation to standardization.
Interpersonal associations structured and operating upon common ground remain just
thatcommon.  Normal encounters "naturally" unfolding slip into general expectation
categories, doing nothing past what they already have in store.  Beneath the stereotypical
veil of autonomy, at their center, adjustments are often deceptively core-less.
Even if it is actually possible to appreciate the pervasiveness of cultured
uniformity, such vision does not automatically clear a path for alternatives, or indicate
foundations where regularities arise.  More specifically, acknowledging a limitation does
not equate to discovering ways in which things could be otherwise.  Primarily through
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over-reliance upon scientific verification most (researchers as well as lay people) become
"purged of bias"(Whyte, 1956, p.28).  With rigidity paralleling that typical in the natural
sciences purveyors of (quantifiable) social insight seek closure.  Their primary mission is
for a tight-knit, consistent formula that aims at resolutionpreferably something fool
proof.  The result is that, in a manner paralleling empirically established disciplines,
micro-theories get justified within discrete, esoteric areas of knowing; coasting behind an
aura of expertise, social researchers secure autonomy utilizing comparably objective
criteria.  They establish a niche that for the greater population, capacity to question stays
well out of reach.
Sociological authority that effectively categorizes humanity can attenuate natural
curiosity, blocking incentives for exploring into less-outlined ways of knowing.  Mass
consensus amounts to over-extension, premature aggrandizement, and ultimately
exaggerated faith in a composite external truth.  Cues this contextually closed serve as
pretenses for possibility.  With expectations firmly grounded there are created incomplete
focal points, well-dressed barriers to genuine understanding.  Where only stock patterns
seem to spur interest and win credibility intuitively held beliefs become vulnerable to
compromise.  Spontaneous inquiry, essential to initiate a choice-spectrum where
incentives for challenge might surface gets well contained.  By such prospects arrive
contingencies for knowing, bases where established assumptions elude impartial scrutiny.
With constricted precepts awareness is lured into a combination of self-delusion
and interpersonal fabrication.  Drawn from the need to know, in either case, affirmations
are too readily resigned to.  Any sincere quest to know with conviction, then, gets
overshadowed by impulse to simply know what to expect.  The result is avenues for
understanding lack intricacy, with insights suppressed or otherwise buried parameters
remain underdeveloped, unappreciated and underutilized.
Freudian and Marxian Perspectives on The Human Condition
The notion of being subsumed by powers more ominous than our selves—more
specifically, being oppressed by dynamics without reliable bases for acknowledgment—
was a theme emphasized tenaciously by Sigmund Freud, and (presenting a broader socio-
political image) through Karl Marx.  Both managed to highlight the ubiquity of human
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deception, accepting that motivations do not correspond directly with either conscious
intent or overt behavior.  Each were inspired by images of unconscious influences; this
then esoteric idea that hidden energies are persistently working to undermine the
legitimacy of subjective will or socio-cultural pretension.  Both fashioned models
whereby obscure forces, energies limiting recognition of broader motives, can stymie the
credibility of heartfelt beliefs.  Yet, even while visions of a false consciousness were
mutual, cases presented were pivoting upon thoroughly divergent premises (Fromm,
1962, pp.104-113).
For Freud the social realm came second to physiology or biology.  He recognized
society "influencing" only by either enabling or further debilitating whatever innate
features happen to be present or revealing.  The most important inference to draw from
this is that human character quality gets seen more a product of inner complexity than
outer exigency.  Every social dilemma for Freud had a central impetus, and was viewed
an ultimate consequence of manifestations occurring from within.  Bondage or neurotic
oppression, for example, becomes surmountable only inasmuch as intrinsic, libidinal
repression surfaces or gets consciously revealed.  Freud formulated this proposal
theoretically, and presented convincing evidence through psychotherapy how readily
misconception dominates consciousness.  What his sessions demonstrated strongest was
that most of what is real escapes recognition, while most of what gets commonly
acknowledged is often deceptivearriving consciously as distorted rationalizations of
the truth (pp. 89-96).
Drawing on a much wider historical-economic foundation Marx held that
independent existence, in fact consciousness itself, is an inescapably social occurrence.
For purposes of self-potential there is little speculation outside an ideal social context; he
felt that subjectivity was directly wedded to one's social roots, holding the implicit forms
in place where intrinsic characteristics potentially emerge.  Marx considered the plight of
the sole individual a mere symptom (and ultimately consequence) of the greater problem,
most notably a poorly designed socio-economic foundation.  He did not consign to ideals
where the complete, independent person ultimately "graduates," by growing distinct and
apart from fundamental social complexes.  In fact, he projected the wealth of one’s very
existence (potential as well as uniqueness) would hinge on how satisfactorilythe
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quality of unification through participationsocial structures are meaningfully attended.
For Marx, “The eye has become a human eye when its object has become a human social
object...the senses therefore become directly theoreticians in practice.” (p.69).
Marx, with great emphasis on affiliation, amplified the essential importance of
structural connection by making a strong case for social reform; he did not merely tout
abstract principal alone.  Human-to-human and human-to-object relations were key
concerns, viewed critical for cooperation to prevail over exploitation.  Such posture
naturally demanded the uprooting of familiar structural edifices and replacing them so
they properly feature an ideal “organic community.”  The vision was for a bold
transformation, and it was one with an ontological premise that required, in effect, to
hold-in-cultural-context whatever personal valuations transpire to benefit (White, W,
1961, p.198).  Anything short of this still dodged the greater need for the human
condition, where morals (to be justly weighed) depend on this composite perspective.
The Marxian trademark “communism” is actually less a political ideology than a personal
confession, a call for unification as an indispensable opportunity to realize one’s pinnacle
of human development.  Social integrity for Marx was an essentially intrinsic attribute of
human nature; any inner ideal therefore demanded a very definitive social pathway, so
that the self might find completion only inasmuch as the social world is complete
(Fromm, 1962, pp.68-70).
For Freud, with a conflicting impression, mankind has an intrinsic capability
(with therapeutic assistance) of overcoming repression without need for social
modifications.  He recognized biological markers not only as predominant but embedded,
primal and virulent forces overriding extraneous circumstance.  Given this libido-driven
pretext, social change was not a matter directly relevant to questions concerning personal
growth.  Nor would social stability necessarily "culture" or inspire an essential
foundation for individualistic expression.  For Freud a true individualself-discovered
beyond subconscious restraintis realized only through self-reliance; grounding from
early childhood experience (compiled internally) impacts more significantly on the
psyche than any immediate, circumcised, social concern can influence.
Even if leaning toward a Freudian position, nonetheless, it remains difficult to
shrug-off the virility by which social expectations infiltrate and modulate many actions.
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One only need consider the extent to which youngsters grow up flooded with suggestions
over what constitutes appropriate vs. improper behavior to recognize how indelibly social
patterns are laid down.  This, moreover, is not simply indicative of encumbrance
beginning at the age when such structures need to be faced head on.  Before any distinct
roles are ever clear a prototypical social charactercrafted through the psychic agency of
the parentsgets patently manufactured without even having to leaving the house.  By
picturing a child’s first school experience it becomes evident how well presumptions (for
even the most hesitant children) over what will and won't pass as socially acceptable are
already situated.  No amount of stereotypic “kindergarten uncertainty” can overshadow
the endless line of preconceptions, opinions and biases when the child first arrives.
Concerns over what might be conceivable or attempt-worthy, vs. that more clearly prone
to be discredited through reproof, brace most in advance for an irrepressible, shifting
reality that wields strong judgment.  Prohibitions most children carry for swearing seems
only the most obvious example; even something arbitrary as how to hold a fork or where
to put your elbows when eating are sure grounds for evaluation.
It is certain that children at this suggested age can and will modify behaviors quite
readily when relevant cues change.  But this by itself is no compelling evidence that
contexts are arbitrary, easy to challenge, or readily surmountable; it only serves to
strengthen the case for how dynamic the learning process actually is.  Social orientation,
with its vast potential for mutability appreciated, manages to maintain boundaries and
“correct” digression by keeping expectations within fluid constraints, often in spite of
both personal will and impulse.  That’s because "...The members of the society...behave
in such a way as to be able to function in the sense required by the social system...it is the
social character’s function to mold and channel human energy...for the purpose of the
continued functioning of this society.” (pp.78-9).
The most fundamental idea to appreciate here is there are certain, socially
relevant, criteria by which individuals and groups with few exceptions adhere.  It matters
little if communal structures are firmly in place or undergoing considerable
transformation.  When frameworks go vague the tendency is to seek them out and, by any
conceivable means, restore socio-personal balance and regain interpersonal securities
(Festinger, 1950, pp. 272-3).  To consider a conglomerate of people without a social
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structure is almost as unfathomable as postulating a communal structure without people.
This magnetic inclination, pulling together to draw forth available precepts attests to the
adaptability of the human condition.  It also underscores the implicit urgency involved,
revealing social applicability in ways hard to imagine at face valuepunctuated by
drives for relational assurance, not simply to appease attractions for integrity, but to keep
intact boundaries that delineate one’s very humanness.
This predisposition for social immersion can be considered to parallel, in a sense,
the protective coloring many animals assume to create (naturally) an appearance of being
invisible relative to their surroundings.  People in a comparable way, are "better covered"
when giving up uncertainties of sovereignty, more comfortably shielded from (a human
version of) anxiety and doubt.  Little is gained pursuing the problem of why self-
abdication would be justifiable since most never shed the guarded impression that such
lifestyle adjustments are intrinsic choices.
To appreciate why repression can be so absolute it is necessary to consider what
happens when the means to keep a protective veil in place fades or is otherwise not
available.  Here discrepancies between oneself and an interpersonal reality become clear,
with the displaced self now visible for the world to see.  For the many denied acceptance
longings for inclusion persist as powerful preoccupations.  When estrangement translates
to painful lifestyle limitation, exclusion does not generally unfold like some lonesome-
hero scenario where solitary forces triumph, maintaining their ground against a wall of
sanctioned resistance.  What often happens in spite of their anomalous exterior, those on
the margins seek each other out, reaching to find comfort and strength in each other’s
impotence.  Sensing their own deficiencies for certainty and meaning they desperately
create an affiliation base, an orientation touchstone, or risk drifting into madness.  Some
demonstrate this urgency with great resolve as when compulsion plays out in destructive
impulse.  Most disturbing is where the propulsion for inclusion, unrelenting, depreciates
into sadomasochistic strivings (Fromm, 1941, pp. 179-83).
Appreciating the power and ubiquity of social forces a “thoroughly Freudian”
viewpoint carries less weight.  While biological determinants very likely effect human
character, it is difficult to imagine them as sole forces overshadowing the complexities of
the social known.  In a similar respect, Marx’s call for an extensive societal reevaluation
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might fare well as a harmonious communal ideal, but any actual dismantling seems a
Herculean task.  This rings particularly true for the sole individual, one for whom
dramatic cultural overhauls are not likely to emerge from any intuitive ideal into the
tangible and real.  Rather it seems more practical to appreciate social constraints as
expansive, largely irreconcilable, albeit malleable, givens.  Instead of being
fundamentally re-designed or theoretically dismissed, social barriers to self-determination
(not being directly conquerable) might rather be "confronted" by sidestep, to be
“encountered" or dealt with without directive, by way of allusion.
While such a suggestion may appear little different than debunking or under-
representing the fortitude of the social realm it is not the same; considering the problem
evading social constraint, acknowledging its impenetrability might just as likely lend
credence to its virility.  Just as there are those plagued by compulsions for self-denial or
complete enmeshment (as through duty) there is an opposing path—a less revered
detraction from the securities of the social.  For those who are in their most primary
phases of self-developmenta characterization with no strong correspondence with
chronological ageextensive social debasement can be traumatizing and, therefore,
experienced as a very profound self-threat; here one’s semblance of self, one’s very
inner-permanence and grasp on existence is menaced.  Yet, while social expulsion may
induce certain (potentially lasting) harm, a void of interpersonal separation might also
open unexpected havens of opportunity.  As will be explored, personal transformation
demands a degree of severance more elaborate than is generally popular or congenial.
Detour by Solitude
It may have been by circumstance or just as conceivably through initiative that the
benefits of a life matured through severance came to be appreciated.  Aside from origins,
it is not difficult to consider notable examples of those (particularly philosophers and
writers) who revere detachment, often touted as critical grounding for prolific insights
ever to surface.  Hegel for example, when speaking of the necessity of alienation, placed
separation at the very heartbeat of life spirit, an orientation held essential for any
subsequent authentic union ever to be possible.  Heidegger, with notably greater
emphasis on self-direction, felt there was no true essence beyond the personal or
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potentially self-relevant.  For humans he placed great importance on death, envisioning
this non-relational understanding for existence as its pinnacle (Schacht, 1970, pp. 202-
04).  Aside from whatever intrinsic virtue such extreme perspective might bestow, stark
dissociation is not a "condition for being" characteristically (at least overtly) sought.  Any
grand idyllic appraisal would undermine the more typical emphasisprimarily on the
aloneness dimension of solitude—gauged culturally, rarely as a quality to embrace but
more commonly an attribute of burden, to evade or eagerly erase.
Philosophical consensus, as a general impression, indicates that purposeful
awareness include provisions for peace of mind.  This means inner strength or assurance
depend on (or at least runs consistent with) fundamental, tactile-relevant conditions for
serenity.  Repose, while cherished as essential for deep meaning to surface is,
nonetheless, always at risk of eclipse by a world powered through imposing influence.
For one staunch believer the benefits of solitude were obvious and hardly worth the effort
to question, but Powys (1933) did provide terse insight into why avenues for a composed,
unitary existence are so effectively derailed:
Vigorous, robust, expansive natures cannot refrain from overriding and overwhelming every other
self that they approach.  They mean no harm.  They are not cruel or malicious.  They are simply exuberant.
Nevertheless in their innocence they are the worst enemy against which the...solitude of the soul has to be
defended! (p. 57).
Allowing that we can recognize the impetuousness by which the world of
attachment operates, the question of why solitude should receive such low quality
appreciation (weighing-in this perspective) seems more addressable.  One observation is
that negatives are attributable directly to the stark consequence itselfdissociation.  For
Csikszentmihalyi (1990)“…the worst sanction that the community can issue is
shunning.” (p. 165).  Such a dismal collective view of isolation will have ramifications
whether circumstances indicate self-imposed seclusion, overt rejection, or anything in-
between.  Those who relish in or resolutely endorse solitude, the stigma suggests, are
engaging in a style of self-shunning; consequence of the majority therefore, with their
substantial emphasis on and partiality for affiliation, negative impressions fuel attitudes
that amount to shunning all the same.
Given the stoic image portrayed by dissenting philosophers, it is understandable
why many found cause to criticize introspective thinkers, most notably Nietzsche and
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Kierkegaard, for delving too far inward in their searches for truth.  In spite of well-
rounded respectfor both, “ones own truth" was a virtue beyond which any universal
truth could providethey were plagued by inner torment which psychologically
overwhelmed (debilitated) each toward the end of their short lives.  In the case of
Kierkegaard, for example, the issue of solitude as an essential lifestyle requisite was
addressable only by answering questions with absolute decisiveness, solely through
confrontation with (and retention of) stark certainties.  There would be no collective
appeasement (irrespective of potential suffering) in order to compromise; either solitude
or sacrifice to the peculiarities of culture were the possibilities, no lesser position would
yield the greatest understanding (Barrett, 1958, pp. 171, 181).
While providing distinct clarity, this determinism for meaning never avoids
striking up an enormous divide for prospective evaluation.  Uniqueness inquisitive and
extreme, sometimes strange in demeanor, ends up obscuring assets more important for
appreciating a stand in the name of severance.  In the midst of Kierkegaard’s immoderate
posturing what gets underrepresented for solitude are the tangible advantages in
separation, the illuminating engagement of purpose particularly unique to the experience.
While incentives may not present themselves clearly, bulging at the seams, a low
visibility "engagement" often equates with a silent, and yet substantial, connection to the
real world.
With major discrepancies outlined, a more effective contrast is better conceived
between two terms most closely tied to interpersonal estrangementsolitude and
loneliness.  While interpretations frequently overlap, with applications often being
interchanged, there are earmark distinctions in need of recognition.  Both terms, with
little question, are compatible for representing some circumstance or impression of
aloneness; either expression might also convey a clear-cut dissociation from familiar,
interactive patterns of life.  However, when matters of affect are afforded better focus
these semantic homologues part ways, and quite dramatically at that.
Loneliness, put simply, denotes a resounding and enduring incompleteness.  It
indicates a plight-of-self punctuated by restlessness, compelling those afflicted to yearn
and wander relentlessly in quest of its overcoming.  Solitude conversely, portrays
isolation highlighted by heartening reassurance; this underlined with a state of
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confidence.  Assets may not always manifest as pleasant but solitude triumphs even in the
face of hardship, for here purpose endures, defining and unifying features which, for
those plagued by loneliness are noticeably lacking.
The benefits of solitude, nonetheless, come with an imperative to strike a wedge
between oneself and whatever forces of humanityno matter how well meaningcreate
an opposition.  Solitude, like virtually any other important lifestyle effort, is characterized
by aspirations for yielding favorable results.  But any sincere attempt requires sacrifice:
disengagement from the barrage of contradictory cues (disruptions that confine
“involvement” to the superficial by restricting it to the interpersonal).  The deep disparity
between self and society so commonly anticipated is one possible reason Richard Sennett
(1980) resolved to describe solitude in a way that could easily be interchanged with
virtually any other variation on estrangement.  It may also have something to do with his
associating the concept with matters of circumstance more than choice:
Solitude is an emotion of absence...a lack of connection and therefore a lack of constraint.  But it
can be so painful that people will blindly commit themselves to a marriage, a job, or a community, and yet
find that in the midst of others they remain alone. (pp. 4, 10).
Sennett’s general impression is of a profound, enduring self-alienation more than
any stark isolation or loneliness per se; however, whatever his true intention, because this
interpretation is bound with deficiency of purpose it is an insufficient depiction of
solitude.  When descriptors necessary for representing interpersonal separation jump
(affective) contexts so easily semantic standards dissolve.  This manages only to raise
questions about the relevance of certain venues, creating doubts about where credible
consensus might finally reside.  With indiscriminant application, in a society that esteems
affiliation over seclusion, linguistic imagery surrounding solitude gathers poor light for
approval, and (given its marginal cultural pertinence) gets prematurely imbued with
undesirable overtones.
While I believe that either loneliness or solitude might result from matters of
circumstance (rather than choice) what is more critical to consider is the impact of any
possible result.  The less social disengagement is viewed a burdenas with
individualitythe less likely it thrives as an inhibiting, preoccupying or disaffirming
obstacle.  For all practical purposes, the only way solitary existence can gain positive
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(social) light is through a call of judgment.  The greatest tendency however is to regard
this statelikely without having fully experienced itone to avoid, or more plainly a
path devoid of desirability.  But if detachment is this easily branded detestable, this
impulsively reduced in purpose, it seems more sensible to stick with characterizations
indisputably accepted as undesirable—inhibition, desolation, emptiness, etc.  For solitude
to go the way of familiar idioms projecting distinct negativity would be unfortunate;
worst, it would condone a shallow semantic appraisal, the watering down of linguistic
value where biased impression and generalization can imprudently overshadow intrinsic
meaning.
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Chapter IV
Self as a Dynamic Work-in-progress
Any representation of "self" as an organization of interdependent processes
automatically implies that transition is at least as essential as stability.  It recognizes that
existing frameworks somehow allow for personal drive, these become integral
foundations underlying potential elevation, serving as formed pretense, ingredients
foreshadowing later developments in self-pursuit.  Ira Gordon (1958, pp. 138-51)
presented just such a perspective, where structure effects no sure stranglehold on
function.  He held that when matters of self are acknowledged as process, shifts away
from familiar dogma result.  Conversely, when structural parameters are emphasized at
the expense of this elemental human dynamism, opportunities for uniqueness get
compromised.
Gordon beheld the self as the psychological equivalent of the central nervous
system, that biochemical core for sustaining integrity requiring no catalyzing influence or
coordinating set of controls from without.  This kind of portrayal for person-hood is both
definitive (in the present) and continuous, a “self-system” stressing internal initiative
while not blindly discounting inevitabilities of circumstance.  It is a view capturing
“quality of function” in a composite profile of sorts, with temporal and yet incisive
positioning, stressing an intrinsically mutable and developmental, rather than static self-
condition.
Favoring a singularly forward progression Gordon’s self-system depicts self-
growth as an exclusively one-way development.  But this raises the question: how can
initiatives that are purposeful be distinguished from self-efforts more clearly misdirected?
While there is no absolute answer, there is something loosely recognizable with a
heightening of intuition, a seasoned coherence increasingly difficult to shake throughout
one’s self-development.  The indication is that a mounting conviction can emanate
despite formidable (possibly unanimous) resistance, sincerity to defy opposition, with
assurance guided by a durable internal compass.
Staying with this idea, if attempting to consider the likelihood of succumbing to
baneful encroachment and deception, ultimately it is one’s reflective potential, or self-
system capacity situated as the most essential marker for self-evaluationthe center
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where depth and sincerity parallel one's capability to respond maturely.  When traveling
along an ontologically relevant path there presumably appear unique, distinct milestones
of self, which had here-to-fore been inconceivable.  Moreover increments in cognitive
wherewithal are not, by this model, transient qualities; those mysteriously lost or
relinquished.  Rather, the suggestion is that capacities gained create a foundation or
essential medium upon which a more capable self-awareness secures possibility.  With
this view is portrayed (while sometimes appearing to wax and wane along this process) a
propagation self-competence which is never subtracted in whole.
The significance for self-hood to be interpreted as a series of personal
progressions is justified by its lexicalityit best denotes the antithesis of the self-
alienation concept.  Self-realization is, in a very straightforward sense the fundamental
feature of self-alienation’s overcoming.  Self can also be understood in an instrumental
way distinct from identity.  While self, as depicted, reflects the current state of maturity
for an existing self-system, identity is a more interpersonally wedded indicator, a concept
incorporating affiliation-bound factors that recognize status not directly indicative of self-
constitution in truth.
The semantic utility underscored draws from high visibility.  It stems from the
numerous associations by which this concept gets so readily employed: self-esteem, self-
confidence, self-determination, self-concept, self-interest, etc; for better or worse "self" is
the prevailing baseboard whereby a multitude of meanings access expressive value.  Even
discounting its prevalence within the social science literature, usage pervades into the
most common exchanges.  But it is just this very unfettered mutabilityits eclectic and
largely unbounded potential for applicationthat allows the essential flexibility for
interpretation.  The present idea is that self is potentially many different things.  It seems
a fitting concept therefore, appropriate for conveying a vision of something both
transmutable as well as unidirectional; a formulation not rooted but properly suited for
“beings-in-process,” yet retaining relevance where exigency for pattern and organization
are expected.
With such an eclectic premise it is important to recognize the self as entirely
distinct from ego.  Ego, at least its maturity, is an idea closely associated with inner ethic;
its health is predicted by gauging aptitudes for warding off instinctual urges.  Success for
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its growth is an indication of one's ability to best channel “virility of character,”
withstand frustrations, control emotional tension and persist toward rational, socially
delimited goals.  The self, instead, demands a conceptualization which lends credence to
one’s dynamic human center; that seat of understanding where prevailing beliefs and
fortitude of curiosity intersect and continually redefine cognition.  Such a reaching
interpretation manages to transcend virtually all contextual presumptions and conceivable
categories for approaching value judgments.
For something so fundamental (self) to be considered as a matter of process, it is
necessary to select the most telling semantic application, that which draws directly from
its premise.  Seemingly, the most compatible representation is to think (and speak) of not
any set self, nor any multifaceted representation thereof, but of a progression of separate,
situation-applicable, temporal-relevant selves.  The greatest advantage with this view is
the many possibilities for drawing an image, without having to discount or discredit the
relevance of maneuverability.  The breadth suggested here moreover is in no way
intending to reduce self-continuity to something arbitrary or ephemeral; it only attempts
to dispel static, one-dimensional preconceptions, to exemplify that there are very few
ways of predicting and pigeonholing the self.
It must be mentioned, however, that not every pluralistic view of self need be
thought of as commensurate with self-growth.  The American Psychologist William
James’ (1890) representation of “multiple selves,” while useful in displaying mutability
of behavior across various scenarios, is not a fitting model for addressing issues of self-
maturation. What he envisioned was a self which could (upon demand) divide into
various images or versions compatible with situation and expectation.  For James,
“...there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares.  He generally shows
a different side of himself to each of these different groups...where one is afraid to let one
set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere”(p.296).
While such character variations certainly occur, they manage to say littlefor
James, are not intended to addressabout any actual development of self-condition.
Absent from this image is a place for self-authenticity.  James’ depiction underscores the
inevitable self-appeasement paralleling circumstance and expectation.  It shows that self-
dispersal (rather than transformation) is more likely, more insidiously, indicative of self-
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solicitation.  This image of a divisible selfor mutual variations thereofseems
something closer to an identity reassurance quest, of being plagued by and reacting to
incomplete accord from within, resorting to self-compromise as a cry for want of a
meaningful, intrinsically relevant basis for understanding.
James presented a conceptual picture he coined discordant splitting to illustrate
this lack of self-constancy.  It is a portrayal of "self perpetually revising self," modifying
in accordance with whatever social encounters are most favorably anticipated.  In certain
ways thisamending of behavior relative to scenariomight serve as a viable tool-kit or
testing ground to decipher, and eventually endorse, whatever behaviors get weighed most
advantageous.  Yet such adaptive eclecticism could just as easily indicate an ongoing
ambiguity, evidence that self-growth has actually stagnated.
Consistent with this suggested “stagnation,” ironically, is something thriving that
allows one to internalize, and more convincingly depict, a socially versatile image.
Maneuverability becomes useful for compatibility and ease of adaptation; any clear signs
of self-immobility go largely unnoticed amongst the clamor for self-dissemination.
Convenience for accommodation is a weak platform to appreciate a stalwart self-presence
and an equally poor one for catalyzing self-augmentation.  Self-relevance
underdeveloped, may be cause, effect, or a combination as such, of being plagued by
impulse to acknowledge trend; concession to what ultimately amounts to situation
appropriate conductthis internal “correcting” according to expectation.
Most importantlyor of gravest concern for this discussionadjusting
disposition to serve the motives of another, while not always negative, manages to
conceal self-alienating impositions.  Responding competently, even to rapidly changing
conditions, may indicate nothing beyond an artful aptitude for subjugation.  No matter
one’s skill or poise, nor how aesthetically appealing or seemingly appropriate, slick social
malleability falls short as a practical asset for approaching questions relevant to self-
discovery.
Self-alienating conditions are not, nonetheless, inevitable indications of mere
parroting the social dynamic.  A sizable population certainly engage with defiance,
challenging any or all notions of willful surrender society may dish out.  While not
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exactly centerpieces of the larger cultural framework, such cases deserve attention and
will be subsequently considered in greater detail.
While following blindly is not to be accepted as universally commonplace, having
to function within a prefabricated framework virtually is.  Finding one’s niche, moreover,
by becoming part of the larger social configuration can be effective shelter for defective
motive and action.  While idealism may persist, impulse to deflect deeper intention can
be unwitting and pervasive, even for those who don’t appear to outright conform.
With relativity acknowledged, submission is not (by itself) exclusive evidence for
inhibited self-awareness.  Just as well, simply defying expectation is no good indicator of
self-directed behavior.  Letting others know where we stand with conviction may say
nothing of introspective quality, propriety, and all the other factors relevant for gathering
essential attributes necessary for self-certainty.  Confidence, while never reprehensible by
itself, may disclose no more than determination to allay fear by positioning oneself
securely.  No matter how fully voices get aired, what seems neglected most are the
“situation-specific” boundaries so vehemently defended.  Veracity is called to question,
not for insincerity but the narrowness upon which positions get supported.  Holding
strong may reveal little beyond a capacity to position well, to effectively balance oneself
against that of another.  Here determination and deference blend in a sense, for
individualistic strivings to get compromised cues only need be taken, assuredly and flatly,
in-context.
Closely resembling the picture of discordant-splitting introduced by William
James is Robert J. Lifton’s “Protean man” (1969).  This symbolic image was borrowed
from "Proteus," an Ancient Greek Mythological Figure able to change shape and exhibit
diverse functions with relative ease.  Given this mutability Proteus found it
uncomfortable, almost impossible, committing to a single form.  While gifted as fluid and
dynamic the character also suffers, delimited and unfastened by these persistent, multiple
incarnations.  Proteus is an appropriate mythic representation for the ideological hunger
to know and to feel, matched by a painful, irreconcilable, division that endures between
inner and outer worlds (pp.43-6).
This Protean Man Paradox has, in many ways, a distinctive contemporary parallel.
Mankind today is genuinely burdened by what Lifton understood as “psycho-historical
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dislocation” (p.54), when alluding to the fragmentation of cultural traditions and
dissolution of symbols, cherished staples for ready connection with one’s essential human
rootsfamily, community, religion, etc.  The break in association has tangible
implications; take for example the flood of conflicting imagery swelling contemporary
communication venues.  The picture is of a whirlingmostly media drivenplatform for
securing meaning, ambiguous as much as it is ubiquitous, the effect of a relentless
seductive force taking advantage of human compulsions for inclusion, inflating concerns
where there can be found no holistic, meaningful theme.  Where diversity reigns to such
degree “reassurances” to be sought know no boundaries.  Because images are
encountered extensively and mutually, psychological processes are also shared but
(against this backdrop) only partial and often vague meanings yield well for
interpretation.
Weakly defined yet enduring cultural idioms distort both self-perception as well
as the integrity of a self in process.  This problem corresponds directly with what Erikson
(1968, p. 131) referred to as identity diffusion (and accompanying confusion).  Since
delimiting identity calls for self-insight as well as mutual understanding (compatibility in
relation) images of what constitutes dysfunction can be fragmented in a similar sense,
with identity still fluid one's wherewithal of self can be just as tenuous.  James' vision of
(horizontally) variant selves may underscore adaptability, influence and resolve, but also
a peculiar ability to function with marginal certainty and, as Lifton (1969) reveals, with a
corresponding debasement in direction as well.
“Until relatively recently, no more than one major ideological shift was likely to occur in a lifetime, and
that one would be long remembered as a very significant inner individual turning point accompanied by a
profound soul-searching and conflict.  But today, it is not so unusual to encounter several such shifts
accomplished relatively painlessly within a year, or even a month...the rarity is the man who has gone
through life holding firmly to a single ideological vision” (p, 53).
An enhanced ability to shift ideologically may seem to some, distinct from being
a detriment, a mark of aptitude, clear evidence of social efficacy.  Gaining an essential
avenue to coincide might indicate an effective way of coming to terms with an
indiscriminant, essentially formless reality, such allowances could even be revered as
survivalist.  It cannot be overlooked then, relying upon familial and cultural symbols for
incorporating social meaning involves something beyond choice; wellsprings for
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understanding are as fundamental as the social realm itself.  When external dimensions
are, for whatever reason, rendered meaningless the urge to manufacture them is nothing
less than impulsive.  When the field opens wide symbols get taken inwhether by choice
or circumstancebut not do escape consideration all the same.
For the contemporary, needless to say, the most common instance is facing
boundaries that are tenuous more than clear.  The need to incorporate parameters, not
being diminished, only becomes less exact.  To arrive at a feasible culprit for driving and
sustaining conformity demands a broad-spectrum consideration.  Predictability suffers
most when this blurring of boundaries is never challenged, when the shift away from
familiar influence is never attempted, and uncertainties remain so well concealed that the
growth of a self in all its genuineness can secure no basis for priority.
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Chapter IV
Self as a Dynamic Work-in-progress
Any representation of "self" as an organization of interdependent processes
automatically implies that transition is at least as essential as stability.  It recognizes that
existing frameworks somehow allow for personal drive, these become integral
foundations underlying potential elevation, serving as formed pretense, ingredients
foreshadowing later developments in self-pursuit.  Ira Gordon (1958, pp. 138-51)
presented just such a perspective, where structure effects no sure stranglehold on
function.  He held that when matters of self are acknowledged as process, shifts away
from familiar dogma result.  Conversely, when structural parameters are emphasized at
the expense of this elemental human dynamism, opportunities for uniqueness get
compromised.
Gordon beheld the self as the psychological equivalent of the central nervous
system, that biochemical core for sustaining integrity requiring no catalyzing influence or
coordinating set of controls from without.  This kind of portrayal for person-hood is both
definitive (in the present) and continuous, a “self-system” stressing internal initiative
while not blindly discounting inevitabilities of circumstance.  It is a view capturing
“quality of function” in a composite profile of sorts, with temporal and yet incisive
positioning, stressing an intrinsically mutable and developmental, rather than static self-
condition.
Favoring a singularly forward progression Gordon’s self-system depicts self-
growth as an exclusively one-way development.  But this raises the question: how can
initiatives that are purposeful be distinguished from self-efforts more clearly misdirected?
While there is no absolute answer, there is something loosely recognizable with a
heightening of intuition, a seasoned coherence increasingly difficult to shake throughout
one’s self-development.  The indication is that a mounting conviction can emanate
despite formidable (possibly unanimous) resistance, sincerity to defy opposition, with
assurance guided by a durable internal compass.
Staying with this idea, if attempting to consider the likelihood of succumbing to
baneful encroachment and deception, ultimately it is one’s reflective potential, or self-
system capacity situated as the most essential marker for self-evaluationthe center
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where depth and sincerity parallel one's capability to respond maturely.  When traveling
along an ontologically relevant path there presumably appear unique, distinct milestones
of self, which had here-to-fore been inconceivable.  Moreover increments in cognitive
wherewithal are not, by this model, transient qualities; those mysteriously lost or
relinquished.  Rather, the suggestion is that capacities gained create a foundation or
essential medium upon which a more capable self-awareness secures possibility.  With
this view is portrayed (while sometimes appearing to wax and wane along this process) a
propagation self-competence which is never subtracted in whole.
The significance for self-hood to be interpreted as a series of personal
progressions is justified by its lexicalityit best denotes the antithesis of the self-
alienation concept.  Self-realization is, in a very straightforward sense the fundamental
feature of self-alienation’s overcoming.  Self can also be understood in an instrumental
way distinct from identity.  While self, as depicted, reflects the current state of maturity
for an existing self-system, identity is a more interpersonally wedded indicator, a concept
incorporating affiliation-bound factors that recognize status not directly indicative of self-
constitution in truth.
The semantic utility underscored draws from high visibility.  It stems from the
numerous associations by which this concept gets so readily employed: self-esteem, self-
confidence, self-determination, self-concept, self-interest, etc; for better or worse "self" is
the prevailing baseboard whereby a multitude of meanings access expressive value.  Even
discounting its prevalence within the social science literature, usage pervades into the
most common exchanges.  But it is just this very unfettered mutabilityits eclectic and
largely unbounded potential for applicationthat allows the essential flexibility for
interpretation.  The present idea is that self is potentially many different things.  It seems
a fitting concept therefore, appropriate for conveying a vision of something both
transmutable as well as unidirectional; a formulation not rooted but properly suited for
“beings-in-process,” yet retaining relevance where exigency for pattern and organization
are expected.
With such an eclectic premise it is important to recognize the self as entirely
distinct from ego.  Ego, at least its maturity, is an idea closely associated with inner ethic;
its health is predicted by gauging aptitudes for warding off instinctual urges.  Success for
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its growth is an indication of one's ability to best channel “virility of character,”
withstand frustrations, control emotional tension and persist toward rational, socially
delimited goals.  The self, instead, demands a conceptualization which lends credence to
one’s dynamic human center; that seat of understanding where prevailing beliefs and
fortitude of curiosity intersect and continually redefine cognition.  Such a reaching
interpretation manages to transcend virtually all contextual presumptions and conceivable
categories for approaching value judgments.
For something so fundamental (self) to be considered as a matter of process, it is
necessary to select the most telling semantic application, that which draws directly from
its premise.  Seemingly, the most compatible representation is to think (and speak) of not
any set self, nor any multifaceted representation thereof, but of a progression of separate,
situation-applicable, temporal-relevant selves.  The greatest advantage with this view is
the many possibilities for drawing an image, without having to discount or discredit the
relevance of maneuverability.  The breadth suggested here moreover is in no way
intending to reduce self-continuity to something arbitrary or ephemeral; it only attempts
to dispel static, one-dimensional preconceptions, to exemplify that there are very few
ways of predicting and pigeonholing the self.
It must be mentioned, however, that not every pluralistic view of self need be
thought of as commensurate with self-growth.  The American Psychologist William
James’ (1890) representation of “multiple selves,” while useful in displaying mutability
of behavior across various scenarios, is not a fitting model for addressing issues of self-
maturation. What he envisioned was a self which could (upon demand) divide into
various images or versions compatible with situation and expectation.  For James,
“...there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares.  He generally shows
a different side of himself to each of these different groups...where one is afraid to let one
set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere”(p.296).
While such character variations certainly occur, they manage to say littlefor
James, are not intended to addressabout any actual development of self-condition.
Absent from this image is a place for self-authenticity.  James’ depiction underscores the
inevitable self-appeasement paralleling circumstance and expectation.  It shows that self-
dispersal (rather than transformation) is more likely, more insidiously, indicative of self-
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solicitation.  This image of a divisible selfor mutual variations thereofseems
something closer to an identity reassurance quest, of being plagued by and reacting to
incomplete accord from within, resorting to self-compromise as a cry for want of a
meaningful, intrinsically relevant basis for understanding.
James presented a conceptual picture he coined discordant splitting to illustrate
this lack of self-constancy.  It is a portrayal of "self perpetually revising self," modifying
in accordance with whatever social encounters are most favorably anticipated.  In certain
ways thisamending of behavior relative to scenariomight serve as a viable tool-kit or
testing ground to decipher, and eventually endorse, whatever behaviors get weighed most
advantageous.  Yet such adaptive eclecticism could just as easily indicate an ongoing
ambiguity, evidence that self-growth has actually stagnated.
Consistent with this suggested “stagnation,” ironically, is something thriving that
allows one to internalize, and more convincingly depict, a socially versatile image.
Maneuverability becomes useful for compatibility and ease of adaptation; any clear signs
of self-immobility go largely unnoticed amongst the clamor for self-dissemination.
Convenience for accommodation is a weak platform to appreciate a stalwart self-presence
and an equally poor one for catalyzing self-augmentation.  Self-relevance
underdeveloped, may be cause, effect, or a combination as such, of being plagued by
impulse to acknowledge trend; concession to what ultimately amounts to situation
appropriate conductthis internal “correcting” according to expectation.
Most importantlyor of gravest concern for this discussionadjusting
disposition to serve the motives of another, while not always negative, manages to
conceal self-alienating impositions.  Responding competently, even to rapidly changing
conditions, may indicate nothing beyond an artful aptitude for subjugation.  No matter
one’s skill or poise, nor how aesthetically appealing or seemingly appropriate, slick social
malleability falls short as a practical asset for approaching questions relevant to self-
discovery.
Self-alienating conditions are not, nonetheless, inevitable indications of mere
parroting the social dynamic.  A sizable population certainly engage with defiance,
challenging any or all notions of willful surrender society may dish out.  While not
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exactly centerpieces of the larger cultural framework, such cases deserve attention and
will be subsequently considered in greater detail.
While following blindly is not to be accepted as universally commonplace, having
to function within a prefabricated framework virtually is.  Finding one’s niche, moreover,
by becoming part of the larger social configuration can be effective shelter for defective
motive and action.  While idealism may persist, impulse to deflect deeper intention can
be unwitting and pervasive, even for those who don’t appear to outright conform.
With relativity acknowledged, submission is not (by itself) exclusive evidence for
inhibited self-awareness.  Just as well, simply defying expectation is no good indicator of
self-directed behavior.  Letting others know where we stand with conviction may say
nothing of introspective quality, propriety, and all the other factors relevant for gathering
essential attributes necessary for self-certainty.  Confidence, while never reprehensible by
itself, may disclose no more than determination to allay fear by positioning oneself
securely.  No matter how fully voices get aired, what seems neglected most are the
“situation-specific” boundaries so vehemently defended.  Veracity is called to question,
not for insincerity but the narrowness upon which positions get supported.  Holding
strong may reveal little beyond a capacity to position well, to effectively balance oneself
against that of another.  Here determination and deference blend in a sense, for
individualistic strivings to get compromised cues only need be taken, assuredly and flatly,
in-context.
Closely resembling the picture of discordant-splitting introduced by William
James is Robert J. Lifton’s “Protean man” (1969).  This symbolic image was borrowed
from "Proteus," an Ancient Greek Mythological Figure able to change shape and exhibit
diverse functions with relative ease.  Given this mutability Proteus found it
uncomfortable, almost impossible, committing to a single form.  While gifted as fluid and
dynamic the character also suffers, delimited and unfastened by these persistent, multiple
incarnations.  Proteus is an appropriate mythic representation for the ideological hunger
to know and to feel, matched by a painful, irreconcilable, division that endures between
inner and outer worlds (pp.43-6).
This Protean Man Paradox has, in many ways, a distinctive contemporary parallel.
Mankind today is genuinely burdened by what Lifton understood as “psycho-historical
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dislocation” (p.54), when alluding to the fragmentation of cultural traditions and
dissolution of symbols, cherished staples for ready connection with one’s essential human
rootsfamily, community, religion, etc.  The break in association has tangible
implications; take for example the flood of conflicting imagery swelling contemporary
communication venues.  The picture is of a whirlingmostly media drivenplatform for
securing meaning, ambiguous as much as it is ubiquitous, the effect of a relentless
seductive force taking advantage of human compulsions for inclusion, inflating concerns
where there can be found no holistic, meaningful theme.  Where diversity reigns to such
degree “reassurances” to be sought know no boundaries.  Because images are
encountered extensively and mutually, psychological processes are also shared but
(against this backdrop) only partial and often vague meanings yield well for
interpretation.
Weakly defined yet enduring cultural idioms distort both self-perception as well
as the integrity of a self in process.  This problem corresponds directly with what Erikson
(1968, p. 131) referred to as identity diffusion (and accompanying confusion).  Since
delimiting identity calls for self-insight as well as mutual understanding (compatibility in
relation) images of what constitutes dysfunction can be fragmented in a similar sense,
with identity still fluid one's wherewithal of self can be just as tenuous.  James' vision of
(horizontally) variant selves may underscore adaptability, influence and resolve, but also
a peculiar ability to function with marginal certainty and, as Lifton (1969) reveals, with a
corresponding debasement in direction as well.
“Until relatively recently, no more than one major ideological shift was likely to occur in a lifetime, and
that one would be long remembered as a very significant inner individual turning point accompanied by a
profound soul-searching and conflict.  But today, it is not so unusual to encounter several such shifts
accomplished relatively painlessly within a year, or even a month...the rarity is the man who has gone
through life holding firmly to a single ideological vision” (p, 53).
An enhanced ability to shift ideologically may seem to some, distinct from being
a detriment, a mark of aptitude, clear evidence of social efficacy.  Gaining an essential
avenue to coincide might indicate an effective way of coming to terms with an
indiscriminant, essentially formless reality, such allowances could even be revered as
survivalist.  It cannot be overlooked then, relying upon familial and cultural symbols for
incorporating social meaning involves something beyond choice; wellsprings for
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understanding are as fundamental as the social realm itself.  When external dimensions
are, for whatever reason, rendered meaningless the urge to manufacture them is nothing
less than impulsive.  When the field opens wide symbols get taken inwhether by choice
or circumstancebut not do escape consideration all the same.
For the contemporary, needless to say, the most common instance is facing
boundaries that are tenuous more than clear.  The need to incorporate parameters, not
being diminished, only becomes less exact.  To arrive at a feasible culprit for driving and
sustaining conformity demands a broad-spectrum consideration.  Predictability suffers
most when this blurring of boundaries is never challenged, when the shift away from
familiar influence is never attempted, and uncertainties remain so well concealed that the
growth of a self in all its genuineness can secure no basis for priority.
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Chapter V
Roots of Self-Alienation
A Personal Reflection
In 1969 after my 13 year-old cousin’s family tragically died in a fire, our family
suddenly became hers.  The introduction of a new member was an exciting, yet quite
traumatic change.  Our close-knit group had been disrupted overnight in that we had new
roles which none of us yet knew how to fill.  A hard to describe, hard to address
imbalance was immediately created; regular functions, specifically relations with one
another, had been noticeably upended. Responsibility of such importance provoked an
urgency to organize and redefine our infrastructure, to reevaluate what we usually took
for granted, and finally to acknowledge what had previously gone to a large extent
unquestioned: our usual expectations and familiar patterns of operation.
A pressing need was to figure out a reasonable means for her inclusion, the most
accessible avenue into our distinct ways of knowing, the clearest opportunity for
providing a niche where she could conveniently fit into our existing familial machinery.
What occurred was a spontaneous pursuit on all our parts to best understand her, a
concerted effort to explore possible venues to allow her identity to project convincingly
forth.  Yet we strove to know her not exclusively for her sake.  An (at least) equally
relevant motive was to better comprehend, and most effectively address, the changes we
ourselves were undergoing.
After she had a job at a local bakery for a few weeks I was perplexed when it did
not last.  Even though I still hardly knew her, I somehow felt it was uncharacteristic for
her to quit so soon, the job seemed a good environment for her.  Not only had she (we)
descended from a family of bakers, she seemed to love working around food and helping
create meals.  Most importantly I (virtually anyone who knew her) recognized her
approachable, cheerful character that seemed intuitively a perfect fit for a service-
oriented position.  It was an ideal opportunity for genial attention: an occupation where
pleasantries are freely exchanged with customers and high visibility is advantageous.
The anticipated (idyllic) connection, of course, was also an unmistakable way in
which I could identify her.  Her job became a useful channel to fuse mannerisms and
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personal qualities to a specific role.  In retrospect—I have come to understand—I viewed
this as a necessary catalyst, a means for her character potential to secure a tangible basis,
the choice inspirational path where those natural attributes could be best invested.  All
this, nonetheless, to turn her into an objective truth which could be understood on terms I
projected appropriate for her.  It was not that I wanted her to be anything she was not, yet
I wished her to be comprehensible, one for whom there was a sound guidepost for
understanding.  My intuitive concern for her fit therefore took precedence, coming before
any languishing she figure out the most appropriate way for herself.  When she quit it
seemed an abrupt and foolish move, when in truth I could not accurately recognize her as
I had so impulsively expected.
Prior to ever revealing much maturity of choice, culture taught me that it was
essential to place my cousin in a category from which I could predict a tangible, socially
“relevant” identity.  The weaker the manifest identity I experience of her however, the
less I believe I am able to offer her.  The less I can offer, the fewer clues I can provide
that I am motivated or even concerned enough to get to know her.  With this, the less I
feel capable of getting to know her, the less it seems I am able to offer her of myself.
Through cultural common sense, by placing someone in a static category I gain a more
credible opportunity toward understanding, an indispensable medium where connection
seems more plausible.  Yet this greatly anticipated avenue has an inherent paradoxical
quality.  While it provides entrance into knowing, it simultaneously carries knowledge
along a prefigured medium.  Critical therefore must be the nature of inquiry, so that
knowing something about can be distinguished from, and recognized with certainty to be
something inferior to knowing.  The most familiar means for understanding, while
allowing ready access, also manages to overly focus, reduce and ultimately
compartmentalize meanings.
Sincerity of motive, it seems, did not save me from obscuring and undermining
my stark assumptions.  Through an eagerness to categorize someone, albeit with good
intentions, I also ended up placing a boundary around this person as well.  To underscore
this wayward logic it must be reemphasized that “getting to know” is not somehow
automatically equivalent to getting to know matters of significance.  My convictions were
normal but presumptuous since (after sifting through personal particularities) I
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mistakenly thought to have at my disposal a ready profile, exclusive evidence easily
accessible, with a solid base for comparison.
Forces That Craft Identity
The futility of depending upon a fact-laden approach toward understanding
identity is not always obvious; efforts toward an interpretation, rather than unearthing
truth, often antithetic to motive, manage to invite barriers and close doors.  With an
imperative for certainty driving actions less obvious possibilities are assertively
diminished, effectively avoided or reduced to superficial irrelevance.  The consequence is
for a forced gravitation toward the familiar when searching out each other’s identities;
insisting that inner beliefs pivot upon mutual ways of knowing, we are forever groping
for similar structures upon which to relate.  Rarely are we able to get acquainted with
another without playing on the same field, yet, we are not really ourselves on this field
which we so instrumentally resort, and so depend.  Indeed, often we come to “know”
others by relying upon fundamentally accepted rules for not being ourselves.  These are
some featured paradoxes supporting the ubiquitous foundation of self-alienation (Jourard,
1971, pp. 28-33).
Naturally however, to defy convention and explore unique ways into seeing the
world is hardly a clear and never an easily definable pursuit, common ground is a feature
commensurate with meaning itself.  Identity, in fact one’s very existence, generally
hinges on whatever security interpersonal expectations can contribute.  Social boundaries
are, for the most part, intuitively suggested givens, with indispensability largely
overlooked provided it goes unquestioned or otherwise is not used as a blatant focal point
for discrimination.
Fromm (1962, pp. 94-6, 127) recognized identity to be distinct and demanding of
a more elastic interpretation than self-determination alone could provide, his position
moreover is compatible with Gordon’s (1958) self-system.  Identity incorporates
characteristics of both social form and inner relevance, while one’s “self-position” in the
same respect conveys intrinsic as well as externally determined qualities; both identity
and self-system ideas imply (human) hybridization, a merging of the social with the
intrinsic.  What remains less certain is to what degree each area influences a particular
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person and contributes to, or detracts from, understanding.  But it is safe to assume that
choice can be obscured even when felt unquestionable, where assurances rest surprisingly
well on illusion, and identity gains security in spite of much inner ambiguity.
Primarily for these reasons, "getting-to-know" and "new-ways-of-understanding,"
while sharing obvious surface similarity, must be recognized as explicit.  For the latter
suggests uniqueness in discovery indicating something beyond the conventional,
indoctrination-style, i.e., tell-me-what-you-do inquiry.  The former, conversely, projects a
more one-dimensional way of forming judgements and is, in large part, indicative of
modern societal materialism.  Furthermore what one has represents, not simply valuables
but knowledge and position in kind.  Societal advantages become ultimate focal points
for recognizing merit; cultivated as implicit truths, desired skills get paraded no less than
the most glorified possessions.
Somehow work, the way our culture has come to perceive it, serves as a highly
visible yardstick for telling us who we are.  Combs (1958, pp. 212-13) drew attention to
how occupational responsibility creates self-fulfilling effects and, moreover, how with
respect to one’s self-concept, quotas generally abided to provide little genuine connection
with capability.  Unbalanced emphasis on employment skews, contains, and relegates
conceptions of identity to the economic.  For many, much dissatisfaction suggests, jobs
cannot easily (accurately) coincide with self-relevance, as if they magically blended with
and characterized “tell tale” qualities of our intrinsic nature.  Closer to the truth, even by
popular opinion, jobs are often reduced to little more than narrowly appreciated
obligations, unavoidable eventualities of life, "opportunities" which are in fact mandatory
for managing an existence.  Occupational relevance promises less any inherent goodness
but more a built-in inevitability; distinct from underscoring an essence of existence, jobs
might as likely be recognized as capriciously defined means toward impossible to defy,
unavoidable, ends.
On the positive side though, any natural inclination for stability does provide
comfort of predictability.  When essential supports are in doubt (occupational or
otherwise) even our most basic assurances get jeopardized.  Rather than instilling strong
incentive to endure through rugged individualism, social-identity threat, conversely,
ignites a desperate pursuit to validate (whether legitimate or not) interpersonal relevance.
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De-stability initiates overwhelming urgency for re-stability, familiarity is fundamental for
certainty, for revealing when questionable bases appropriate upon which to relate.
Value afforded to security then, is not to be reduced to a lesser essential than self-
realization.  Needs are needs.  They surface, upset and transform lives in complicated and
unexpected ways.  Some needs are naturally more clear and readily visible than others,
similarly, the degree to which needs can be addressed directly vary substantially as well.
It would be helpful if depth of concern corresponded directly with needs most
intrinsically relevant, yet this is generally not the case.  In fact meaning and urgency
behind needs are often miscalculated, de-emphasized or unwittingly ignored; more than
being conveniently put aside, in spite of their importance, they can be mysteriously
cleared or detached from the conscious realm altogether.  While concern over self-
relevance may not normally appear a conscious preoccupation, the effect of it being
obscured or ignored or persistsas vaguely definable ill willsurfacing through
character ambiguity, anxiety, or voids of unspecified melancholy (Horney, 1950, pp. 155-
75).
Considering deception's breadth, where justification rides on impulse provoked by
caprices of circumstance, existing arrangements often foreshadow outcomes,
predisposing personal choice.  Overly magnified for most, employment (and the
infrastructure so representative of it) tends to project possibilities that are ultimate.
Incorporating fully and redirecting if necessary, it anticipates irrefutable lifelines to the
social known; occupation instills something as fundamental as one’s inclination for
identity.  When most are captivated by forces largely in flux, influences fueling this
vehicle can evade effective scrutiny.  Despite the ambiguity implicit with any identity-
quest, its telling urgency, the propulsion for predictabilityhowever misconstrued by
cultural forcesrefuses to cease.
Self-Alienation and the social known
All this speculative emphasis naturally begs for a practical question that addresses
unmet needs involving self-alienation.  This is inherently difficult to do since self-
alienation tends to fall conveniently into a category of normal, in that impositions are
often so weakly recognizable.  The usual assumptions, exaggerations, misunderstandings
and deliberate distortions are not only common they are commonly tolerated.  It is this
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naive acceptance that best protects the deceptive barrier, maintaining situational-relevant
obstacles impairing incentives for self-growth.
There is however an exception where self-alienation persists but manages to
escape the interests of social influence.  While I will explore this aspect more thoroughly
in a later section, I wish to introduce it here to distinguish it from more benign
conceptions of self-alienation.  To make this point I refer to those who experience social
alienation and self-alienation as coupled, or compounded into a single syndrome.  While
self-alienation alone may very well be interpersonally inhibiting to various degrees, I
prefer to distinguish specifically between self-alienation commensurate with
interpersonal support, and self-alienation paired with interpersonal exclusion and its
distinctive pain.
This latter, dualistic, version of alienation surfaces in ways much more revealing
than self-alienation alone.  At its widest extreme, dual-form alienation would be most
clearly evident in cases of schizophrenia or acute psychotic delusion.  Here there exists a
sort of pseudo-independence coupled with marked detachment from meaningful social
connection.  This may be indicative of self-afflicted estrangement or consequences
endured through outright rejection, results of a more imposing interpersonal division.
Irrespective of origin, manifestations (unlike self-alienation alone) are put clearly on
display; heightened visibility becomes something both externally evident as well as
internally obvious.  Dual-form alienation (featuring both inner and outer division)
ironically takes on a discernable shape and provides a base for graphic, sometimes
humiliating exposure.  Alienation manifesting as a totality appears nothing like the
stereotypical, more elusive, self-alienation that gets insidiously obscured by affiliation
and identity securities, assurances embedded as essentials of the cultural infrastructure.
This is not to suggest that self-alienation (alone) exists in an attenuated form.  While
certainly not clear of symptom self-alienation absent social estrangement, staying well
within the psychological mainstream, remains less susceptible to diagnostic scrutiny.
Dual-form alienation can be distinguished from more purposeful division or
separation from society given its trademark stagnation in self-growth.  Those afflicted, by
this description, are burdened with distinct intrapersonal responsibility without benefit of
a suitable internal definition.  Despite their blatant exclusions they remain (at least
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indirectly) interpersonally dependentsuffering through a paradoxical connection
through protracted estrangement.  Ill-prepared to rely on their own devices there is no
choice but to allow for, at least, superficial involvement to cover for obvious self-
insufficiencies.  When genuine inclusion is repeatedly denied or otherwise unattainable
self-obscurity often grows; a cost that obliterates fundamental opportunities for
individualistic pursuits.  The indication is that abandonment from social contexts can be
catastrophic when this underpinning, alienation-from-the-self, has not been effectively
surmounted.
While every case is unique and finely delineated categories offer convenience
more than justification there exists, nonetheless, a distinction to be drawn.
Discriminations are supportable by logic as well as intuition; the self-alienated vs. the
self-alienated being socially rejected need to be considered separately.  The defining
quality they hold in common is a shortcoming of the intrapersonal, but how adequately
one might manage given this fundamental deficit is an entirely different question.  Self-
alienation, generally speaking, suggests a lack of self-sufficiency led primarily by
compulsions for self-escape, but a necessary related question is how accessible human
resources are to buffer any given predicament.  One image shows alienating
characteristics products of strong affiliation detriments, while for the other, where social
sanctification functions as a protective shield, impositions and hindrances are much less
clear.
However beneficial this appears for the self-alienated remaining involved any
privilege gained acts as a double-edged sword—supports do protect one’s image, but it is
this very advantage which invites a relinquishing of self-responsibility.  Reliable affiliates
are quite effective in helping provide an external foundation for identity reassurance.
While consonant acceptance permits the indisputable advantage of belonging it
simultaneously works to silence (actually suppress) symptoms of deficiency.  Longings
for self-insight can then afford to wane, to becoming non-concerns inasmuch as social
relevance gets obviated.  The indication is that the self can thereby afford to ignore itself
(its growth) while camaraderie provides a safety net of emotional assuredness, that
critical feature where identity can secure a sense of certitude.
Concerns over social connection vs. disjunction may in certain ways seem
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completely removed from issues specific to inner well being.  Yet, the point must be
reiterated that social assurances very often contribute to an adulterated security,
remaining woefully equipped to outline symptoms specifically relevant to one’s self-
condition.  Good-natured advice, with its built-in imposition is never a sure remedy for
quelling personal doubt; challenging self-alienation effectively is, in the final analysis, a
personal responsibility.  Relational supports, while emotionally essential, inspire little
interest in possibilities transcending custom; even at their best they provide few
incentives for opposing good-natured intrusion, ways that might help provoke a most
self-relevant transformation.
Simply appreciating need for change moreover is no assurance for appropriate
action.  The only practical approach to address this malignancy is to attack it at its root,
otherwise a difficult to evade lure will remain, fueled through false confidence, persisting
with illusive permanence.  Resilience lies in its invisibility, self-alienation strikes not at
any periphery but more beguilingly at a less measurable core.  To be deceived, as such, is
to be sucked wholly into a picture as it currently exists and still remain unconcerned.
Self-alienation is a social-borne enigma effectively perpetuated through blind acceptance
from within; it is not an affliction with clearly definable remedies, no magical solutions
exist.  Instead it is a consequence of culture, a condition reflecting the potency through
which condoned beliefs overshadow heuristic pursuits.
Self-alienation therefore cannot be successfully overcome without
“confrontation” with the unfamiliar.  While such a proposal may not seem profound, the
problem lies in the difficulty securing means; it is less an issue concerning specific
motive or intent.  Yearning for the unfamiliar is nothing striking, yet self-alienation gets
perpetuated through venues seemingly innocent as following instruction.  Behaviors
associated with simply “tuning-in” can appease one’s sensibilities and undermine or
exaggerate perceptions of self-certainty.  Moreover, optioning outside known boundaries
is generally uncomfortable; driving this insecurity is a fundamental fear of detachment.
Trepidation draws not only from apprehension over rejection but more convincingly, it
seems, from the formidable prospects of having to (without conventional buffers) first
confront one’s impending self-absence.
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Self-alienation is therefore most resistant to frontal attack.  Another way to
imagine it is as something securing insidiously from deep recesses.  It stifles breadth of
purpose by binding to emotion; practical intuitions get persuasively undermined and
placated.  In such a way, as Marx recognized, it takes our potential essence away
fiendishly behind our backs (Fromm, 1962, p. 109).  This is the consequence of
ignorance; implicitly it is also a consequence of sloth.  The kernel for criticism is that
opportunities to change are all around.  “Successfully” obscuring paths toward freedom
deserve less merit than productively paving ways and falling short.  But even with self-
initiative certain and sincerity favorable, the most purposeful direction for motives can
still be difficult to recognize.
Self-alienation, this recondite human plight, from all indications requires a unique
means of confrontation.  It cries for idiosyncratic understanding, a marginal trust that
might anticipate something beyond prefabricated or customary solutions.  It seems
feasible that “shared privacy,” as a point of emphasis, would nurture greater potential,
instill a quality of maturity more purposeful than conventional entanglements contribute—
there is likely some merit for this image. Yet human nature shows that intentions will (to
various degrees) be misinterpreted, guided, or inappropriately stereotyped.  Unprovoked
“inspiration” means seminal beliefs are (along with good intentions) easily run amuck,
often in spite of good company.  In the end intuition and initiative of pursuitmore than
strength of supportcontribute most effectively to an incontestable base for stability, that
essential place where uniqueness can fuel life change.  Put simply, the more resolutely one
can unearth attractions outside cultural anticipation, the more completely barriers of self-
alienation can be identified and, therefore, the more thoroughly familiar distortions can be
distinguished from matters of self-relevance.
Self-Alienation as Learned Helplessness
With an emphasis that parallels the issue of "deficits in self-directed initiative,"
Selye, (1950) presented a convincing case that stress can generate noxious consequences,
setting-in-action a general adaptation syndrome.  What this model displays best is that
resistance, outright, to upsetting properties of stress wane as the futility of applying such
effort becomes increasingly self-obvious.  Borrowing this backdrop, submitting to other-
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directed ways of understandingas adaptationmight in a similar sense be recognized
as a succumbing to uncontrollable forces, providing evidence of a proliferating
resignation taking hold.  With respect to self-growth potential may be getting equally
“arrested,” where unique energies culminate in a broad-scale inner-relinquishment.  More
precisely, given such forfeiture, one is afflicted with a mounting conviction that things
couldn’t be otherwise.  What this “settling-in” can potentially upset is personal “spirit-
trite,” or more plainly, vestiges of awareness that initiative requires reassessment, that
inner virulence and depth of meaning are routinely attenuated, while the most
fundamental obstacles go without challenge (Jourard, 1971, pp. 80-5).
In cases of chronic stress, as with adaptation through self-alienation, the essence
of injury is either too far removed for solutions to be apprehended or buried too deep to
be psychologically comprehensible.  Yet variations as to what qualifies as stress or
estrangement is always an open question.  Nuances are, in other words, afflictive in ways
that vary greatly between subjects as well as peculiarities of circumstance.  This point is
meant to emphasize the problem quantifying deprecation, the difficulty arriving at a true
picture of oppression.  Many relent to relatively weak forces while others endure in spite
of the most bleak of outlooks.  Discrepancies to be drawn, therefore, cannot simply be
reflections on the severity of circumstance at hand but must include factors such as
resiliency, hope, and intrinsic openness.
While learned helplessness as an analogy with impediments in self-growth is
conceivable, these ideas are not thoroughly compatible; as limiting as self-alienating
effects are, they remain illusive enough where stifling effects can be routinely overlooked
or diminished.  Even when clutched within its unyielding grip, one can be spared a
conscious burden.  Assaults upon the self are consequences of social seduction more than
overt subjugation.  Learned helplessness is most relevantly associated with self-alienation
in that, in either case, concessions allowed create traps divorced from genuine inner
initiative.
Because self-alienation is so invisible next to stress, where it concerns learned
helplessness, comparisons are inexact.  While stress induces a direct, immediate impact,
growth of the self is not a pressing priority or preoccupation for most.  Even if “life
relevant” questions are not clearly dismissed, seldom are they focal points for everyday
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awareness.  Self-sacrifice is rarely a preoccupation for those so enmeshed with others the
identity they hold most substantial actually hinges upon them.  If this is the case
interpersonal departure gets reduced to negatives; displacement enables formally buried
uncertainties associated with self-neglect to invade consciousness; concerns do not
simply generate choices between set alternatives but trigger doubt-filled imperatives,
insecure impasses that, when impossible to ignore, can only fuel a mysterious inner-
emptiness.
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Chapter VI
Alienation as an Aspectual Concept
The Alienation Phenomenon
To represent alienation "as a phenomenon" it is necessary to carry an argument
that social estrangement and conformity be understood as conjoined; here alienation can
be presented symbolically as (E/C), where each idea is shown distinct but still
inseparably wedded.  This captures the full meaning better than do loose, isolated
applications.  Social science, for the most part, depicts alienation through separate
categories or sets of features, where each semantic image is considered unique, but all are
still tied to this one sole concept (Barakett, 1969, p. 2).
Self-alienation, fundamentally speaking, signifies an abdication of personal
rights—this is most evident when conformity (C) alone can create a tight
interpersonal stranglehold.  But alienation also has close associations with
excommunication, irrational passions, peculiarity, pride, and other socially
estranging (E) qualities that compel a distinct will to surface.  Self-alienating
qualities that are most indicative of illusive interdependence, get paradoxically
coupled with features particular to relational exclusion, so that when either
conceptual dimension of this alienation composite (no matter how contrasting) gets
excluded, holistic meaning is not possible.
The ultimate purpose behind this preferred arrangement may not be at first
obvious.  Because alienation demands considerable breath for interpretation its
subjective aspects must merge with (and be reconciled against) its more objective
one’s.  Within these supra-concepts (E/C) are embedded sub or constituent
elements, together which show alienation to be recognizable as a spectrum of
distinguishable aspects.  The great cost in any semantic quest is concept
fragmentation, with value restored only in recapturing integrity.  However uneven
these supra-concepts first appear, sides deserve to be balanced; however anomalous
and incongruous conformity and exclusion, each are intimately tied, bound within a
psycho-social collage.
Conformity (C) can be divided into three broad components—suggestion,
internalization and identification.  Compliance is an aspect that forms a bridge, so to
speak, from the world of conformity to a much more overtly impacting social
alienation.  Interpersonal estrangement is less clearly delineated since external
separation carries many impressions and is rarely absolute.  Briefly, deviance
indicates a very objective social alienation but connections are reestablished in
another venue.  Individuality and autonomy assume varied forms, each conveying
distinct affiliate estrangements accented by specific channels where interpersonal
merging remains possible.  Finally, psychosis is indicative of (E) at its greatest
extreme, the most thorough kind of interpersonal alienation conceivable.
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Part 1
Intrapersonal Aspects of Alienation
Illusions of Individuality
Authentic individuality is rarely witnessed in the middle of a staged spectacle; it
is a character quality urging sufficient foresight and preparation.  Its image, for instance,
requires a vocabulary proficient enough to support intended positions.  It must be
defendable not simply by being meaningful but, as importantly, in being comprehensible.
Individuality depends upon pliable criteria where respected opinions might be
challenged.  Inner positioning must be carefully balanced, so any given stance taken is
not unwittingly derived from unseen premises.  True individuality does not reject all
supporting knowledge, it only demands option be afforded priority over permanence.
Fundamental assumptions are subject to scrutiny for no more specific purpose than the
sharpening critical perception.  Needless to say this is not always the best prescription for
making, much less keeping, an abundance of friends.
The greatest limitation for this outlook is that self-exploration, in comparison to
advice and training, is not well accepted in our society, at least not where it regularly
crosses boundaries from ideal into real.  This is not an entirely negative commentary
because a lingering belief or illusion of individuality generally persists, providing
evidence that interest still endures.  It is difficult to justify nonetheless, given its wide
admiration and appeal, how individuality might get so distorted in truth.  One useful
analogy is to imagine the degree of personal control (impressions of freedom) commonly
accepted within a dream state.  In an underworld very much obscuring perceptions of
choice, there develops an overwhelming tendency to be convinced of circumstances and
events that, only upon awakening, are realized to hold no practicality or truth.  Control so
seeming real is resting upon premises less stable than a house of cards.  Affirmed without
the luxury of a reliable reflective will, dream concerns are responded to as they are
encountered, by caprice.  As everyone who dreams knows, false images have a way of
prevailing over veracity, not only is ambiguity unavoidable, beliefs prior to waking are
held to be irrefutable.
74
Clinging to illusion is not simply evidence of personal shortcoming; it is in some
ways necessary for an intact, discernable identity.  A key quality to note for the modern
community is (given a strong underlying commonality) how character depicting it can be.
Though varied characteristics do exist, attitudes generally gravitate around a fundamental
base.  The individual “surfaces,” but also gets curbed and channeled through cultural
contingencies, in this case, upon those drawing heavily on a social contract idea for
society dating back to the 17th century.
Social Contact
For a believer in communal integrity social contract was viewed a practical
avenue for relinquishing personal rights to a sovereign authority, a sacrifice justified for
the "betterment of all."  Personal growth, while valued theoretically, was also conditional,
depending on provisions that quality cohesion be maintained.  This proposition insisted
on divestiture of liberty; characterized as voluntary it was equated with investment,
positioned to pay off in very personal ways where"…each gives himself to all…without
reservation" (Schacht, 1970, p. 11).  The central idea was that each and everyone hand
oneself over willingly for the sake of community survival.  This theory has its original
roots in property transfer.  Only in this case the "products" being divested (transferred)
are human beings, or more precisely their independence in exchange for a proposed
security (pp. 8-13).
Social contract parallels the least detectable aspects of (self) alienation.
Relinquishment of personal liberty for the good of another is largely an abstraction,
escaping the realm of conscious depth and maturity.  Some recognize nothing of inner
sacrifice.  Others may trivialize losses of liberty by mouthing sentiments for solidarity
more than is warranted.  Still others will be able to sense a void of injustice but be unable
to target their concern.  The Modern American Democracy is a, modified with time,
variation on social contract.  The ideal becomes most revealing with draws toward
popular causes, where personal concerns get set aside for the greater good.
In the same way that Hegel's emphasis on unity included an important feature for
surmounting interpersonal alienation through surrender, the contemporary version
(surrender via social contract) gets lauded as no less essential.  In the later case,
nonetheless, relinquishments for a consensus cause are not likely to transpire as matters
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of true choice.  Culture, with its many paradoxes, can congeal only superficially so that
the essential "payoff" (self-sacrifice in the name of communal integrity) still premature,
falters incomplete.
It is worth mentioning that compromise of personal right for the whole
accentuates—whether by belief alone or given reliable evidence—equality of condition.
Equality carries significance in its associations with "coming back," where images having
to do with the communal-other seem to matter again.  This can be a pleasant
consideration for many where "reunion" has chance to triumph over chaos, camaraderie
the possibility to outshine coercion.  For the general citizen the gain is also an avenue
away from isolation, the most foreboding consequence of estrangement.  In many cases
"equal condition" spells nothing less than "identity haven," where wholeness is sanctified
and self-assertion still seems (somehow) to remain an option.
As alluded, the naivete so characteristic of self-alienation shares some of the
"good for everyone" qualities implicit in social contract.  Because parallels are strong
analogies are helpful, even though Hegel’s metaphysical emphasis is not particularly
relevant here.  While Hegel was not a social contract theorist in the spirit of Hobbes or
Locke he undoubtedly recognized this direction of thought.  His attraction to unity was in
large part a reaction to the skepticism for institutions so sweeping Europe during the
Romantic Period.  His philosophical solution to quell these turbulent conditions called for
solidarity (pp. 48-50).  While never denouncing individuality, given his intrigue with
merging, Hegel helped pin down the credibility of ethical standards where unity could be
elevated.  Whatever his source intention, the effect of this emphasis helped for
interdependence to overshadow individuality as a lasting virtue.
With Hegel in perspective, it is easier to recognize with social contract the likely
fate for individuality; the unfortunate notion that many end-up essentially forfeiting their
"individuality" before any credible relinquishment is warranted.  This supposes the
surrender "virtue" can precede good opportunities for individualistic initiative.  For most,
it seems, the likelihood choice will ever have full opportunity to mature is marginal, so
that with assertions still well "in context," initiatives rarely penetrate convention.  To the
extent this remains true, any formal contractual agreement suggesting alienation-of-will
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to be a noble idyllic relinquishment, is likely no more than an effective device to
subjugate perpetuated by a climate ripe for conformity.
Sacrifice, to be a virtue, must involve something more than respect and concern
over community integrity can explain; often forfeited prematurely is potential for
understanding, compromised by abstract initiatives for communal harmony.  Indeed,
what must be factored-in is a premise for which not understanding might result in a more
compatible constituency.  To challenge structures one must be able to risk for,
experience, and internally recognize opportunities for freedom.  This is not possible when
mobility toward a resolution is prematurely applied or poorly clarified.  The ethical basis
from which social contract was so skillfully proposed specified a voluntary deferment—
this of course can be interpreted relatively.  Sacrificing inner-liberty as a matter of
"choice" can never be sincere when divestiture is fixed-in or viewed inevitable.  While
influence behind any communal ideal will vary, if extensive and complete enough it is
sure to cloud one's ability clearly to discriminate heartfelt objectives from the pull of
convention.
Social Filter
There is no way to conveniently anticipate what most closely composes hidden
dimensions of humanity, keeping in mind limitations of context.  No matter how
seemingly benign, consciousness contained by culture illusively and effectively conceals
alternative.  Dependence is incompletely recognizable on a personal level, co-habitation
an inevitable feature of life.  Boundaries impacting the self are not simply imposing, but
limiting because one's language is never adequate for carrying panoramic meaning.
Perspective, its breadth, is intimately a product of semantic sufficiency.  Certainty is
always straddled, forever attenuated by linguistic approximation.
This contextual posturing, at least, reflects closely Fromm's (1962) representation
of the social filter.  This instrument, while underscoring similarity, obviously was not
intended as a practicable semantic model pointing toward unity, cohesion and acceptance.
What Fromm's social filter implies most fundamentally is that humans remain altogether
unaware of experiences that have no corresponding cultural symbol.  Without potential
sign posts intuitions are afforded no worldly basis for recognition.  Cultural repression,
like that personal, means many things escape conscious preoccupation.  Whatever gets
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"filtered out" evades anticipation, appreciation and even avenues for influence (pp. 113-
22).
Fromm's image manages to capture best society's built-in auto limiting
mechanism.  Perceptual barriers override faith and initiative; one's ability to focus is
never completely divorced from realms of predictability.  This nonetheless does not mean
human drive for diversity must atrophy; efforts away from the familiar may never cease.
Fromm's awareness filters only attempt to highlight what normal conditions already
suggest—familiarity (being essential) is also a liability, an eventuality of life that elbows
out prospective insights.  Widespread inclusion coincides with an attrition of categories;
character-transforming opportunities get passed by where capacities are forever wedded
to social relevancy.
The filter, difficult to tangibly embrace, is best accepted as something that just is.
Its prime message is that ways of seeing and knowing cannot be conveniently contested,
simply because most alternatives are not recognizable; points for relevance stay in place
since not acknowledging them would be inconceivable.  For individualistic pursuit
difficulty concerns something beyond social imposition.  There is added the matter of,
not only how willing, but how (insightfully) able one is to dissect convention and
generate difference; this proposes responsibility beyond obvious choice.  Potency must
also include the margin of displacement one can trigger; structures have to be
recognizable as obstructions before the burden for challenge becomes conceivable.
A typical cultural idiosyncrasy Fromm posed for illustration was an American
(western) tendency to over-objectify reality, to emphasize heavily with language having
over being.  Given this perceptual bias nouns get awarded greater recognition than verbs.
What arrives to awareness concerns things more than process and mutation.  This
emphasis on materiality and possession does carry an obvious advantage that allows for
greater precision and clarity; intentions whether shortsighted or broad are afforded
definition, whatever their ultimate value they gain a discernible point for contemplation.
But along with this mindset less objective avenues are deemed, without genuine
consideration, less credible, so that for those with attitudes well woven into the fabric of
having, there is no other reality (p. 97).
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Unconscious forces nonetheless are not necessarily benign.  While not clear
preoccupying concerns they persist as subtle life dissatisfactions, faint impressions that a
wider-ranged understanding might be possible.  Language highlights specific areas, and
in so doing limits for others conscious acknowledgement.  "Our language just does not
give us the words which we need to describe many visceral experiences which do not fit
our scheme of thought" (p.117).  With fixed terms for exploring affective phenomena,
impressions often are that nothing can be thought or felt which cannot also be explained.
Psychoanalysis, for example, largely ignores art and poetry, but these are useful outlets
for obviating emotions in ways traditional semantic channels cannot equal, indispensable
tools that help fully characterize and congeal symbolic meaning.  Through such venues
consciousness can often transcend, perspective more fully shift, triggering opportunities
for change.
Language then is both indispensable and inadequate to convey meaning.
Semantic (contextual) utility gets accepted as cultural end, even when that uttered is
much less important than what is intended.  What underlies impression is only
approximated through words.  "The whole language contains an attitude of life...a frozen
expression of experiencing life in a certain way" (P. 118).
Suggestion
With images closely paralleling Hegel's ethical world, Cooley (1902) postulated a
similarly underdeveloped state of being, that of suggestion.  Put simply, suggestion
depicts an existence lacking any notable introspection; it features an awareness where
fundamental truths are never afforded critical evaluation.  Envisioned by Cooley was an
interpersonal entanglement, a common human pool where all personal and social
characteristics first emanate.  He did not regard suggestion merely as a temporary
condition to be wholly surmountable, rather it was felt to endure and permeate into most
normal behaviors (pp. 51-8).
Given this perspective, a clear distinction or contrast seems necessary between
suppression of will via suggestion and that particular to ethical world unity.  The
discrepancy to note is important because while Hegel viewed the ethical world as pure
and absolute, Cooley conceived a very fine line (in fact, vague interchange) between "the
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world of suggestion" and pure choice.  Implied for each construct was a necessary
overlap, with obscure demarcations each semantic tool, each term's usefulness for
approaching genuine expressions of self, were viewed as approximations, particularities
notwithstanding.
While in most respects similarities with Hegel's ethical world are clear,
suggestion is less an idea to convey "awareness lain dormant" but more a natural property
of human development, an essential platform from which all subsequent self-drive
depends.  Cooley for example included willful, not simply reflexive, action as a
representative feature of suggestion.  His reasoning was that in a world of inconsistencies
this is necessary; finding oneself bombarded with opposing suggestions, a rudimentary
decisiveness is essential in order to ever capture any value associated with choice (p. 54).
Choice then becomes an asset to behold, with it one is better able to distinguish
subjugation from free will.  It is "arrived at," however, only after relentless contradicting
suggestions batting for one's attention.  With compatibility between these ideas strong,
suggestions tend to foreshadow avenues that likely both characterize and color choice;
given this semantic proximity, one might be able to recognize the roots of their own
(suggestive) subjugation against prospects for free will uncovered through choice.  Both
symbolic constructs concern interpersonal connection, each involves a real world one
must both adjust to and potentially transcend.  Suggestion retains significance (next to
choice) because its image can support a premise that composite uniformity might
conceivably blossom into genuine inner-initiative.
The idea that a world of suggestion could actually permeate most reality, in any
case, underscores the depth whereby suggestive standards stay resolutely in place at the
expense of true choice.  Most cultural indications are that "options" are well outlined, so
that visions and ideals secure a conceivable basis only inasmuch they are acceptable.
This lack of inner potency, not ordinarily preoccupations, grows most overtly
(consciously) evident however in cases of bondage or slavery, when self-sacrifice is at it
utmost.  Under such circumstances direct authoritative force, much more than suggestive
manipulation, becomes the preferred mechanism for suppressing the will of another.
Irrespective of one's predicament, stark subjugation never corresponds directly
with slacks in initiative.  Where actions are not ambivalent but have a square target,
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suggestible people are often the most motivated ones, those most inspired through
influences of the subjugator.  One only need be reminded of the most successful
hypnotists, the effect of their ability to instill zeal and commitment into suggestible
subjects.  In cases where behavior is thoroughly controllable there is "…the feeling that
anything is possible while all scope of freedom is suppressed" (Paicheler, 1988, p. 204).
The "anything is possible" posturing is most clearly apparent in the world of the occult,
where devotion gets fueled through possessions or other suggestive absolutes.
Because hypnosis and possession are examples where criteria are narrow and
devotion zealous, it is tempting to equate suggestion with sheep-like behavior.  This
however is not always true; next to Hegel's ideal unity, suggestion can imply a turbulent
and unpredictable connection between the influence source and the influenced.  If an
intuitive void does persist, attributing deficits to an all-inclusive (ethical world) context at
least becomes more difficult; while suggestion may not clearly reveal self-directed
initiative it, in any event, conveys (symbolically) that a rudimentary sense of self has
managed to emerge.
Internalization and Identification
As has been emphasized through previous examples, fewer possibilities for
knowing stem from having fewer channels for inquiry.  A limited base from which to
project uniqueness equates with a narrowing of interests and decreased gravitation toward
novelty in general.  Enthusiasm may not be lost but incentive is often blocked by illusive
obstacles suppressing need to question.  Influence, nonetheless, does not depend on
coercion or even a direct presence.  Conversion is a concept useful for indicating cases
where the effects of influence persist after all overt pressures to conform are removed
(Blake and Mouton, 1961).  Conversion signifies lasting intrinsic modifications where
personal impulses to defy are buried or lost.  One for whom identification ties are the
stronger wishes to be like the source of influence, and so will be most pliable, easily
shifting personal disposition to parallel alluring contextual opportunities.  Those more
prone to internalize, less effectively recognizing they are objects of influence, are more
prone to cling steadfast to attitudes and customs well embedded and familiar (Kelman,
1958).  While similarities are strong these later concepts are most alike in that, in either
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case, self-initiative is relinquished—dismissed for attractions outside oneself or readily
converted via context.
Conceding to expectations well in place, where self-alienation gets firmly
established, is not generally perceived a burden.  Illusions of freedom persist; willful acts
for the most part are appreciated as voluntary, primarily because it feels right to be
accepted.  Agreement is simply a natural counterpart to security, where values stay clear
and avenues for dissent remain largely invisible.  Reassurances sealed through affiliation
serve as deceptively effective buffers, obscuring evidence of weakness for not having
fully matured.  To highlight the resilience and latitude of these impressions one only need
be reminded of the boredom and pain most adolescents experience when deprived of their
most intimate peer connections.  Only when reliable supports are gravely threatened will
the incompleteness of a true inner base land as a forefront concern.  Only when hope to
retain the fragile source from which one's identity seems to hinge crumbles will the self,
in all its superficiality, surface as overtly troubled.
Persona Mask
The persona is a provider, metaphorically speaking, of human characteristics
closely associated with internalization and identification; its coinciding mask is not
merely a mythical amusement to ponder since in many respects it is thought to embody or
"become" the person.  The persona is both a ubiquitous and essential boundary, it
functions as an effective buffer for anxieties connected with social uncertainties.  As a
psychological tool it has evolutionary relevance, creating a base for understanding,
compatibility, and so opportunities for human survival.
While enabling essential inclusion—with unspecified anxiety tied to most roles
upon which one's existence hinges—all is not perfect with the persona.  Communal
arrangements structured where connections get defined are often unstable, rarely rational
given the enormous appetite for human approval.  One significant feature to note is any
retreat behind a contemporary persona mask generally coincides with a release from fear.
With impulse for a common point to connect no weaker than in less technologically
developed societies, collective insecurity persists, propelling the drive toward a
contemporary mass identity.
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The persona's prime asset is it affirms a social seal-of-approval, an advantage
encouraging of consistency.  While blunting uncertainty, it also serves as an effective
channel to promote visibility.  Oftentimes when alone the mask can be dropped, but since
social expectations can easily outweigh private confidence this is not a sure thing.
Introspection may not always have an obvious social directive, but there may be little
personal incentive to see otherwise.  The point of course is that even in private the mask
can stay stable.  What appears to provide obvious gain from the outside (manners and
etiquette, for example) is often settled-for on the inside.  At its most extreme the self and
the mask are indistinguishable; values and expectations are as personal as they are
relational.
Given the great urgency in which most of the modern world operates, many
"truths" must be accepted without critical evaluation.  Too often unreliable explanations
are invited or simply settled for.  The modern mask, for these reasons, is (ironically) more
enduring than that for cohesive cultures, more completely split-off and isolated from
perpetual transition.  For the contemporary, it has become quite difficult to discern where
the ceremony begins or ends, whereas communally close, well-worn masks provide built-
in distinctions.  The persona for the modern, not being easily pinned-down, is not as
reliably turned on or off at will.  Cultural definition is neither clearly established nor
readily discarded.  The more demanding and unpredictable civilization becomes, the
more varied and adaptable the contemporary persona is expected to be (Jacobi, 1976, pp.
33-58).
Conformity
How does conformity so roundly predominate?  While there is no simple answer,
it is first essential in contemplating this issue never to overlook an overwhelming human
apprehension to "take-on" a public without the benefit of public support.  Conformity,
moreover, is not simply a logical response to better understand existing conditions, there
need be no motive or hope that someone else holds better insights.  Asch's (1952)
experiments demonstrated clearly that conformity involves something beyond drive for
certainty; longings to be "influenced" are not longings to find truth in any absolute sense.
But there is nonetheless an unmistakable (seemingly universal) compulsion to quell
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inner-doubt (pp. 468-72).  When personal confidence is shaky, apprehension to reveal
fragile impression outwardly is common; if "they" can never discover what it is I am
unsure of, there is no revealing the potential magnitude of my ignorance.
Where majority influence is able to effectively fuel cultural cohesion, personal
positioning will more comfortably parallel group perspective.  What’s more, by ducking
contradiction most avoid public debasement; uncertainties and premature inclinations can
then be conveniently attenuated.  While this “contextual adjusting” may not threaten
inner-belief directly, it does reduce opportunities for feedback.  When social possibilities
for self-evaluation are compromised self-confidence is well at risk.  Seeing no viable
avenue to overtly weigh inner beliefs against another's, one wonders whether personal
intuitions were ever worth defending in the first place.  Disappointed at prospects,
uniqueness is diminished before having ever been shared.  Not being valueless, but for
lack of appreciation, value gets compromised; with no sure (trusting) outlet for venting
tenuous concerns potential worth goes unaccounted for.
It seems however, no matter conformity's cost, its overall effect is not entirely
negative; zeroing in on restrictive features alone would be biased.  Baldwin (1911), for
example, respected social imitation as an essential attribute of human development, a
relational prerequisite necessary for any quality inner development ever to become
possible.  “By imitation he tries on the varied way of doing things and so learns his own
capacities and limitations…”(p. 21).  Allowing this premise, we must accept that over-
defining aspects of conformity are not merely shortsighted crutches and pitfalls but
necessary ingredients, precursors to eventual drives away from interpersonal domination.
Uniformity, no matter how seemingly ironic, may be indispensable for any subsequent,
more authentic inner orientations ever to crystallize.  It might be said, then, that the
barrier itself (conformity) is what makes possible one's very impetus to go beyond it.
But if socio-cultural constraints are in some sense necessary, alienation on the
whole must be anything but smooth or free of ambivalence.  On one side unity and
predictability are critical for spotting moral incompatibilities and blind alleys; on the
other cohesive energies can be trapping, invested into racism, for example, where
polarized (negative) thinking might effectively carve out one's fate.  Foucault (1977) was
a modern visionary who recognized how cultural normalization can serve as a very
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effective yardstick whereby individual variation is made more visible.  With standards
and beliefs firmly in place a base for all others to be compared is set.  Aside from
intention the net effect is to reveal specific gaps, the sharper exposure gained can then
more effectively outline (often minute and not particularly relevant) personal differences.
This is the signature cost (or consequence) of normalization: small differences are
exaggerated while stagnant similarities get overlooked (p.184).
To consider a tangible (familiar) example, whites in our society often resort to an
"open door" argument when comparing opportunities in life to those of minorities; many
hone in on an attitude that anyone simply need take-in the enormous possibilities
available in a free society.  With less insight of belonging to a composite group whites
are more apt to ignore their own similarities.  With little collective concern pressing or
apparent enough to ignite a quest for solidarity, "obvious" commonality fails to get
recognized.  As a majority, whites have considerable leverage consolidating difference in
general, they overlook a strong propensity to weigh collective dimensions reflexively,
single out aberrations, and normalize without conscious preoccupation.  A dominant
group is more prone to anticipate equal conditions because while subconsciously
focusing on incidental differences, next to minorities, they underestimate their own
overwhelming conglomerate privileges.
It often takes someone from a foreign land, the advantage of observing from afar,
to point-out the magnitude consensus pervades for one’s own culture.  Along this very
line of thinking can be appreciated Paicheler's (1988) image of “reciprocal concessions,”
(p.119) where illusive sacrifices for the sake of alikeness are regular, routine and,
presumably, very standard (culturally specific) human impulses.  But it is an entirely
different question whether one can actually recognize, or is willing to face up to, the
alikeness they so diligently adhere to.  With subtle group nuances amplified over gross,
deep, similarity even the smallest discrepancies preoccupy attention, least obvious are
inconsistencies stemming from within.
The singling out of difference becomes most evident in a society’s condemnation
of a deviant.  While removing an integral communal member may be rationalized for the
good and safety of everyone, it is also an effective way of maintaining socio-personal
balance.  Equilibrium-seeking movements however do not require extreme triggers.
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Regulation can be both broad and soft, where persons attach to norms without much
concern or interest.  With society well braced to anticipate aberrations, wayward actions
are easily identified; given these biased boundaries scrutiny can establish a distinctive
relation-relevant positioning.  With only public eccentricities getting circumscribed,
nonetheless, dissent that can be more effectively concealed will be less vulnerable to
framing, less apt to be branded deviant.
Since social assignment to roles is not particularly inviting, it seems a wonder
how the public-relevant face can be “made” so effectively against what feels more natural
in private.  If cultural imposition must be endured as somehow essential, but is also
attenuated by an effective buffer, what is it?  Often when conditions are “accepted” that
continue to contrast with inner belief, a common identity with society nonetheless ensues.
Source connections are often only vaguely recognizable, but one’s mindset may very well
be situated within Sennett's idea of a mythical social reality (in Paicheler, 1988, pp. 171-
3).  What this image demonstrates most plainly is that fundamental assumptions
concerning one’s communal world are based on general, holistic misperception.
A contemporary mythical social reality clearly thrives within the whirlwind of
today's expanding information glut.  With opinions to sift through unending most are
never granted sincere reflection.  An enormous division for one's attention may not seem
oppressive outright, but it does propel incentive to legitimize another’s position without
bothering to validate it.  Unchallenged, ideas poorly evaluated get nonetheless accepted;
against a wall of ambiguity agreement more easily precedes certainty.  Without the
necessary means for paying regard many assumptions go uninvestigated, so that influence
can congeal, prematurely to be taken for reality.
There is an analogy to draw here with Hegel's notion of essential connection,
where individuality is something valued, but only as a means to the greater end,
interdependence.  For the modern, individual choice is certainly not irrelevant either,
nonetheless, community pull is not likely removed enough from an original (ethical
world) connection for conditions to be fully recognized constraining.  Surrender is never
a conscious care or obstacle within Hegel's (premature) idealistic world, and the same
might as likely hold for Sennett's mythical social reality.  For the contemporary, where
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unity carries great usefulness, conformity will generally pass as a non-issue; benefits can
then be resoundingly embraced while costs get blissfully discounted.
When comparing these models, Sennett’s interpretation of conformity might be
dismissed as a cheap substitute for the utopian choice toward unity Hegel envisioned.
This inferior, but ever more typical "harmonious unity" has a dead-end.  Not only does it
stifle possibilities for broader individual choice, connections strengthened, through
unwitting compromise, actually impede possibilities for genuine communal unity ever
becoming a reality.  Hegel's vision of reconnecting with social roots only after tasting the
wisdom of true freedom through individuality gets substituted with a banal,
unenlightened, interpersonal fusion.
Part 2
Interpersonal Aspects of Alienation:
Compliance, Deviance, Autonomous Authority, Individuality and Psychosis
Introduction
Conformity is less a consequence of direct pressure but more a matter of fact; no
blatant agenda or devotion is necessary to maintain it.  While conformity gets obliged
more broad-brushed recognition, there are some distinct, objectively identifiable,
dimensions and paths where non-conformity can be clearly delineated.  The five
categories above are notable because, for the emerging self with respect to society, there
is a growing trend away from character dispositions as products of prevailing norms;
evidence of independence more generally speaking is another matter.  The most
profoundly estranged, ill prepared for freedom, may succumb to the greatest dependency.
Conversely, "participation" that parallels majority objectives may always correlate quite
poorly with genuine involvement.
What most keenly distinguishes those grooved into a cultural niche from their
contextually estranged counterparts is that multiple concessions underlie the demeanor of
virtually all behaviors.  With broadening fundamental divisions, however, there are
decreased opportunities to align attitudes and conduct directly alongside socially relevant
values.  The five broad groups considered signify growing departure, a progressive
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movement away from sincere connection, with each category (from left to right) a more
thorough interpersonal separation is suggested.
This series of categories, however, is in no way indicating an arrangement of
imperative stages the self must traverse toward its (non-sociological) realization.  It is
easy to recognize, for example, how those falling into psychosis might become more
dependent than others maintaining compliantly.  But the rationale for the general order
remains.  Relative to the psychotic, the compliant, while not fully accepted, better retain
qualities for maintaining a collective "face."  The psychotic conversely has few promising
avenues or clear motive for inclusion; with division much more absolute intrinsic purpose
woven into a world of belonging is less conceivable, or even recognizable.
Compliance
Why compliance?  In all fairness with this particular term (as a co-component of
interpersonal alienation) I risk misinterpretation.  Compliance after all seems an inferior
position, where inclusion denied continues to be sought, where appeasement to the will of
another is commonplace.  Those compliant brim with cognitive dissonance, and bear a
striking resemblance to the mainstream conforming majority.  Cognitive dissonance,
however, while no strong feature of individuality, is a psychological signpost that inner
and outer worlds are not well reconciled.  At their greatest discord, when normal
conformity is not an option, those compliant are forced into a “virtual exclusion” within
their own culture.  Ideals of acceptance may not depreciate in value but where inclusion
seems futile, where options are few, inner integrity becomes a more critical concern, with
attention to its fullness growing ever more critical.
While term ambiguity is expected, forcing some conceptual adjustments,
distinctions from other versions of conformity (internalization and identification) cannot
be ignored.  Steeped in negativity this idea requires a more careful operational approach
than aspects of alienation leaning clearly one direction or the other.  Accepting that the
compliant adhere well to norms is not enough, what must be factored in any
interpretation is where one’s sincerity lies.  Compliance, never a content posture, is a
middle ground for alienation—where social exclusion is still a very obvious concern but
where new, introspective avenues for addressing uncertainties are allowed to open, so
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that sources for meaning beckon from opposite (inner and outer) directions.
The compliant may always prefer full inclusion to the alternative, where rejection
is blatantly noticeable.  Attempts to blend in may be authentic, but they may also be basic
survival tactics where relational positioning does not penetrate and satisfy any inner
ideal.  With little actual (rewarding) involvement there intensifies the clear dissonance
between ones actions and the extent to which any action can be meaningfully influenced.
With growing distance there thrive fewer and fewer incentives for relinquishing residual,
aberrant inner beliefs.  With this “subtle divide” appreciated it is possible to understand
compliance in ways beyond the stereotypical subordination-of will image, because
whatever the interpersonal sacrifice, it can secure little personal reward.
Compliance then requires a unique kind of interpretation; it can certainly project
evidence of submission and weakness but what goes most unnoticed is the festering,
subdued rebellion often paralleling this.  “Compliance is conformity, but it is also a sly
means of resisting influence…It is public acceptance of a behavior or system of values
without any private commitment to them.” (Paicheler, 1988, p.137).  Since challenge is
not directly sought when "going with the flow" there appear few positions necessary to
defend.  Here arise occasions for personal-points-of-view to incubate without being
systematically refuted.  Where prevailing attitudes are tolerated only superficially, more
genuine impressions avoid getting cut down; peculiarity is less ruthlessly invaded by
majority opinion.  Compliance dissolves purpose for any lasting “inner-conformity”
because subtle, non-participatory positioning has become an alternative.
For the compliant then, uniqueness need not be put out to slaughter.  Not being in
demand one simply has little base for being deplored; no credible public platform to be
viewed a threat.  Social instruments for curbing self-definition and inflicting direct
psychological havoc grow weak.  With sparse human proximity and a disinterested public
forum ideas of "distinction" have chance to survive. Where peculiarities are not genuinely
welcome they can only be internalized.  This is the double-edged sword of compliance—
while marginal acceptance is painful distance proves an effective shelter for idiosyncrasy
to blossom without significant interference.  When personal interests escape direct
interpersonal invasions concerns can be addressed autobiographically.
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All this opportunity for the compliant, however, does not escape the cost of
settling for a more ambiguous identity, at least one less comforting than for those with a
more tangible basis for internalization and identification.  Concessions made in the social
arena still run discordant with deeper concerns and desires; this is the case whether one
can function without much disruption or gets clearly split-off from any true vestige of
acceptance.  Present in body but not humanly included many overtly “functional”
members of society are fundamentally discarded.  The “conformity” submitted to can
little more than outline pseudo boundaries compliantly abided by for portraying a “self.”
It is not uniqueness perpetuating estrangement as much as estranging conditions
containing good opportunities for expression.  But when scrutinizing encounters are
unavoidable, where variation can no longer be concealed, when through regular
interactions aberrations stand out and become focal points for criticism, compliance is no
longer a useful option.
Deviance
When the norm separates out idiosyncrasy it sparks a defensive stance in those
displaced.  A common response is to “separate-together” to create essential ground for
defense.  The foundation resulting provides a basis directly against the impenetrable
conditions set up by the (more comfortably accepted) majority.  The pariah group
becomes, in consequence, socially alienated from those generally included.  But because
defiance, to prove useful, requires group effort conformity reappears and is often
inescapable.  When non-conformity becomes one’s mission through solidarity with
similar dissenters, a path toward individuality is not well paved, and not likely to be
featured as a lasting solution for the problem of alienation.
It was Fromm’s (1941) general impression that the most estranged exhibit the
most destructiveness (pp.179-85).  Those oppressed, so heavily saddled, have the greatest
incentive to organize in order to gather strength; this is best illustrated with the early rise
of Nazism.  A telling irony to be noted—the most holistically excluded discover the
greatest willingness to conform for a cause.  What becomes most appealing is an
opportunity to meld into yet another incomplete subjugating realm, a seemingly essential
move to reap the retaliatory capacity only unity can provide.  All conciliatory dialogue
with the mainstream can be cut off; humiliating adjustments necessary to comply with the
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majority are quickly abandoned. Nonetheless, Self-interests become matters overt more
than introspective; where benefits are “collected” in public rather than in private.
Visibility is gained best by identifying with a minority voice, a cohort capable of
distancing one thoroughly from the most comprehensive or dominating reference group.
While there seems clear justification rejecting compliance as a worthy character
crutch, stark "mainstream" disconnection can be just as unsettling.  When experienced
firsthand the strongest impulse is to reconnect, to align with alternative bases without the
usual impediments and indifference.  But every dissenting subculture brews up its own
unique constraints.  With new, typically inviting, supports to situate around self-
definition remains well in danger of extinction.  For the deviant particularly, cohering for
a purpose can stifle uniqueness with great resolve.  Excluded from the majority and
enduring tremendous change, it becomes incredibly difficult to distinguish subservience
from yearns for compatibility.  Nor can be accurately weighed contentment vs. unease,
simply by considering one’s “freedom” to choose one defiant cohort standard over
another.  Only occasionally is an environment available where uniqueness can be
unleashed without reservation, rarely is there an opportunity that is not subsequently
muffled by a barrier.
Compliance is, just as well, something of a subdued rebellion or pseudo
withdraw, sure debasement stemming from one’s inability to unify.  Overt,
especially public, discrimination moreover, seems the surest way to “draw one out”
of a compliance mode.  When the cost of shielding one’s shame is recognized greater
than that to confront and reassess it, a critical point has been reached for the
problem of alienation.  When one crosses from communal self-estrangement, over to
conditions where social exclusion becomes a pressing reality, there must be faced
and endured a more visible disconnect.
While fundamental exclusion is a way of life for the compliant, in the case of the
deviant clear opposition means separation will never be casual.  Personal motivations that
can cohere with others fuel one's sense of purpose, where one gets backed and can more
comprehensively channel a target.  This “advantage” of course increases visibility, there
are sharper points a majority can stigmatize, resolve on one side only intensifies that on
the other.  If society could have one composite conviction it would be to reject, much like
any other organism might, features it does not recognize as its own.  Communal
adjustments, given this perspective, become “natural consequences” transpiring without
much regard for singular systems (persons).  Morals, in general, then get extracted and
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contained as matters to be weighed, only relative to the composite.  Specific exclusions
need not be graphic (nor even pressing) for norms to obscure and override individual
wishes, norms for which even the most inconsequential standards pass as ultimate truths.
Individuality vs. Autonomy
The question of individuality and its relationship to autonomy deserves some
attention.  It seems plausible that one might intend similar degrees of freedom with either
semantic application.  But it is also possible to understand autonomy as a less evolved
individuality, the suggestion that thought and action are afforded freedom of expression
while breadth of choice remains narrow.  Capacity to learn and adapt (never to be under
emphasized) must in any case be understood as something separable from growth.
Dominating, in order to reap rewards, for an autonomous person could very well be
appreciated as a utility, an asset, rather than a moral obstacle to overcome.  Influence
created by autonomous persons might also (effectively) fill a heavy void left by—now
less popular—authoritarian influences.  The consequence then is many with autonomy,
given our contemporary cultural development, have evolved an effective weapon against
those who are without it.  The leverage to exploit remains, nonetheless, a “respectable”
basis for inflating yearns and accessing independence in spite of consequences on
humanity, and whatever insults on it are necessary to maintain personal positioning.
Autonomous Authorities
It goes without saying that instead of most everybody being treated with dignity
in life, many in various cultures are exploited, they get treated as little more than some
means to someone else's end.  Whether by arrogance, ignorance or a combination, there
always seem to be a steady supply of those who attempt to arrange and settle people's
lives for them.  While this may seem a rarity (where inhumanity prevails over common
sense) it is actually rather common that many do treat others as if they were not credible
agents of their own actions.  This is not a standard feature for all relationships, or even
most encounters, but it is tellingly noticeable in the modern-day classroom; similar
attitudes are, as well, engrained into most communities—largely through patterns that
parallel familiar work environments.  In certain contexts, particularly with those held
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important, impressions are that "responsible influences" can demand respectful attention;
deservedly or not, some are simply handed a presence of influence, a privilege that can
effectively nullify another's possibilities for self-determination.
While subjugation of another need not be a prime initiative it is the consequence,
or impact, that is most relevant for this point.  Domination by exaggerating one's
importance is often internally justified as righteous—rationalized as acts of "good will"
for making certain others know just what to do, and, most especially, how to do it.
Because it is generally accepted in today's competitive world that a firm directive attitude
be commonplace, it is easier to imagine just how extensively points-of-view become
points for manipulation.  What gets deemed essential vs. insignificant are products of
matters handed-down, cultural mores familiar and embedded, direct offspring of greed
and hedonistic drive.
Autonomous Authorities benefit greatest from society by creating a respected
substitute for individuality, on the cost side however they remain fundamentally
dependent on their "subjects" to maintain this security.  There is a distinct “advantage”
consequently where Autonomous Authorities are in a class separate and set above the
deviate: instead of finding themselves systematically rejected or sealed-off, this "counter-
point" to individuality secures a firm niche in a consumption driven society.  Their
characteristics thrive where consumable demands continually redouble and needs always
seem to outstrip supplies of experts (Sennett, 1980, p. 45).
If Autonomous Authorities actually are deviates this is more a moral attribution
than cultural revulsion.  Lauded for their expertise they get respected but rarely
penetrated.  The mysterious awe they aspire grants them freedom to suppress the will of
another without worry of credible retaliation.  Weakness compounded from an implicit
embarrassment for lack of knowing, means assertions of "experts" get taken for granted.
Moral indignation against those in higher positions of esteem (to retaliate) has a
boomerang effect.  Striking out openly can be equivalent to the proverbial shooting
oneself in the foot, where repercussions carry in all directions, especially back on to
oneself.  In most contemporary (particularly westernized) venues experts have the final
word, this underhanded way of suppressing another presents a peculiar hurdle for the
problem of free will.
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Where the Autonomous Authority image is strong subjugation is always a
contrasting by-product; “collective individualizing” can then supercede the genuine
collective in all its deceptive arrogance.  While domination may be “expected” in a
general sense, the question of what seems the most effective, contemporarily preferred,
way to smother the will of another is the prime issue here.  According to Sennett, it is
shame that has most tellingly replaced outdated physical devices of discipline, now
reigning as the most prolific vehicles of authority in a capitalist society.  For the majority,
with limited resources, attributes and behaviors systematically severed from desires
unique assets tend to be shame-based.  The vulnerability of not understanding has
become the most powerful vehicle for controlling and extending influence, with a
virulence more effective than physical threat can manage (pp. 91-7).
The welling up of shame is an affliction generally kept private; when its principle
source is recognized but challenge is impossible, compliance or dual-form alienation is
the likely result.  Conversely, for those who can “negate” the impact, self-alienation
remains while subjugating effects are either carelessly dismissed or too deeply buried for
resentments to surface, for change shame must first be respected for what it is.  When this
is possible there can brew something palpable to spark a challenge, behind a
consciousness capable of recognizing signs of domination implicit in shame-based
attitudes and conduct.
The Autonomous Authority prospers against a backdrop where ways-of-operation
can evade effective scrutiny.  Seemingly "personalized" choice closely parallels a revered
cultural identity, autonomy is clearly cherished but the question remains whether there
are open viable avenues for most to actualize any "individualistic" ideal.  In too many
cases the idyllic end lingers attractive while egalitarian opportunities stay illusive.  The
general public may romanticize assertiveness and a strong ego, glorify self-sufficiency,
while paths outlined exclude more than provide opportunity.  Autonomous Authority
character attributes, for example, never escape tunnel-vision drives to compare, where
inner worth has to be weighed against another, and value is never considered something
beyond what competitive positioning can provide.
American culture then clearly extols autonomous characteristics, carving the way
for those most adept at actualizing an egocentric ideal, with visibility and influence is
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bolstered interpersonal value.  This image of authority (distinct from paternalistic) can be
exploiting without being perceived so.  Societal indicators underscore attributes for
success that are not easily debunked nor evaded.  When ideals impact powerfully enough
they can project self-determination where only free-floating selfish-determination exists
in truth.  When common manipulative influence passes for self-assurance opportunities to
dominate open up that manage to masquerade as leadership.  This is not just a peculiarity
of market dictates but general expectation.  "The constant increase of needs…makes us
dependent on these needs and on the people and institutions by whose help we attain
them." (Fromm, 1962, p. 65).
Drawing on Fromm's insights what is most clear is that resources for securing
inner constitution are social, every bit as much as self-appropriations.  The entire cultural
collective therefore might very well be getting led astray, where inimical character
qualities can roundly penetrate, be condoned without a single individual for whom to
assign blame.  Approval can be supported by a culturally neurotic premise: worth rests
more securely on acceptability than intrinsic value.  Autonomous Authorities sensing
their popular dominance can be rigid and uncompromising; expert influence, despite its
subjugating virulence carries captivating meaning in the eyes of others not so fortunate.
For “the rest” lacking their advantage, consumer culture creates conforming "subjects"
with self-alienating vices; even if very little commercial leverage is actualized, relevance
(still efficaciously commercialized) is not abandoned.  Even if not instilled through direct
personal relation attributes conveying such power are alluring, not simply as matters of
personal preference, but as attitudes clearly products of strong socio-personal ties.  To be
in society means being subject to particularities of society, while stark transition might
very often be inconceivable, roots are inescapable.  To view to world with "market
relevance" for the modern urbanite is never at first a choice.  It is a character disposition
consequence of circumstance, to be curbed or dismissed only after being introspectively
comprehended.
Buffered by their notorious impersonality modern bureaucracies are effective
facilitators of self-alienation.  The market may not coerce outright but it still manages to
outline available preferences; poor balance in decision-making (influence) is at the heart
of the matter.  “Concrete jungle” attitudes may vary incredibly but fundamental worth is
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something already decided.  Consumption mentality eclipses work relevance and so
pervades all of life; economic strength carries a metaphysical flavor so that imbalances
are dismissed as matters of fate more than challenges for change.  The "invisible hand" of
the market deals-out very tangible, critical human values, where moral appraisal gets
confused with, or is considered only subsequent to, commercial significance.  This, even
for the Autonomous Authorities themselves is unfortunate because apprehensions
commonly held about "giving away positioning" denies useful knowledge, that with
potential to create a mutual benefit situation.
If cultural props manage to support assuredness more effectively than inner moral,
confidence alone can be no good indicator of character virtue.  High status and position,
qualities afforded the most recognition, are those appropriated the greatest worth.  An
occupational setting where an autonomous type is likely to thrive well might be found,
among other places, somewhere in the natural sciences.  Here human expertise can
outweigh, and often overshadow subject matter value itself.  Meaningfulness is never
without some principle requirement for precision.  For any why to collect credibility it
must first be viewed, and so reduced, into a context of how.
Most who find it is necessary to function within a world of expertise are however
not themselves experts.  We might consider a (modernly common) situation of someone
being groomed for a position as a Microbiology Lab Assistant.  Duties handed down are
expected to be performed to perfection.  Once executed with precision and consistency
little else extraneous to the task is required.  Along with one's training there is typically
some explanation concerning utility and underlying purpose behind the function
performed.  There is also likely to be some rationale shared about the employer's
fundamental endeavor or business objective.
While the ultimate worth or importance of specific duties is not the issue,
considering the circumscribed expectation suggested, most companies (judging from their
job descriptions) are not in the "business" of fostering human growth.  By formulating
and upholding a certain niche where function and purpose are already well arranged,
one's role might be delimited with just a few words, i.e., "testing microbial populations
for transplant recipients.”  To pinpoint meaning, while measuring responsibility "to a
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science" seems rational, instruction suffers because exactness always supercedes human
factors that depend on uncertainty.
If relevance must be unequivocally reduced to something precise and empirically
formulated “understanding” cannot involve much more than interpretation.  What gets
rendered inappropriate is already decided.  Any aberrations spinning off the familiar
baseline are under immediate scrutiny.  The greatest consequence of most behaving in
ways directly expected of them is that experts can easily portray themselves as an
exclusive group; moreover, they gain distinction without the lesser informed believing
they have lost any choice to decide what they want.  For those less qualified, despite the
contextual hierarchy, an illusion of individuality is created within “tech” positions that
stoke perceptions of self-importance.
Actual time spent with more qualified employees may not be the most significant
consideration when attempting to estimate the level of sharing that occurs between
unequal positions.  Authorities clear in their intentions, but who expect little else, are
venerated but still stay fundamentally estranged from subordinates.  Against any
technician’s willingness to get clued-in must be weighed a respected scientist's
unwillingness to holistically enlighten.
What matters more, nonetheless, than the attitude of any superior are expectations
concerning one's "place" in the overall order of things.  Envy of the boss may linger
while status driving the resentment is being essentially handed over.  It is easier to fault
oneself than those with more clout, particularly when it is "given" that both play on a
field of equal opportunity.  In the minds of the less fortunate one did not try hard enough,
or had less God-given potential from the start.  When there is no point clear enough for
blame to be absorbed, felt inadequacies are more internalized, more completely
transformed into matters personal (Sennett, 1980, pp. 84-8).
So how do Autonomous Authorities then manage to acquire and retain power
without losing respect being depicted as exploiters?  If it is acceptable that esteem is not
always deserved we must assume it is somehow bequeathed.  Those of lesser status let
the more fortunate "have" knowledge and capability, projecting that it is theirs.  Status
established, alongside one's own want of it inspires awe, inasmuch as it does it is
disillusioning on both sides.  Subordination is certainly not pleasant but it is usual.  It is
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pseudo authentication of another’s capability that diminishes hope for inner authenticity,
particularly when those most revered remain largely devoid of reverence in kind for
others.
Individuality
The meaning of individual freedom is as difficult to put into words as it is to teach
others.  No simple recipes are conveniently delineated, packaged and provided.  Its most
critical attribute calls for human escape from the boundaries of formula.  Elusive to
describe, its essence becomes recognizable through flashes of inspiration.  Most idealized
representations that mark its virtues evade opportunities for tangible experience.  The old
adage that anticipation and expectation rarely equal reality is applicable here.  Keen
impressions, offshoots of positive intention, are indispensable but alone insufficient.
Sincerity of effort is too often overtaken where capacities get turned toward, and commit
to, interests that can only contain.
For those genuinely aspiring, individuality dissolves the very significance of ego.
Lust for emulation, aims to control or manipulate others to feed pride, is outside one's
priority of concerns.  The more thoroughly uniqueness can isolate selfish motives, the
more effectively conformity’s grasp can be measured and managed.  The more complete
one's self-integration, the weaker any potential compulsion to control others toward
personal ends.  The most liberated secure the greatest insight—harm spilling over on to
others is not separable from negatives impacted upon oneself.  Because fighting fire with
fire is not a featured weapon of the freedom-seeker the most inimical obstacle is to be
enveloped by another's ambitious rage, where exchange depreciates and reactivity
becomes more valued ammunition than reflection.  For those less eager to attack,
problems are not necessarily avoided but they are less likely to dissolve into a
stereotypical grudge match.  Responding in-kind becomes inviting only inasmuch one is
inclined to stoop to that level.  For individuality complexity is not expendable, shortcuts
to meaning are impossible.  But by staying sincere, the rational impetus and relevance of
one's positioning (from everyone else's perspective) is not always so clear.
Since meaningful intention requires considerable foresight, heartfelt moves that
shatter prevailing views may be mistaken for insincerity, or a lack of commitment to
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work toward visible goals.  The collective reaction, a common one, is partly a product of
guardedness, where for many there seem few conceivable ways to open up to novelty.
For the majority, the amount of time “invested” in relations may be adequate, but where
engagements are largely fixed, channels for reception remain narrow in consequence;
with points for interaction well established, incentives tolerating variation get more
repressed.
"Involvement" then must be recognized for its effectiveness to distance as well as
cohere.  The division aspect is largely tied to impulses built upon false assumptions.
Believing in a purpose is necessary but alone insufficient if one is not willing to respect a
given position.  Respect, to make this point, needs to be viewed from two angles.  While
most tend to emphasize the devotion side, the etiology of the term also features a
willingness to explore.  Respect, for its more precise interpretation must include one’s
determination to "look again and again" (Fromm, 1947, p. 107).  If process is to be
acknowledged essential in understanding, the payoff is a more comprehensive capacity to
mentally (re)-focus.  Acknowledging one has a certain desire and knowing the
circumstance by which a desire thrive are two different things.  Yearning for change and
recognizing the most favorable path for results are exclusive, but each essential for
exploring (respecting) possibilities with sincere impartiality.  Involvement, time and
energy invested can only be counterparts, never substitutes for such openness.  For
authenticity insights must carry phenomenological, not simply objective (prescriptive)
significance, so that credibility gets appreciated outside of venues that are already well
trampled.
Weak perspective, it must be noted, is not always attributable to an insufficient
foundation; equally plausible can be a deficit of commitment.  The value of novelty and
challenge may be obvious all the while motivation remains arrested, where the core from
which desire must spring gets lost in ambivalence.  When significance and a broader
purpose are sensed but still premature, inner drive and relevance can be arduous to
realize.  Because thought and action have such deterministic origins it is also difficult to
know with clarity if efforts in the name of independence actually coincide with genuine
moves.  Initiatives, to be lasting require considerable uprooting.  For anything short of
this, yearns for transcendence may persist while workable means remains illusive.  When
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being stripped of comforting familiarities more complex assertions are in order, those that
require more thorough a personal sacrifice.
Allure then is something separate and often obscuring of hardships necessary for
actuality; to paraphrase the famous Buddhist principle—opportunities for everything
become possible only when expecting nothing.  Value can be fully anticipated only after
transcendence allows adequate perspective for calculating worth.  With social
expectations panoramic and relentless, inner growth runs discordant with ensuring
harmony with others as a foremost priority.  The gem of freedom, its scope of
understanding, will not escape interpersonal compromise.  Even one of the most
optimistic voices on the subject of inner freedom never lost sight of its essential
sacrifices.  Rogers’ (1962) general impression was of a"...groping, ambivalent, confused
and uncertain movement into a new territory" (p. 220).  Seeing no shortcuts, Rogers
could fully appreciate how valuable insights are recognized only after personal biases get
challenged, are well dissected, and subsequently balanced with care.
Moustakas (1968) is another contemporary placing strong emphasis on authentic
individuality.  His "take" on human growth is as disrupting as it is enlightening.  In
supporting a premise, he openly shares the personal anguish involved cultivating his own,
personal integrity of self; he portrays a quest set against influence relentlessly intent to
dissuade.  Through his trials, he has fashioned a quality of purpose that personally
appropriates and challenges uninspired influence, a mindset committed to introspect in
search of worth, a sense of self drawn to unfamiliar territories, places that can best lure
and spark curiosity.  For Moustakas new experience is an indispensable counterpart to
learning.  Novel perspective provides entry into a wholly dissimilar worlds, those
separate from the familiar, but each always essential for any valuable contrast ever to be
possible.  Only through acknowledging opposition can one effectively underscore the
great disparity between an emerging self and obstacles of convention (pp. 1-13).
Given the open attitudes of these two humanistic theorists, it seems
reasonable to consider how discipline and individuality might be related.  It is fair to
assume that one's grounding of disciple will require sufficient supports, but
paradoxically not the kind of character qualities that can be readily imposed;
discipline, if ever to retain any semblance of inner relevance, can never be
effectively unearthed and implanted on another.
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Though quite dissimilar ways of looking at independence, discipline's most
valuable assets still depend on individualistic insights; the rationale being that
fundamental discipline might indirectly initiate improvement in self-discipline.  Instead
of a "molded" maturity that is something endured, character worth might more closely
align with common sense, where one adheres to it because it makes sense.  This implies,
for the underdeveloped self, that a more satisfying self-disposition might actually be
something thinkable.  This positioning seems essential in order to internalize the
importance of standing by a problematic or unpopular position.  Intrinsic beliefs
appreciated to contain intrinsic merit are interests worth defending; where this happens
discipline can become the axis where individualistic initiative joins personal value.
Psychosis and Dual-Alienation
To simply say a condition of self-alienation happens to exist is alone too broad,
significant meaning is arrived at only when clear discriminations are possible.  Self-
alienation varies depending on one's awareness and visceral experience of alienating
effects, as well as on the degree of consensus or collective acknowledgement (estranging
presence) more directly orchestrating one's fate.  As any lack of belonging grows more
noticeable effects directly on the self, as much as for one’s social "standing," become
more detrimental.  This is recognized most clearly in the immediate social arena, but it is
also increasingly obvious internally, particularly for those with no reliable identity
backdrop for a fragile sense of self to be measured and balanced.
With defenses weak and outlets few, for the dually estranged, the "best" avenue to
capture meaning is inward, as a sole alternative for security and self-assurance it is not
often ideal.  Because cognitive representations of the world are not satisfactorily
developed separation is more a consequence of circumstance than choice; discriminations
made are both impulsive and fragmented.  Assurance is depleted not simply due to
resentments over rejection but for the poor "sense of self" that so typically parallels social
estrangement; rejection might be humiliating but dislocation of identity can be downright
frightening.
Fear underlying insecurity, nonetheless, stems from an inner appearance of more
than any actual threat; skewed perceptions cloud discretion, credible intent suffers along
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with objective clarity.  For the psychotic with phobias growing increasingly nonspecific
only a diffuse discomfort remains.  In the social arena surfacing strongest are misplaced
fears.  Inner triggers never transcending impulse drive character qualities that can
address, at best, only partial truths.  Threat connected with the interpersonal realm is both
inflated and distorted, as one's guard remains securely in place even for the most common
exchanges (Mc Neil, 1970, pp. 37-42).
The full extent of one's relational predicament is something to be considered only
in retrospect; felt inadequacies are not merely situational, they get carried-over, unjustly
coloring social situations that generally pass as non-threatening.  But not all retreats are
capricious; pulling away from normality is never a move made in vain.  What cannot go
imprudently overlooked is the blessed ground estranged and psychotic states share with
individuality (Johnson, 1973, pp. 32, 72).  Self-absorption, even when defensively
provoked, has close association with keenness of insight.  Obscurity can rhyme with
innovation, particularly when novel impressions gain opportunity to become cognitive
fixtures.
Productivity and growth nonetheless are more often attenuated, how directly
depends upon the severity of one’s social phobias.  In too many cases one finds it
necessary to exist within without having ways to quell strong fears over being a part.
The most common preoccupation is that behavioral shields depended upon will get
discovered as mere props, those held necessary to protect inner recesses from a
scrutinizing invasion.  With the most fearsome negative situation ruminated continually
over, the worst possible (future) scenario gets cognitively magnified (pp. 75-6).  Nervous
concern becomes its own affliction; compulsively attended, idiosyncrasy graduates into
strangeness, mounting stigma and labels retain cultural overtones getting effectively
compounded within.  The self-condition—short of individuality and devoid of relational
supports—is a peculiar and disturbing estrangement where pain surrounding social
rejection gets projected onto oneself; this is the epitome of dual-form alienation: not
sufficiently prepared for independence one is left (without clout for escape) to the
dictates of circumstance.
With a strong inner absence gnawing, the prospect of finding purpose through
affiliation cannot be carelessly abandoned, even though avenues seem inaccessible.
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When one’s grasp on life is eroding the bitter experience of incompleteness demands
some hope for inclusion remain.  In spite of overwhelming trepidation (even with few
opportunities for securing integrity) the world is not entirely dispensable.  Fullness and
quality of acceptance, in any case, is difficult to gauge.  The schizoid character (a pre-
psychotic type), for example, does not simply play roles well, it is something of a
preoccupation.  "The exquisitely schizoidal person becomes...an amateur sociologist
studying his own operations...He sees himself as a puppet cued by social circumstances
which exact ritualized performances from him."(Johnson, 1973, p. 69).  There persists
however, irrespective of how well one can blend through acting, an affective deficit;
attention paid, no matter how skillfully crafted, contributes little beyond a superficial
front.  Encounters lack significance, not because they actually do, but because
significance is not reachable; whatever the greater value, not being addressable,
interpersonal assets can only be approximated, surfaces can be scratched but not
penetrated.
When meaning proves illusive, delving inward is a natural human response.
Cognitive realms are not merely mirrors of the world, they are critical foundations where
meaning secures permission.  External relevance is never conveniently detached but
importance can only be appreciated, measured and decided upon internally.
Understanding originates with commonality, but if roads for connection fragment or
disappear longings for certainty still thrive; the less ground is common, therefore, the
more “understanding” must depend on inner creation.
Moves away from credible social anchors for life, however, often amplify inner
felt disjunction; this creates an increased vulnerability to lose one’s very self-definition.
Obliterating a basis for identity, particularly a weak one, is likely to be equated with
death (p. 77).  When one finds only a frail relational boundary to brace against, and inner
integrity is seriously fractured, the threat of self-deprecation becomes as ominous as any
other social stigma overtly imposed.  The cost of being “noticed” when estranged from
within and without is high.  “Here…he concludes that his own intricate self is as different
from others as if he were a separate species.” (p. 76).
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Syntony
What, if any, ultimate value holistic unity might carry over to an objective reality
seems a reasonable question: is social alienation’s overcoming (reemergence) a
possibility, or will distinctive barriers, accepted ways of understanding always manage to
thwart genuine attempts?  Is a philosophical doctrine conceivable where individuality
will never be denied but a totality for life continues to be earnestly sought?  "Syntony
evolves from a broad valuing of the totality of life...The term...applies to the resonant,
non-conflicting perception of the infinite variety of all things that may relate to one's
being." (Chenault, 1966, pp. 146-7).  Along with a psychological emphasis that protects
freedom and openness, behind this image there is a broad resolution to reduce conflicting
perceptions, where it is held most beneficial to transcend idiosyncratic (dichotomous)
bases, and fuse into a grand unity.  This is a theoretical ideal advocating wholeness over
division; one touting the virtues of reentry after absolute separation has been a genuine
possibility (pp. 145-51).
By this model, it is presumable that those fully liberated from the chains of both
social conformity and self-separation can contextually "regress," choosing to coexist
within a less enlightened population, to commune and merge with those for whom
comparable avenues remain largely blocked.  The intimation is, of course, that the
liberated one can somehow function and thrive uncorrupted within the bounded,
manipulative realm of the non-liberated.
Liberation, for it to survive by this example, must be internal; any proposed
societal liberation is never a comparable “solution” for an innermost one.  Here, a special
acuity is thought to mature where concerns might actualize (be shared) without
enveloping and dissecting the direction of others.  For instance, one who reenters by way
of Syntony is not preoccupied with seducing another toward a parallel enlightenment.
One’s very “character example” where concern emanates naturally has no credible
substitute.  Opinions offered (when not motivated by desire) do not undergo metamorphic
change, where, otherwise, “grand” ideals might get curbed willingly, compromised for
benefit of creating a persuasive effect.  What is in the end “for another’s own good,” in
the mind of the individual who appreciates the scope of things, is never blatantly clear.
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Piloted instruction is known to carry deterministic overtones, in spite of potential value
recognized or one's sincerity of intent.  Deceptive ploys to trap someone into specific
channels of thought and action are known to result in unpredictable outcomes, the
combination of factors and potential negative outcomes of which have yet to be
imagined.
While “merging” is not beyond normal expectation (given human diversity) there
is an important point where Syntony can be distinguished from most any other unlikely
reunion, the best example—there is no value in playing the zealot; leadership obliged is
not something egotistically propelled.  The featured “restraint” of refusing to indulge in
popularity is no personal sacrifice; individuality is nothing to be sold, cultured via
indoctrination, not even received through grace as a gift.  Only after enduring unique
trials, those who have traveled a valuable enough path realize that nobody can find the
way except by experiencing it personally; those this fortunate must be able to both lend
support and sustain a reliable enough wisdom to leave “well enough" alone.
Underscoring the importance of reticence and ambiguity is in no way intending
that authentic behavior can only have a pseudo influence.  But because “those to behold”
refuse to bend to another’s wishes, they do not utilize a forceful communicative vehicle
for any great purpose to be amplified.  Genuine intentions are never one-dimensional in
scope or inflexible in position; moves to engage cannot be, in the same, moves to convert.
Involvement is neither covertly scheming nor overtly persuasive and indoctrinating;
motives in fact, transcending desire, are not corrupted at all by external preoccupation.
When the burden of primal interdependence is severed, there can be respected a quality
of reflection where external inconsistencies are no longer internally intrusive.  Here a
special stamina thrives, where concern for others can be purposefully shared without (at
the same time) being enlisting and directive.
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Chapter VII
Alienation and Education
Introduction
Here are some indispensable questions for education—how does avoiding
involvement impact student self-concept, is retreating from attention an effective escape
from irrepressible scrutiny.  How is “going visible” worth avoiding the alternative:
outright rejection, or worse, public humiliation; when simply “surviving well” what sort
of pedagogy might actually be taking place.  Do students grow distant to teachers through
influence similar to what is evidenced in highly structured, disciplined families.  If social
estrangement is a real and persistent fear, does preoccupation over favorable status
override educational relevance?
It seems unquestionable that when holding back in a classroom, opinions go
unrecognized; it remains an essential question though to what extent inner worth is
diminished when students fall silent.  Irrespective of whether inhibiting effects are
pronounced or lasting, by not sharing students sacrifice possibilities to prevailing
consensus, by not acting everything else can be dictated majority class opinion.
Considering pedagogical structures parallel the makeup of American culture, it is
widely accepted that most are personally responsible for their educational status,
achievements as much as shortcomings.  This is not just a benign societal peculiarity but
a point of vulnerability, where involvement is carefully screened to avoid potential shame
for knowing less, where a blatant resignation often takes hold to shield one’s actual
competence against expectations of an academic standard.  Much has to do with an
irrepressible emphasis on expertise; one need not be convinced of another’s superiority to
be evasive, only uncertain.
Emile Durkheim (1956) was among the first to outline a strong parallel between
societal aim and educational structure, leading the way toward a general
acknowledgement that educational norms are manifestations of market ideology (pp. 113-
34).  Any dip in self-value therefore must also be recognizable against this backdrop:
those least adaptable suffer communal, personal and educational (not simply commercial)
value.  General impressions draw upon commodity market images for securing meaning,
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this makes educational and economic worlds essentially inseparable; one need only
consider the capricious criteria students depend upon to justify choosing a major.
“Personal” choice, for example, is relentlessly probed for applicability before a
student can even test the water, decisions are expected without the necessary exposure.
The caliber of personal goals becomes the ultimate device for gauging just where another
stands.  While the issue itself is not irrelevant, it certainly seems the most common
inquiry students are faced with, the small talk impulsive as bringing up the weather with a
stranger—for students the modal conversation ice-breaker is, painfully, to find out
another’s major.  And while this may appear grossly insignificant, as students generally
tire of this question, rarely do they escape offering a response.
The point, naturally, underscores their readiness for having something to say.  To
take-on a position and affix it to one’s identity before gaining the essential, informed,
experience smacks of urgency.  There is then placed a “responsibility” to gauge value
prematurely, value afforded to clear-cut occupational positions, where impulses are
(before respecting significance) to juxtapose the most publicly esteemed image against
one's own.
If academic pursuits are toward science and technology prestige or usefulness is
not readily scrutinized.  For a host of other areas however (art, communications,
psychology, for example) a common reaction, either verbal or implied is “what do you
expect to do with that.”  Condescension surfaces, not simply where a field is felt not
serious, but where current employment opportunities are deemed mediocre.  Many feign
well an understanding of curricular worth while carelessly leaving out key features and
assets; others can better detect discrepancies between genuine attraction and market
cultivated images; decisions with any student are sure to change but for those maturing,
criteria supported are backed with sincerity.
Aside from specific goals and need for finding purpose in education, there are
some general character dispositions that could apply to most any student.  A quite
common occurrence is the toning down, or under representing of effort invested into
academic pursuits.  The very student who puts so much emphasis on decisiveness with
respect to curricular categories (their applicability) tends to be much less concerned about
specifics, investment into study and unique projects.  End rewards, being heavily
107
objectified, overshadow the means (learning experiences) behind grades and certificates.
But, realistically, when means get compromised so does the value and credibility attached
to effort.  Ambition may manage to endure but the accompanying strain and commitment
necessary for attaining results is, at least for most, kept under wraps.
Constructivism
The suspicion is...that knowledge and explanation might have more to do with the knower and the
explainer, than what is being known or explained:" Parmenides, 5th century B. C. (Candy, 1991, p. 253).
Another way to interpret this insight is that knowledge can never really be taught
but must be constructed.  A prime goal here is to point out the strong (multiform)
relationship between individuality, constructivism and self-directed education.  This
particular premise for education goes past the theoretical, aspectual model for
representing alienation.  Beyond the speculative arrangements there are some practical
(conceivable) paths that point the way out of constraint, or toward, if you will, an
authentic individuality.
Constructivism's significance for education lies primarily in its accent on
individual perspectives and experiences; it never loses sight of the relativity of
understanding, always impressing that what we learn, no matter the subject, gets
assembled from within.  This vision for education is an outgrowth of the empirical based
philosophies of John Locke and Immanuel Kant.  Both emphasized this inevitability for
acquiring knowledge—it must first filter through sense-based perception.  The essential
argument was that limitations and inconsistencies of our human senses disallow both
transmission and procurement of unequivocal knowledge.
To consider this philosophical premise for education seriously familiar attitudes
and styles (the most fundamental presumptions held regarding transfer of knowledge
from teacher to student) require re-framing.  Even in very objective endeavors, with math
or chemistry for example, learning becomes an exercise in discovery.  Simply looking at
answers and test scores does not generally contribute to any comprehension of how the
knowledge was essentially constructed.  For whatever is really "out there," the logic of
mathematical understanding only occurs "within" cognitive structures.  This thinking can
be frightening for educators sensing their authority and expertise being challenged.  The
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now familiar "Rush Limbaugh logic" that students' minds are hands-full-of-mush, for
perfection, only needing to be molded through strategic guidance is a position that,
considering this innovative paradigm for education, becomes vulnerable to grave
scrutiny.
Heightening its controversial complexion, constructivist strategies endorse a high
degree of self-direction; this "personalized" emphasis on learning draws heavily from
humanistic psychology.  Humanism is that discipline within the field of psychology
celebrating an inherent human drive toward spontaneity, natural environments and
independent thought.  Along with humanism, constructivist approaches for education
have been criticized for focusing too heavily on the individual (even though this criticism
grossly oversimplifies constructivism as a whole).  With a broader platform than
humanism attempts to encompass, the constructivist ideal emphasizes that knowledge
must be, not only negotiated and weighed, but regarded as inseparable from historical and
cultural contexts.
Over one hundred years ago it was Durkheim’s (1956, pp. 64-6) respected opinion
that, in their effort to construct knowledge, students never completely ignore existing
knowledge bases already in place, and remain very much influenced by legacies
established through earlier communal structures.  Appreciating more completely history’s
prolific effect on learning, Durkheim parted company with the celebrated Lockean
epistemology.  It was Locke’s contention was that, utilizing their tabla rasa—the
metaphorical blank slate upon which knowledge supposedly incurs—students are
uniquely accountable for the potential quality and viability of knowledge they can incur.
Durkheim also recognized self-determination as vital but saw this epistemological
attribute, when isolated, contextually naïve.  Intellectual development even on a very
personal level, he believed, effectively retains cultural characteristics, maxims inherited
from previous generations “…existing realities he cannot create, or destroy, or transform
at will.  He can act on them only to the extent that he has learned to understand them..."
(P. 166).
This "understanding" requires that students must somehow come face to face with
historical-cultural barriers implicit in the immediate environment they are expected to
learn in.  Gaining insightful knowledge by exposing the core features that define it does
109
not pass easily as trivial.  In most educational settings in-depth inquiry into historical,
cultural and ultimately intrinsic sources—those investigating why we learn what we
learn—is rarely encountered.  This is unfortunate since such approaches ignite curiosity
critical for unearthing seminal roots of meaning, thirst for inquiry necessary to dissect
grounded knowledge generally expected simply to be "known."  The notion of sparking
an essential wherewithal in students to contemplate predicated meaning and fundamental
constraint was a strong characteristic of Thomas Kuhn's (1981, pp. 354-57) model for
anticipatory schemes.  His strategy was to modify learning environments so students
could personally design, develop and direct unique activities.  It was within these
environments that schema's—autonomous cognitive frameworks—came to be
appreciated as natural tools for deciphering propositional (codified) contexts (Candy,
1991, p. 345).
By being better able to anticipate and uncover coded meanings students more
effectively discriminate between (and evaluate the legitimacy of) various opinions—
expert or otherwise.  The art of questioning the validity and value of accepted
interpretations for knowing (hermeneutics) goes beyond general ideas or familiar
explanations of learning.  Any “unraveling” of cultural and historic presumption also
creates intricate, unanticipated avenues for more inclusively considering knowledge.  If
an intellectual quest can be formed with intrigue, learning blossoms into something
beyond simply comprehension and acquisition of facts; epistemological critique (even
within restrictive curriculums) can foster opportunity in self-direction, heightened
enthusiasm, need for challenge, and a sense of indispensability that drives the
fundamental learning experience.
Habermas' Learning Styles
Jurgen Habermas, in his "knowledge and human interests," (1971) explored this
difficult issue regarding what kind of parameters actually constitute knowledge.  Prior to
his investigation this problem of delimiting epistemological foundations had been largely
ignored in education (Candy, 1991, p.275).  Habermas recognized three broad, separate,
areas of knowledge signified by distinct domains of pedagogical experience:
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Instrumental, communicative, and emancipatory styles of learning (Mezerow, 1991,
pp.72-89).
The most familiar style for education is overwhelmingly instrumental.  Within
this domain learning strategies and methods of investigation are defined by means-end
thinking guided by pre-set objectives.  Toward the issue of school reform, any sort of
"transformation" would be addressed and implemented by clearly defined proposals that
seek high predictability.  Instrumental learning borrows heavily from a "structuralist
metanarrative" which contends that, with knowledge principally deductive, legitimacy
depends upon set hypothesis, empirically tested, where credibility is secured through
linear, cause-effect relationships.  Characteristic of positivistic learning, the “act of
acquiring” knowledge is systematic and repetitive by approach.  Efforts are strategic and
task oriented, where problem solving generally parallels clearly established criteria
(Maxcey, 1991, pp. 13-14).
Rather than depicting an atmosphere dependent on technical rules and calculable
conditions, communicative learning style is an epistemological pursuit squarely
embedded in, and directly relevant to, inter-relational meaning.  Intellectual growth is a
by-product of consensual understanding; pedagogical value depends upon and emerges
along lines of this dynamic premise.  Ideally, students are never without opportunities to
question or challenge the validity of existing presumptions through participatory
discourse.  Usual conceptions and commonly held beliefs are matters for negotiation,
features that perpetually mutate along with the sharing of personal insights.  Because
communicative learning depends upon confrontation with the unfamiliar, intuition and
imagination are valuable assets for catalyzing explorative channels of interaction.
Educational progress becomes an outgrowth of challenging past assumptions against the
feasibility of alternative perspectives.  The likelihood of functioning well within
communicative contexts depends on maintaining a keen external focus and persistent
level of involvement.
In the case of emancipatory learning, Habermas recognized that through honest
self-inquiry students are able to fundamentally challenge existing, underlying
assumptions of knowledge.  For this style the move is toward a critical, novel exploration
straight into the learner's most rudimentary self-awareness.  Implicitly, there must involve
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a concerted effort to capture obscure insights that emanate only with genuine detachment
from worldly biases.  Moves to dissociate are not wholesale denials of external
credibility.  Distance, for perspective, is merely an attempt to approach taken-for-granted
possibilities as new and original.  When conceivable, this frees the self from familiar
constraints, illusive barriers that characterize uniform cognitive states.  Assuming a "de-
centered perspective" (Piaget, in Mezerow, 1991, p.147) is vital to properly scrutinize
socially situated biases, those persisting as external impediments to internal meaning.
The value in any unconventional approach toward learning is best recognized by
its effectiveness to prompt insight, in how well it assists in reworking information so it
can be inclusively understood.  Elusive, nonstandard, states are best actualized through
autobiographical expression, here critical inquiry secures a positioning that is not directly
distractible.  Even though self-report is likely based on social interactive encounters,
importance has little to do with specific observations or isolated facts.  Rather, the literary
recount turns into a virtual recreation (more than replication).  It is when language
generated tells more than could have possibly been anticipated that autobiography serves
best as an instrument for exploration.  Creative written expression, generated in solitude,
clarifies best how classroom discussion or textual material might be relevant on a
personal level; life tangible learning experiences are not lost, but matters contemplated in
private.  The gift of writing sits at the very heart of the emancipatory movement, carving
out an intense submergence into the unknown—exploration via self-inquiry—propelling
the drive for knowing.
Sternberg's Cognitive Types
The following categories represent cognitive learning types (which coincide very
evenly with Habermas' learning styles); only now pedagogic variation is being viewed
from a more personal, cognitively tangible perspective.  With respect to educational
reform, there will be little focus on instrumental approaches relative to the two other
classifications.  Intention is not to deny benefits associated with structured paths; in fact,
there are many students who identify closely with and thrive well within environments
where expectations are detailed and clearly forecasted.  Robert Sternberg, (1990, pp.18-
38) refers to this kind of learner as an executive type (metaphorically derived from the
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executive branch of government).  There are more than a few familiar occupations
highlighted by executive type characteristics: police officers, surgeons, lawyers, etc.  A
common thread that runs through each of these jobs is the necessity to function well by
an existing rule system.  Within school settings, executive types generally excel given
their affinity for facts and natural adaptability following set procedures.  With respect to
assignments they prefer explicit instruction to ambiguity, well-defined boundaries, and
clearly outlined objectives.
For the most part, schools already insist upon this well-worn learning approach.
Indeed, the greatest criticism of highly structured, instrumental styles is their
exclusiveness and overrepresentation.  This relentless drive for "certainty" (while benefits
are not denied) overshadows the legitimacy of all other systems.  A positivistic, truth-
seeking epistemology exists, by its very nature, at the expense of both communicative
and emancipatory learning.  Schools of present characteristically craft executive type
learners out of students who, otherwise, have no inherent inclination to embrace such an
approach.
Judicial types (again, the government metaphor) have an ingenuous propensity to
analyze existing structures and procedures; these are learners who operate best in an
environment that features dialectic exploration.  A natural inclination is to seek out
meanings embedded in and relevant to interpersonal critique.  They function most
effectively when evaluating the legitimacy of ideas and activities that have well-
developed and tangible forms; insights are most relevant, occupationally speaking, for a
program evaluator, consultant or movie critic.
Finally, the legislative type portrays best those who prefer to define their own
structures, those learning most effectively by creating personally relevant approaches.
This flexible tendency is most evident in the very earliest school experiences.  In later
years a more conforming character generally replaces the spontaneous one.  The
legislative type, with attributes difficult to repress, seeks outlets for uniqueness through
writing, policy-making, or possibly architecture, often in spite of cultural pressures to
embrace a more predictable niche.
Ironically, many executive types with occupations requiring precision and
orientation to detail—scientists, mechanics or engineers—tend to actually value
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legislative learning qualities.  Inventiveness and creative problem solving skills are
attributes often revered for fueling occupational innovation and advancement.  But when
schools are set-up to accommodate only executive type learners, other, poorly promoted,
character qualities weaken or fail to fully mature (p. 34).  Students often claim to have an
aptitude for science and yet demonstrate little, if any, scientific intuition; there may not
even be any pretension how to "experiment" without aid from a manual or pre-designed
model to follow.  The science fields do indeed attract a considerable number of executive
types; however, intuitive, legislative qualities well resected beyond the “training phase”
of school are rarely cultured or encouraged.
Attitudes in Self-Direction
Given the valuable insight gained by considering learning styles and learner types,
it seems that students possess (naturally) unique characteristics where aptitudes and
specific preferences must be gauged.  Communicative and emancipatory learning, for
example, cannot be afforded accurate definition using existing (instrumentally
recognized) scales.  The awareness of these styles, their significance emphasized by the
existing curriculum, is too weak.  Any commitment for school reform intent on
marshaling improvements by implementing stricter standards onto existing systems is, at
best, an oversimplified impulse-remedy for a complex, multifaceted problem.
Anticipating inevitable complications, it is important to ponder at least a couple reasons
why constructivist-oriented approaches deserve more rounded appreciation.
Because self-direction inherently implies greater freedom for students, concerned
(skeptical) educators and administrators often debunk such learning approaches as "free-
lance," equating virtually any proposal with "doing-your-own-thing."  The prime fear is
that letting go of the controls will terribly compromise program quality.  A common
vision is of the lazy instructor who gets manipulated by undisciplined students.  Even less
conservative voices tend to associate self-direction with non-conformity.  The prediction
is often that student actions will be unmanageable; that behavior will dissolve into
apathy, or worse, outspoken resistance (Brockett, 1994, pp. 6-10).
While the basis for these concerns may not be completely unwarranted, in most
schools there is a good chance that students are already resistant or apathetic in spite of
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existing controls.  The fact is much of the responsibility for fostering a successful self-
directed learning atmosphere falls directly on the teacher.  Research indicates that these
environments enable students to bloom when effectively implemented.  The key for
instructors is to form "learning partnerships" with the class.  Ideally, here, teachers will
recognize the importance of building relationships and focus on the needs and progress of
each pupil—rather than the more common, impersonal, style of attending (almost
exclusively) to the class as a whole (p. 9).
An equally strong misrepresentation of self-directed learning is that it encourages
isolation.  It is true that any initiative to direct one's own course must necessarily carry
room for disjunction.  Self-discovery, to be insightful, actually depends upon non-social,
inner-relevant "assertion."  Nevertheless, self-direction has more to do with creating and
subjectively evaluating than, simply and finally, immersing in virtues of solitude.  While
seeking inner-relevance may evoke some social distancing, unique traits do not mature
divorced from shared experience.  People can "succeed" in gaining freedom from others
and yet show little behavioral evidence of independence (Candy, 1991, p. 277).  Aside
from whatever relational positioning one finally aspires, in order to gain any true sense of
self-completion, need for reaction from others (be it positive or critical) is essential.
Even when not directly sought, the mere expectation of future recognition serves as a
convincing and powerful force to motivate.
Communicative Learning—Explored
Self-direction, therefore, aside from the necessary separation, retains distinct
social relevance.  With respect to education, in order to provide a comprehensive
approach, interpersonal elements cannot be readily relinquished.  In this way, self-
direction gets well contrasted with rugged individualism, where separation becomes an
essential end-in-itself.  A significant advantage ensuring a bountiful social terrain—for
mature independence—is the vast perspective for idea sharing it can enable.  Success in
self-direction depends on being able to select the most favorable, personally suited,
avenue to embrace.  This freedom, however, would be of marginal value if selection
availability got reduced to a very narrow band of choices.  A best choice can only be
made from the broadest range of (life-tangible) alternatives.
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Communicative features most vital always challenge arrangements where learning
tends to be conveniently “fitted” within well-embedded educational structures.  But most
never see beyond a very familiar idealistic vision, so that one's expressive opportunities
and likelihood of success depend upon (and get limited directly by) prevailing social
patterns.  Modern-day learning environments typically fall considerably short of
acknowledging, much less promoting, constructivist ideals.  Educational parameters not
prepared for critical, pragmatic malleability likely ignore, in fact, often unwittingly
encourage manipulation and interpersonal intrusion more than provide communicative
opportunity.
From a young age negotiation is a necessary tool in the never-ending search for
personal meaning.  Psychosocial attractions are at first manifestations of a "collective
monologue"—a pure state of undifferentiation from others—this, indicating social
immersion at its most absolute.  Collective monologue in children is often labeled as, and
mistaken for, egocentric speech (Vygotsky, 1986, pp. 232-4).  Reality here is established
and verified through the experience of others.  Ultimately, however, more exclusive
aspirations arise (ironically) through social need, "It is the 'collision' of our thought with
the thought of others that engenders doubt and calls for verification" (p.48).  The point
can be made from this, even after respecting the human impulse which sparks challenge;
desires have been sociologically carved before ever recognizable on a personal level.
Cultural triggers persist moreover; surviving considerably beyond proximal, familiar,
exchanges generally equated with social pressure.
Social fixtures, while not avoidable, can nonetheless be quite vulnerable to
challenge and reevaluation.   To consider an example, the person who is "well read" has
not simply internalized pre-digested constructs manufactured through outside sources.
Comprehension of reading material is a process where personal interpretations and
insights “transform” textual meaning (Brockett, 1991, pp. 135-37).  For an insightful
reader, conceivable avenues where self-relevant perspectives can be constructed are
drawn-in through a variety of contexts.  As a result, inner-complexity, or the examination
base during (and after) "knowledge gathering," becomes more intricate and detailed for
some.  Becoming well in-tune with ideas concerning one's (sociological) world can help
nurture a certain intrinsic confidence improving breath for personal choice.  By
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expanding contexts individual experience can be weighed against a greater variety of
prospects, to better judge where the most valuable interpretations might finally lie.
When allowing a constructivist's perspective, it is important that knowledge not
be mistaken for a deceptively controlling reality.  Introspective decisions always run the
risk of being falsely perceived as personal, since inner illusion can remain a strong
characteristic of cultural conviction.  When need for peer acceptance is amplified (most
notably in school) personal assumptions get more deeply affixed to those getting publicly
magnified.  These complex socially wedded realities are then increasingly distanced from
unvarnished spontaneity.  Impulses for inclusion and involvement naturally parallel
existing conditions, until everyday compromises become virtually imperceptible.
Student beliefs, padded by years, generally grow to parallel culturally prevailing
trends and norms.  The education setting in all likelihood perpetuates sacrifice of intrinsic
motivation, squelching most behaviors deemed not acceptable.  However it happens, it is
important to recognize that conformity (in school or otherwise) is not simply a
manifestation of passivity.  Competitive individualism, like many communally acquired
complexions, is a disposition regarded with great favor (Purpel, 1989).  Academic
environments routinely expound the virtues of competition—convictions held inevitably
at the expense of (alternatively) inspiring a sense of community.  This roundly instilled
conformity ingredient cannot be overlooked when figuring-in the behavioral strength of
hedonistic pursuit, that which students either unconsciously conceal or simply elect to
condone.  "This stress on individuality is by no means free of its conformist aspects—
indeed the culture demands that individuals compete, that they strive for winning over
and beating others; and that achievement in a broad but ultimately bounded realm
constitutes success." (P, 31).
Since normal can only be defined publicly "pluralistic ignorance" is something
commonplace.  Consensus legitimacy gets exaggerated while personal insights are
unfairly buried.  Performance by this circumstance is reduced in complexity, narrowed to
either typical or abnormal (Gusfield, 1979, P. 46).  Behaviors displayed within the
scholastic arena branded unacceptable are often those heavily laden with emotion.
Displays of disagreement, enthusiasm, anger and other overt exchanges between
classmates are for the most part strongly discouraged, even when essential in aiding
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understanding.  This seems particularly true during the middle years of schooling, when
there is least evidence of a curriculum that tolerates dialectic and inner revelation as
integral features of the pedagogy.
It would certainly be an oversimplification to say that since dynamic, direct
exchanges are intrinsically confrontational, rich rewarding learning environments could
never occur.  But educators shy away from promoting demonstrative encounters in class,
not only because they are difficult and unsettling, because self-regulating systems have
inherently low predictability.  Guided by impressions most familiar, school emphasizes
very little dialectic exchange—exchange potentially critical for communicative style
learning to ever occur.  What characterizes these classroom experiences most is that
students stay apathetic and uninvolved; allowing a personal perspective bias, with these
conditions evidenced firsthand, school instilled a powerful sensation that something was
fundamentally wrong.
This mass indifference in school remains, unfortunately, a common occurrence.
Even when teachers appear enthusiastic, with the subject interesting, students remain
distinctly unmoved; when a gregarious instructor pleads for participation, they pay lip
service.  Seeming to lack any sense of naturalness and spontaneity, understanding well
their limited roles, they adhere to them with striking consistency.  Something of course is
terribly wrong with this all-too-common scenario.  For instance, I do not believe that
students can remain uninvolved without feeling out of place; from all appearances when
they exhibit this familiar content-distance (an "excusable" strategy for playing dumb)
classroom tension typically mounts.  Students seem to brace themselves for fear of being
called on; time goes painfully slow in a silent classroom.
Considering low participation is not likely comfortable for students, why do they
persist with a stoic exterior?  Any reactive, demeaning explanation—reasoning that
students simply have nothing important to share—would be shortsighted.  Students have
no problem "sharing" insightful knowledge when it comes to take a test; at least, in most
cases, there is a strong desire not to fail.  So why can't they reveal themselves a fraction
as well (verbally) for the class as in most other natural setting?  More pointedly, why
does there appear to be such a wide discrepancy in performance or aptitude between
internally impressed and public expressions of knowledge?
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In order to strike at the heart of this dilemma it becomes necessary to consider an
essential question: why do American students care so little to reflect on (and decipher)
the apparent knowledge they possess?  Pondering this, I recalled a time when my niece
built up the courage to read a poem written for a large group of relatives before
thanksgiving dinner.  She had always been quite shy and I was proud of her courage.  She
spoke well and everyone let her know what a great job she did.  However, on my drive
home I had the sensation that something important was missing.  The poem shared was
genuinely creative; she used metaphors for intuitions that had broad but tangible
meanings.  Why did nobody bother to pick-apart some of these insightful (revealing)
representations?  Why was there no sharing of interpretations from personal experiences?
Simply telling her she did well was necessary but far from sufficient.  What seemed to be
missing was the “luxury” for her to sort through distinct, overt reactions in order to
uncover what effect her inspiration really had on the group.
When students exhibit outstanding academic performance they get flooded with
recognition, awe, and in some respects glorified.  For those who excel it can be an
undeniably rewarding experience; however, typically one short-lived.  All the seemingly
relevant questions: how and why—indicators of genuine interest—are rarely heard.  What
specifically about the paper stood out?  How did the idea arise?  What epistemological
process was important to support the idea?  Which features of the project were most
meaningful and gratifying?  Where are these kinds of questions in the classroom?  Why
do students (and teachers) rarely consider, or marginally attend, exploring with their class
intricacies of the "final" product?
When a thorough inquiry is excluded from the formula, implications are that high
grades and a few positive remarks serve as ample recognition.  Quite honestly, the quality
of this feedback may be sufficient for many students; but any felt reward and gratification
at this level wholly misses the point.  Without accompanying scrutiny, accomplishments
are not separable from the source by which appreciation originates.  To the extent this is
the case, achievement gets "personalized" while deeper meaning, staying unchallenged,
remains dormant.  Creative processes cease once the evaluation and appending comments
are received; the grade itself serves as the "final implement" which seals off any desire
for further investigation or class examination.
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Purpel (1989) feels that students have a responsibility to stand by their beliefs and
oppose passive acceptance of established (final) standards.  If for example we ask an
opinion on a movie, we don't want someone to merely tell us if it was good or bad.  When
not provided an opportunity to discover why this view might be worth considering we
have learned nothing (other than to rely on someone else's judgement). Unelaborated
opinion is useless since information shared offers points-of-view extending no basis for
weighing believability.  In order to exercise meaningful independence over external
circumstances, "It is critical that people be critical in order that they continue to be
critical" (132).
Paulo Frerie, much more blunt on this issue, maintains that any institutionalized
hindering of inquiry is an act of violence.  He recognizes need for transforming
psychological barriers and rectifying social misperception via unobtrusive, dialectic
exchange.  This kind of pedagogical approach naturally proposes an interactive
commitment signified by a genuine awareness and concern for others.  This appeal he
believes is essential to construct a vital epistemological foundation—one where the
significance of knowledge can be authentically (individually) interpreted.  Obstructions
that impede this human entitlement are firm attitudes which "changes students into
objects," alienating them from their own adjudication process (Finkel, 1995, pp. 87-96).
So, when students pose that familiar question, as they so commonly do—why am I
learning this stuff—comprehensive explanations are indispensable, with benefits well
overshadowing the usual, condescending, its-for-your-own-good type remark.
The message seems clear, a class atmosphere where shared experience and open
inquiry are commonplace will best foster conditions where students can question
"everydayness" and develop the ability to "possibilize" (Purpel, 1989, p.135).  It goes
without saying though, to contravene, students and teachers have considerable trouble
adopting this rarefied and unpredictable approach to learning.  Ideally, for this to become
reality there can be little established method to work with, virtually no end result to
conceive.  Rather, personal interpretations are willingly shared and subsequently
dissected; creative insight gets valued as a process more importantly than as a product.
What this means for academic growth is that spontaneous involvement never be
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minimized, that achievement be understandable and somehow weighed with significance
outside of venues ruled by exams and “final product” assignments.
The Relevance of Conflict
Communicative learning would never be complete without accompanying
conflict; but conflict need not be perceived as inherently destructive.  Actually, it is often
after such "consequence" where it first becomes possible, not simply for needs to get
heard, but so that they become understandable in the first place.  Conflict is a necessary
impetus for change.  In nature (thermodynamics) fluctuation is the norm; for social
systems stability is an artificial creation.  Only by allowing an unconstrained state to
resume, encouraging expression and open evaluation of ideas, can a natural social state of
equilibrium come to exist (Doll, 1987, p. 111).
Georg Simmel (1955, pp.15-19) was the first principle figure early in the
twentieth century to underscore the virtues of conflict, believing personal identities are
actually structured upon it.  He reasoned such encounters evoke strong sensitivities
creating conditions where insights and preferences can gain credibility, where uniqueness
might emerge through tangible venues.  Despite the turbulent and often uncomfortable
bother surrounding confrontation, to be provoked is to be provided opportunity for notice.
Brutal honesty may certainly spark retaliation, but these are also enabling annoyances.
Better to be in school where expressing personal conviction is a risky, than to smother
true feelings and endure the frustration of an unresponsive class.
When feelings are recognized publicly inner beliefs gain credibility; an
environment is suddenly opened where impressions on stirring issues can be explored
without reticence.  It is sometimes a brief, but often meaningful, window where it
becomes feasible to open honestly and disregard internalized socially biased constraints.
Opposition is a critical ingredient to initiate this drive for self-definition, with it true
personal characteristics surface; defensively inspired and inflamed, one finds incentive to
assume a stance that protects the self from external imposition and its most formidable
consequence—domination.
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Emancipatory learning—Explored
Emancipatory learning is always a function of self-reflection, it calls for a
pedagogic approach set clearly apart from role-relevance and technical boundaries
associated with the other two types and styles.  There are significant reasons why it is
necessary to respect emancipatory learning as clearly separate from communicative
educational contexts.  One key distinction to make is that social (particularly peer)
influences are pressing and durable; discursive learning environments improve skills by
improving interaction.  This may certainly be valuable for an ideal communicative
context, but the lure for acceptance and other pressures that inspire conforming behaviors
distract, lessening chance any dialectic ideal will ever become real.  Self-reflection is an
alternative to communication, managed successfully only through distancing.  This is
necessary for original insight into both past and existing social obstacles, so that well
engrained interpersonal distortions embedded through faulty learning can be evaluated
with clear impartiality.
Through the construction of autobiographical accounts, or what Brockett (1991,
p.137) refers to as "intensive journals," useful strategies emerge where language can be
utilized in ways dissociated from ordinary shared experience.  In a sense, there occurs a
concerted effort to disengage, the cost of which creates a sense of role-instability.  It is a
quest for meaning turned into a search for exposing the artificiality or fragility between
words and things.  Ultimate motive is to carve a unique perspective, to dissociate from
embedded voices and biases.  This idea is compatible to, and better conceived by, what
Heron (in Mezerow, 1991, p.149) refers to as "bracketing" or, holding certain beliefs in
check in order to project alternatives, this presumes a quality of wherewithal which can
(at least temporarily) separate conflicting frames of reference.
Because self-reflective approaches for learning threaten the very legitimacy of
established roles, a comprehensive appeal that goes to the heart of taken-for-granted
presumptions is difficult.  With any reflective search various paths must be considered;
alternative thinking is personal but clearly draws upon relational experience.  Ideally
attended, this would lead to possibilities stock-full with poignant meaning.  But becoming
proficient in this way also requires questioning fundamentally held assumptions.  The
shift is best recognized in what Mezerow (pp. 93-4) regards as "transformational learning
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experiences."  Here introspective inquiry gets tapped as a resource for recreating salient,
personally important scenarios; underlying impulses driving actions, once identifiable,
are qualities to be reassessed, along with the many false preconceptions stemming from
them.
There occurs, inevitably, with such development heightened inclusiveness;
keeping this in mind the whole move toward emancipation may seem, rather than
enlightening, instead, more like a plunge toward loneliness through introspection.
Nevertheless, for emancipatory learning to even be possible it must remain (at least
loosely) related with communicative learning.  Ideally, there would be an active, ongoing
comparison between personal and socially recognized meanings.  This might work,
unless of course interactive "sharing" turns into an exercise in sacrifice—acceptance
through approval—inviting a distorted perception of self-directed pursuits.  But since
character qualities stem from many cultural perspectives, the greater the number of
feasible views, more plentifully sprout opportunities to comprehend true intricacies of
one's own behavior.
Even when engaged in solitary quests, social bearings are difficult to ignore.  A
key ingredient for any successful emancipatory learning experience depends on one's
willingness, not so much to reconstruct, but to invent and record personally sentient
reactions to significant events.  Not yet anticipated problems of social importance can
then go into a process of being endlessly discovered and intrinsically evaluated.  The
legitimacy of previously held beliefs need not be carelessly discounted.  Whatever
(embellished or objective) situations students choose to rework, for the possible scenarios
to be considered, ideas will remain at least obscurely connected with cultural roots; both
tacit and tangible inquires depend upon them.
Through autobiographical inquiry students become both subject and object of
their work.  This widened perspective helps deepen the relevance of personal
observations, prompting the way to anticipate events as outside observers (teachers,
classmates, etc.) might actually see the world (Grumet, 1992, pp. 33-6).  Novel insights
carry this depth and relevance only where sharing is possible.  Communicative feedback
on one's autobiographical exploration might conceivably fuel a paradoxical "shared
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introspection" of truth; where from such vantage point, critical perspective gains potential
to de-center egocentric impulse.
Realistically though, information is only as valuable as the source from which it
emerges; recognizing this is crucial for appreciating that personal revelation does not
evade the need to tap into emotional reserves.  Rational approaches for "getting to the
bottom of" issues may never be enlightening in a way that can penetrate embedded
aesthetic roots.  Trying to maintain critical awareness can be especially challenging when
self-knowledge is sought through channels that are exclusively communicative.  While
interactive sources can catalyze successful self-directed functioning, social persuasion is
never far off—pressures to "discover" within preconceived patterns or style.  Any
manipulation disguised as apprenticeship (possibly mentor/protege' relationships) might
actually dissuade rather than contribute to an authentic emancipatory experience.
Habermas, after all, (in Mezerow, 1991, p. 88) considers emancipatory learning to be
completely incompatible with indoctrination.  To the extent this is true, schools of present
are likely modeled upon biased criteria, and elect to operate within naïve restraints.
Successful Reform—What Would It Take?
For any vision of school reform to actualize students need to have a comfortable
environment to prosper.  If not motivated to take greater responsibility, to become
actively involved in the improvement process, reforms can only be superficial
manipulations, measures estranged from the very heart of the pedagogical architecture.
When existing systems are deemed inadequate, or break down entirely, those held most
responsible scramble to assign blame; students in these predicaments become vulnerable
scapegoats.  The most familiar, knee-jerk reaction is to implement stricter controls.
Instituting "shake-ups," however, or some other quick fix "tightening of
standards," will not isolate problems at their source.  Stringent approaches inevitably
mutate and unravel once the scare-tactic-effect subsides.  When the basis for change is
really only a subtle variation on an existing structure, how can students be expected to
respond to (superficial) modifications as purposeful; why should they pretend to.  Any
"restructuring" patterned after traditional criteria will eventually be reabsorbed.
Whatever politically motivated, get-tough reform is honored by educational bureaucrats,
in the final evaluation, will be rejected through student ambivalence.  The fundamental
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truth so thoroughly (systematically) overlooked is students are more powerful victims
than administrators are reformers.
Since school reform surfaces as a concern in the first place to benefit students,
why isn't this obvious to the students themselves, why is it so problematic to involve
them in carving out the nature of their reform?  Again, this is not naive wishful thinking,
or some proposal for a "hands off," do-your-own-thing kind of environment.  The present
circumstance however shows that school gets strongly associated with "requirement;" this
perception likely stems from (both sensed and real) absence of power in the decision
making process.  When students are actually invited to shape standards, attitude shift can
be dramatic; with responsibility shared, compulsory attendance measures intended to
guard against low retention become non-issues.  With voices noticed students can then
step out of their restricting, other-defined, roles so that involvement gets appreciated
beyond an obligatory mindset; with worthless shackles removed school might then
become more than just a holding tank for playing a waiting game.
Acknowledging "school as requirement" something ubiquitous, let us again attend
the question of why students are so apprehensive asserting themselves, typically
resigning to be both uninvolved and uncomfortable.  It must first be made clear that
dialectic and autobiographical techniques are recondite modulation devices; they are not
cute diversions or add-ons to more systematic, evaluation structures already in place.
That's because the "instrument" they enable most particularly occurs at the human level.
Neither are these prescriptive packages for reform; there is no neat formula to simply
decipher and implement.  Such approaches culminate in performance changes difficult to
measure.  Even though improvement on standardized tests may indeed result this is not
the ultimate focus.
It is important when applying this perspective to appraise enthusiasm,
determination and genuine involvement as valuable, tangible indicators of student
progress.  If we are intuitively certain that one is improving but test scores show no
evidence of this, something is very likely inadequate about the test.  Dialectic and
autobiographical methods do not open avenues that can be orchestrated with precision
and gauged conclusively.  Importance exists, more appropriately, given their utility for
combating the problem of self-alienation so prevalent in most classrooms.
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In order to understand the effects of self-alienation with respect to school more
intimately consider some abominable and, unfortunately, common attitudes students
carry—school is an inevitability of life to get out of; work required is something to get
done (or out of the way).  When we study it's not our time.  As long as we pass we won't
"suffer" or be punished by getting held back.  The less we need to study the smarter we
are.  Getting by means getting away from.  Its only natural to dissociate from schoolwork
the same as we learned to detach in class, making sure to apply effort just short of, but
never beyond that instructed?  Who in their right mind would suggest these views
characterize quality learning opportunities?  Within most modern school settings if you
ask students, at various grade levels, if they look forward to going to class don't count on
a favorable reply.  Rather, expect reactions that reduce educational obligations to “ordeals
to endure”—something akin to jumping through a hoop, certainly there is something very
troubling about this picture.
In spite of obvious negative attitudes, if students found incentive to envision, and
orchestrate useful strategies for confronting feelings of detachment they would less likely
resort to dropping out.  If students could initiate real opportunities for freedom of
expression they might no longer be trapped.  Any good proposal intent on improving the
humanness of class surroundings demands genuine consideration.  Students are suffering
because they are caught in a paradox: they intuitively understand the benefits of learning,
while at the same time have strong impressions of school as constraining and oppressive.
Most however, I believe, really are looking for something better in life, respectful of
learning and genuinely longing for a forum where inner potential has chance to actualize.
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